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THE RIGHT TO CONTEST AI
Margot E. Kaminski * & Jennifer M. Urban**
Artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) is increasingly used to make important
decisions, from university admissions selections to loan determinations to
the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines. These uses of AI raise a host of
concerns about discrimination, accuracy, fairness, and accountability.
In the United States, recent proposals for regulating AI focus largely
on ex ante and systemic governance. This Article argues instead—or really, in addition—for an individual right to contest AI decisions, modeled on due process but adapted for the digital age. The European Union,
in fact, recognizes such a right, and a growing number of institutions
around the world now call for its establishment. This Article argues that
despite considerable differences between the United States and other countries, establishing the right to contest AI decisions here would be in keeping with a long tradition of due process theory.
This Article then ﬁlls a gap in the literature, establishing a theoretical scaffolding for discussing what a right to contest should look like in
practice. This Article establishes four contestation archetypes that should
serve as the bases of discussions of contestation both for the right to contest
AI and in other policy contexts. The contestation archetypes vary along
two axes: from contestation rules to standards and from emphasizing procedure to establishing substantive rights. This Article then discusses four
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depth consideration of the GDPR’s right to contestation for a U.S. audience. Finally, this Article integrates ﬁndings from these investigations to
develop normative and practical guidance for establishing a right to contest AI.
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INTRODUCTION
What appeals rights, if any, should people have when they are subjected to decision-making by artiﬁcial intelligence (AI)?1 The right to challenge decisions with signiﬁcant effects is a core principle of the rule of
1. For purposes of discussion, this Article uses “AI” decision-making as a shorthand
to refer to decision-making by algorithms more generally. Though computer scientists
would not consider all of the algorithms used for decision-making today to qualify as artiﬁcial intelligence, decision-making algorithms are rapidly growing more sophisticated. See,
e.g., Harry Surden, Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1305,
1307 (2019) (indicating the range of applications to which decision-making algorithms have
been applied, including playing chess and driving vehicles). More practically, even relatively
simple algorithms can be used to substitute, in whole or in part, for human decisionmaking—an extension, or replacement, of human intelligence. Id. at 1335 (“[Legal selfhelp systems] are simple expert systems—often in the form of chatbots—that provide ordinary users with answers to basic legal questions.”).
It is helpful, though, to consider the background behind the shorthand. An algorithm
is a computer program. E.g., David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing With the Data: What Legal
Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 653, 660–61 (2017).
There are many different kinds of algorithms of varying levels of autonomy and sophistication, some of which are collectively referred to as AI: These range from programs that automate ﬁelds of human expertise by mapping out what human experts know, to algorithms
that scan vast amounts of data, to algorithms that, effectively, create their own rules. See,
e.g., Surden, supra, at 1310 (dividing AI into (1) machine learning and (2) logical rules and
knowledge representation). Algorithmic decision-making entails using a computer program
to make a decision. This can mean taking the decision a computer program gives you as the
end result or relying on such a decision as a signiﬁcant element in human decision-making.
See, e.g., Algorithmic Accountability Act, S. 1108, 116th Cong. § 2(1) (2019) (deﬁning an
automated decision system as “a computational process . . . , that makes a decision or facilitates human decision making, that impacts consumers”).
The EU’s recently proposed Artiﬁcial Intelligence Act (AIA) similarly deﬁnes “AI” expansively. The draft AIA deﬁnes an “AI system” as “software that is developed with one or
more of the techniques and approaches listed in Annex I,” which include (a) machinelearning approaches, (b) logic- and knowledge-based approaches, and (c) statistical approaches, and that “can, for a given set of human-deﬁned objectives, generate outputs such
as content, predictions, recommendations, or decisions inﬂuencing the environments they
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law.2 Yet it is unclear how this principle will fare for signiﬁcant decisions
made or facilitated by AI.
As data collection and storage have become cheaper, processing has
become faster, and algorithms have become more complex and more effective at certain tasks, the use of AI in decision-making has increased. The
government and private sector now use algorithms to decide how to distribute welfare beneﬁts,3 whether to hire or ﬁre a person,4 whether expressive material should be removed from online platforms,5 whether to keep
people in prison,6 and more.7
The increasing use of AI to aid or substitute for human decisionmaking raises the question of what, if any, process should be afforded those
affected by these decisions.8 Machine decision-making can be technically
interact with.” European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (Artiﬁcial
Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, at tit. I art. 3(1), annex I,
COM (2021) 206 ﬁnal (Apr. 21, 2021).
2. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1975)
(“The Court has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some time before
a person is ﬁnally deprived of his property interests.” (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 557–58 (1974))).
3. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev.
1249, 1252 (2008) [hereinafter Citron, Technological Due Process]; see also Ryan Calo &
Danielle Keats Citron, The Automated Administrative State: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 70
Emory L.J. 797, 800–01 (2021); David Freeman Engstrom, Daniel E. Ho, Catherine M.
Sharkey & Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Government by Algorithm: Artiﬁcial Intelligence in
Federal Administrative Agencies 17 (2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content
/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5G5-X24E] (showcasing that
AI is used, among other things, in social welfare policy).
4. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, An Auditing Imperative for Automated Hiring Systems, 34
Harv. J.L. & Tech. 621, 631–33 (2021) [hereinafter Ajunwa, Auditing Imperative]; Ifeoma
Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 Cardozo L. Rev. 1671,
1694 (2020) [hereinafter Ajunwa, Paradox of Automation] (citing the example of Goldman
Sachs building an algorithmic model to automate all management, including hiring and
ﬁring); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 857,
860 (2017).
5. See Rory Van Loo, Federal Rules of Platform Procedure, 88 U. Chi. L. Rev. 829,
836–37 (2021) (discussing the processes used by technology platforms to resolve disputes);
infra notes 312–313 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 Emory L.J. 59, 61
(2017); Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Procurement as Policy: Administrative
Process for Machine Learning, 34 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 773, 776 (2019); Rebecca Wexler, Life,
Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 Stan. L.
Rev. 1343, 1348 (2018).
7. See, e.g., Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 6, at 784–85 (collecting examples of
government use of algorithmic decision-making, including determining veterans’ disability
compensation; evaluating teachers and determining their compensation; identifying children at risk of abuse or neglect; and allocating public services).
8. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process
for Automated Predictions, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 27 (2014) [hereinafter Citron & Pasquale,
Scored Society]; Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1281; Kate Crawford &
Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy
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inscrutable and thus difficult to contest; it is likely to become even less
scrutable as black-box machine-learning techniques expand.9 Humans
may exhibit an “automation bias” that creates overconﬁdence in machine
decisions,10 and an ensuing bias against challenges to those decisions.11 It
is unclear how challenges, especially if they come with meaningful process
rights, will affect the cost efficiencies that automated decision-making
promises to deliver. And if related due process protections such as transparency and notice are implemented badly or not at all, meaningful challenges will not be possible.
In the United States, regulatory proposals directed at algorithmic
decision-making have largely ignored calls for individual due process in
favor of system-wide regulation aimed at risk mitigation. To the extent
there has been convergence among recent U.S. policy proposals, it has
been on the need for systemic policy solutions, such as algorithmic impact
assessments or auditing, rather than an individual right to contest.12
Harms, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 93, 109 (2014); Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, 106 Va.
L. Rev. 611, 651 (2020) [hereinafter Huq, A Right to a Human Decision]; Aziz Z. Huq,
Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State, 105 Cornell L. Rev. 1875, 1905 (2020)
[hereinafter Huq, Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State].
9. See, e.g., Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of
the Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 New Media &
Soc’y 973, 981–82 (2016); Jenna Burrell, How the Machine ‘Thinks’: Understanding Opacity
in Machine Learning Algorithms, Big Data & Soc’y Jan.–June 2016, at 3 (“At the heart of
this challenge is an opacity that relates to the specific techniques used in machine learning.”);
Tal Zarsky, The Trouble With Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to Examine
Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making, 41 Sci. Tech. & Hum.
Values 118, 123–27 (2016) [hereinafter Zarsky, The Trouble With Algorithmic Decisions].
See generally Emre Bayamlıoğlu, Transparency of Automated Decisions in the GDPR: An
Attempt for Systemisation 17 (Jan. 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Bayamlıoğlu, Transparency of Automated Decisions]
(“Automated data-driven systems are distinguished by their complex, increasingly autonomous, and adaptive properties which render their technical dimension and inner workings
obscure to human cognition.”); Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev.
1503 [hereinafter Zarsky, Transparent Predictions] (describing the importance of transparency and advancing a framework for understanding the role it must play in AI regulation).
10. Lee A. Bygrave, Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data Protection
Directive and Automated Proﬁling, 17 Comput. L. & Sec. Rep. 17, 18 (2001) [hereinafter
Bygrave, Minding the Machine] (describing humans’ “automatic acceptance of the validity
of the decisions reached”); Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1271–72;
Isak Mendoza & Lee A. Bygrave, The Right Not to Be Subject to Automated Decisions Based
on Proﬁling, in EU Internet Law 77, 83 (Tatiani-Eleni Synodinou, Philippe Jougleux,
Christiana Markou & Thalia Prastitou eds., 2017) (“The Commission . . . expressed a fear
that such processes will cause humans to take for granted the validity of the decisions reached
and thereby reduce their own responsibilities to investigate and determine the matters
involved.”).
11. See, e.g., Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1271–72.
12. See, e.g., Algorithm Accountability Act of 2019, S. 1108, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R.
1655, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019) (explaining that the act, “[r]elating to establishing guidelines for government procurement and use of automated decision systems,”
attempts to establish “algorithmic accountability report[s]”); Margot E. Kaminski, Binary
Governance: Lessons From the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. Cal.
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In Europe, by contrast, regulators are taking a more holistic approach
to algorithmic decision-making. The European Union’s (EU) General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which went into effect in May 2018,
establishes a complex set of regulations of algorithmic decision-making
that span multiple contexts and sectors.13 The GDPR incorporates both
systemic governance measures and various individual rights for data subjects: transparency, notice, access, a right to object to processing, and, for
those subject to automated decision-making, the right to contest certain
decisions.14
Likewise, the Council of Europe has articulated a right to contest in
its amended data protection convention, known as Convention 108.15 The
Council of Europe is an international human rights organization that consists of all the EU Member States plus additional non-EU members.16 As of
now, forty countries have signed on to the amended Convention.17 Twelve
have ratiﬁed it.18 The amended Convention states that “[e]very individual
shall have a right[] . . . not to be subject to a decision signiﬁcantly affecting
him or her based solely on an automated processing of data without having
his or her views taken into consideration.”19 In 2020, the Council of Europe
adopted recommendations on AI, explaining that individuals should be

L. Rev. 1529, 1582–1607 (2019) [hereinafter Kaminski, Binary Governance] (contrasting
and analyzing the GDPR’s interplay between individual rights and collaborative
governance) [hereinafter Kaminski, Binary Governance]. But see California’s newly
enacted amendment to the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), the California Privacy
Rights Act (CPRA), which includes a provision on individual rights requiring the California
Privacy Protection Agency to issue
regulations governing access and opt‐out rights with respect to businesses’
use of automated decisionmaking technology, including proﬁling and requiring businesses’ response to access requests to include meaningful information about the logic involved in those decisionmaking processes, as
well as a description of the likely outcome of the process with respect to
the consumer.
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.185(16) (2020).
13. See Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119/1) 1 (EU) [hereinafter
GDPR]; Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1538–40 (comparing human and
algorithmic decision-making).
14. See GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(3).
15. Council of Eur., Convention 108+: Convention for the Protection of Individuals
With Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 15 (2018), https://rm.coe.int/
convention-108-convention-for-the-protection-of-individuals-with-regar/16808b36f1 [https:
//perma.cc/N5DL-DUWQ] [hereinafter Convention 108].
16. Id. at 34.
17. Modernisation of the Data Protection “Convention 108”, Council of Eur.,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/28-january-data-protection-day-factsheet [https://perma
.cc/C5FR-HK7E] (last visited July 31, 2021).
18. Italy, a 12th Ratiﬁcation for Convention 108+, Council of Eur. (July 8, 2021),
https://www.coe.int/en/web/data-protection/-/italy-a-12th-ratification-for-convention-10-1
[https://perma.cc/P8TN-7CCS].
19. Convention 108, supra note 15, art. 9(1)(a) (emphasis added).
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provided “effective means to contest relevant determinations and
decisions.”20
The right to contest AI is developing traction outside of Europe, too.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
an intergovernmental economic organization focused on stimulating
world trade, includes a right to contest in its recommendations on AI.21
The OECD’s recommendations have historically formed the basis of data
protection laws around the world, and its recommendations on AI are
likely to be similarly inﬂuential. Brazil’s comprehensive data protection
law, enacted in 2018, includes “the right to request a review of decisions
taken” by AI.22 In November 2020, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner
of Canada recommended that Canadian data privacy law be revised to include a right to contest AI decisions.23 The proposed amendments to
Quebec’s privacy law, Bill 64, include a limited right to contest.24
Despite this, few have given attention to the right to contest AI. Although the GDPR’s notice and transparency requirements for AI, especially the so-called “right to explanation,” have attracted a ﬂurry of scholarly analysis,25 contestation has not garnered as much attention.26 And although the right to contest is clearly established in the GDPR, regulators

20. Council of Eur., Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1 of the Committee of Ministers
to Member States on the Human Rights Impacts of Algorithmic Systems 9, 13 (2020)
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?docume
ntId=09000016809e1154 [https://perma.cc/YC8H-QUTX] [hereinafter Council of Eur.,
Recommendation on the Human Rights Impacts of Algorithmic Systems] (emphasis
added).
21. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, § 1.3.iv, OECD
Legal Instruments (May 5, 2019), https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/
OECD-LEGAL-0449 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
22. See General Personal Data Protection Act (LGPD), Law No. 13,709, art. 20, 2018,
https://lgpd-brazil.info/chapter_03/article_20 [https://perma.cc/W2CL-SFTW] (Braz.).
23. A Regulatory Framework for AI: Recommendations for PIPEDA Reform, Off. of the
Priv. Comm’r of Can., (Nov. 2020), https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/what-we-do/
consultations/completed-consultations/consultation-ai/reg-fw_202011/ [https://perma.cc/
E6ZL-AP7H]; see also Ignacio Cofone, Policy Proposals for PIPEDA Reform to Address
Artiﬁcial Intelligence Report, Off. of the Priv. Comm’r of Can. (Nov. 2020), https://www.priv.
gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/what-we-do/consultations/completed-consultations/consultation-ai
/pol-ai_202011/#fn190-rf [https://perma.cc/Y4MH-YZ2X] (last updated Nov. 12, 2020).
24. An Act to Modernize Legislative Provisions as Regards the Protection of Personal
Information, National Assembly of Québec, Bill 64, 102.12.1, 102.12.1(3) (2020) (Can.). In
addition to the right to correct erroneous information used to arrive at the decision, “[t]he
person concerned must be given the opportunity to submit observations to a member of the
personnel of the enterprise who is in a position to review the decision.” Id.
25. See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 189, 192 n.8 (2019) [hereinafter Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained] (citing literature).
26. A minority of European scholars have discussed contestation. See Mireille
Hildebrandt, Privacy as Protection of the Incomputable Self: From Agnostic to Agonistic
Machine Learning, 20 Theoretical Inquiries L. 83, 119–20 (2019) [hereinafter Hildebrandt,
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have yet to give meaningful guidance on what the right is or how it should
be implemented.
This Article takes on the right to contest, both descriptively and normatively. It seeks to ﬁll the gap in commentary and bridge the U.S. and EU
conversations. This Article is the ﬁrst to examine at length this right and
its content, and the ﬁrst to provide an in-depth analysis of the GDPR right
to contestation for a U.S. audience.27
This Article investigates a central question about regulating algorithmic decision-making: Should there be a right to contest AI decisions? In
investigating this question, this Article uncovers and ﬁlls a substantial gap
in the literature: the lack of a theoretical scaffolding for discussing contestation models for privatized process at speed and at scale. This Article
probes this question theoretically, considering reasons frequently given for
establishing individual due process rights, and comparatively, through indepth case studies of existing contestation systems. Ultimately, we ﬁnd
merit in the possibility of establishing a right to contest AI, including
Privacy as Protection of the Incomputable Self] (“This should result in testable and contestable decision-systems whose human overlords can be called to account, squarely facing the
legal interpretability problem and its relationship with the computer science interpretability
problem.”); Mireille Hildebrandt, The Dawn of a Critical Transparency Right for the
Proﬁling Era, in Digital Enlightenment Yearbook 2012, at 41, 49–54 (Jacques Bus Malcolm
Crompton, Mireille Hildebrandt & George Metakides eds., 2012); Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 10, at 93–94 (“[A] right of contest is not simply a matter of being able to say ‘stop’,
but is akin to a right of appeal . . . . [T]o be meaningful, it must set . . . an obligation to hear
and consider the merits of the appeal . . . . [I]t must additionally . . . provide . . . reasons for
the decision.”).
27. Related work that touches on the right to contest includes Emre Bayamlıoğlu,
Contesting Automated Decisions: A View of Transparency Implications, 4 Eur. Data Prot. L.
Rev. 433, 433–35 (2018) [hereinafter Bayamlıoğlu, Contesting Automated Decisions] (discussing transparency requirements for effective contestation of automated decisions from a
European perspective); Bayamlıoğlu, Transparency of Automated Decisions, supra note 9,
at 3–4, 17 (proposing a transparency framework from a European perspective); Huq, A
Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 621–22 (interpreting Article 22 as establishing
a “right to a human decision,” and rejecting such a right). In an article arguing for counterfactuals as a method of providing the “explanation” required by Recital 71 of the GDPR,
Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt, and Chris Russell assert that these explanatory counterfactuals could support contestation rights. Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Chris
Russell, Counterfactual Explanations Without Opening the Black Box: Automated
Decisions and the GDPR, 31 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 841, 872–78 (2018) [hereinafter Wachter et
al., Counterfactual Explanations Without Opening the Black Box].
Deirdre K. Mulligan and coauthors have developed the related concept of “contestable
design”: system design that encourages and allows iterative human engagement in a system’s
evolution and deployment. Contestable design operates differently from ex post contestation, but systems designed for contestability could support contestation in practice. See, e.g.,
Daniel Kluttz, Nitin Kohli & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Shaping Our Tools: Contestability as a
Means to Promote Responsible Algorithmic Decision Making in the Professions, in After the
Digital Tornado: Networks, Algorithms, Humanity 137, 139 (Kevin Webach ed., 2020);
Daniel N. Kluttz & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Automated Decision Support Technologies and the
Legal Profession, 34 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 861 (2019); Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 6,
at 791, 850–57.
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where decisions are made by private actors, to further due process values.
We consider how to design an effective right.
Part I introduces some of the challenges algorithmic decision-making
presents and how they might relate to contestation. Part II turns to
whether a right to contest AI decision-making can ﬁnd theoretical purchase. Part III looks to models for contestation, establishing four contestation archetypes and examining them in action through comparative case
studies. It considers the GDPR’s right to contest and Member State implementations of it, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s “notice-andtakedown” scheme for online copyright infringement, the Fair Credit
Billing Act’s contestation scheme for credit card charges, and the EU’s socalled “right to be forgotten.” Part IV integrates the ﬁndings from these
investigations and develops normative and practical guidance for designing a right to contest AI.
I. AI DECISION-MAKING: KNOWN PROBLEMS AND CONTESTATION
AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
On March 23, 2020, the International Baccalaureate Organization
(IBO) canceled spring exams in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.28
More than 170,000 students in nearly 150 countries29 faced this ﬁnal hurdle in their two-year journey toward an International Baccalaureate (IB)
Diploma—a credential used by universities around the world to determine
admissions and scholarships and to award advanced course credits.30 In
lieu of exams, the IBO chose to evaluate students using an algorithm.31
On July 6, the IBO released ﬁnal “grades,” to international uproar.32
Many students discovered that their grades were lower than they and their
28. May 2020 Examinations Will No Longer Be Held, Int’l Baccalaureate Org. (Mar.
23, 2020), https://www.ibo.org/news/news-about-the-ib/may-2020-examinations-will-no-longerbe-held/ [https://perma.cc/ZY2C-ALTU].
29. Int’l Baccalaureate Org., The IB Diploma Programme Final Statistical Bulletin:
May 2020 Assessment Session 2 (2020), https://www.ibo.org/contentassets/bc850970f4e54b
87828f83c7976a4db6/dp-statistical-bulletin-may-2020-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2EJ-HVUP].
30. University Admission, Int’l Baccalaureate Org., https://www.ibo.org/university-admission/ [https://perma.cc/84UW-GV6R] (last visited July 31, 2021).
31. The IBO announced that it would employ a “method that uses data, both historical
and from the present session, to arrive at the subject grades for each student,” and that it
would be “undertaking signiﬁcant data analysis” as part of “a rigorous process of due diligence in what is a truly unprecedented situation.” The Assessment and Awarding Model for
the Diploma Programme May 2020 Session, Int’l Baccalaureate Org. (May 13, 2020),
https://www.ibo.org/news/news-about-ib-schools/the-assessment-and-awarding-model-forthe-diploma-programme-may-2020-session/ [https://perma.cc/5TBD-36LP].
32. See, e.g., Anam Rizvi, International Baccalaureate Organisation Defends Awarding
Model After Backlash from Pupils, National (July 15, 2020), https://www.thenational.ae/
uae/education/international-baccalaureate-organisation-defends-awarding-model-after-back
lash-from-pupils-1.1049550/ [https://perma.cc/9F3H-FQHA]; Tom Simonite, Meet the
Secret Algorithm That’s Keeping Students Out of College, WIRED (July 10, 2020),
https://www.wired.com/story/algorithm-set-students-grades-altered-futures/ [https://perma
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teachers had expected.33 Some students lost scholarships, leaving them uncertain how to pay for college.34 Others feared losing provisional acceptances to universities.35 In Colorado, Isabel Castaneda’s “heart sank”
when she saw that she had failed a number of IB courses, including highlevel Spanish, her native language. In an interview, Castaneda said, “I
come from a low-income family—and my entire last two years were driven
by the goal of getting as many college credits as I could to save money on
school.”36
By July, more than 15,000 students and parents had signed an online
petition asserting that the magnitude of downgrading some students experienced “is . . . blatant evidence of a faulty algorithm.”37 The IBO updated grades based on feedback it received but ultimately stood by its
method.38 The IBO refused to answer questions about its system, which it
characterized as an “IB awarding model, not a computer-based algorithm.”39 The IBO stated, however, that the model combined completed
coursework, predictive grades, and “school context” to determine
grades.40
All of this only raised more red ﬂags for critics. It suggested that students from historically poorer-performing schools could be disadvantaged, and that this would disproportionately harm students from
.cc/QYM4-53EG] [hereinafter Simonite, Meet the Secret Algorithm] (last updated July 13,
2020).
33. Chan Ho-him, Number of Hong Kong Students With Perfect Scores in
International Baccalaureate Drops by Nearly a Third After Grading System Change Amid
Pandemic, S. China Morning Post (July 6, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/
education/article/3092054/number-hong-kong-students-perfect-scores-international/ [https:/
/perma.cc/NMX9-RV6T]; see also Simonite, Meet the Secret Algorithm, supra note 32 (explaining that several students received results much lower than expected by their teachers).
34. Simonite, Meet the Secret Algorithm, supra note 32.
35. Id.
36. Avi Asher-Schapiro, Global Exam Grading Algorithm Under Fire for Suspected
Bias, Reuters (July 21, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-tech-educationanalysis-trfn/global-exam-grading-algorithm-under-fire-for-suspected-bias-idUSKCN24M29L/
[https://perma.cc/7YLM-GNX2].
37. Ali Zagmout, Justice for May 2020 IB Graduates—Build a Better Future!
#IBSCANDAL, Change.org, https://www.change.org/p/international-baccalaureate-organ
isation-ibo-justice-for-may-2020-ib-graduates-build-a-better-future/ [https://perma.cc/952Z
-88VH] (last visited July 31, 2021).
38. Int’l Baccalaureate Org., supra note 29, at 1.
39. Awarding May 2020 Results Further Information, Int’l Baccalaureate Org. (Mar.
23, 2020), https://www.ibo.org/news/news-about-the-ib/awarding-may-2020-results-further
-information [https://perma.cc/57NU-WRVN]; see also Simonite, Meet the Secret Algorithm,
supra note 32. Experts considered this characterization implausible. See Asher-Schapiro,
supra note 36.
40. Asher-Schapiro, supra note 36. According to a statement by the IB, a “school’s own
record was built into the model,” which used “historical data to model predicted grade accuracy, as well as the record of the school to do better or worse on examinations compared
with coursework.” Id. For schools with little historical data, IB would use data pooled from
other schools. Simonite, Meet the Secret Algorithm, supra note 32.
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historically marginalized groups.41 Others pointed out that a school’s record might not be a reliable indicator for individual students, pointing to
the surprisingly large drops from predictive to ﬁnal grade that some students experienced as evidence that the statistical model was inaccurate for
individuals.42
At first, the IBO offered only its usual appeals route or for students to
retake exams in November, both of which require paying fees.43 On July 14,
the IBO relented to an extent by making changes to its appeals process.44 It
still did not release details about its decision-making system, leaving open
the question of how students and universities could know whether the
grading model was accurate or fair.45 A recent article in the Harvard Business
Review notes that “what the IBO could have done instead was offer
appellants the right to a human-led re-evaluation of anomalous grades,
specify what input data the appeal committee would focus on in reanalyzing
the case, and explain how the problem would be fixed.”46 In other words,
the IBO could have afforded students a right to contest the algorithm.
The IBO’s decision to use an algorithm to determine important outcomes for a class of people is far from uncommon today. Indeed, the IB
controversy is not the only algorithmic grading controversy. In England,
Wales, and Northern Ireland, officials also responded to the pandemic by
using an algorithm to grade the exams taken by university-bound students.47 Met with vehement opposition when nearly 40% of students were
assigned lower grades than predicted,48 education officials reverted to the
predicted grades.49
41. Asher-Schapiro, supra note 36. The student and parent petition expressed that the
average grades masked and exacerbated this inequality, arguing that “[t]he global average
has increased obviously due to the fact that certain schools around the world achieved much
higher grades than before.” Zagmout, supra note 37.
42. Scott Jaschik, What’s Wrong With This Year’s IB Scores?, Inside Higher Ed (July
13, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/2020/07/13/algorithmused-ib-scores-year-blamed-students-low-marks/ [https://perma.cc/6268-XH8E].
43. Simonite, Meet the Secret Algorithm, supra note 32.
44. Catherine Lough, Exclusive: IB ‘Concession’ Over Grade Appeals, Tes (July 14,
2020), https://www.tes.com/news/coronavirus-ib-concession-over-grades-welcomed-head
teachers [https://perma.cc/D7CK-RR22] (reporting that the IB changed its appeals process to “make[] it potentially easier for students to receive higher grades if they appeal
against their results”).
45. Theodoros Evgeniou, David R. Hardoon & Anton Ovchinnikov, What Happens
When AI Is Used to Set Grades?, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Aug. 13, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/08/
what-happens-when-ai-is-used-to-set-grades/ [https://perma.cc/E2PG-495U] (noting that,
“[s]ince the speciﬁcs of the program are not disclosed, all people can see are the results”).
46. Id.
47. A-Levels and GCSEs: How Did the Exam Algorithm Work?, BBC (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/explainers-53807730 [https://perma.cc/28WT-9YS5].
48. Matt Burgess, The Lessons We All Must Learn From the A-Levels Algorithm
Debacle, WIRED (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/gcse-results-alevelsalgorithm-explained [https://perma.cc/G8NE-4FMB].
49. A-Levels and GCSEs: How Did the Exam Algorithm Work?, supra note 47.
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As important as entrance-exam grades are for students, even more
signiﬁcant decisions are now entrusted to algorithms. Both the public and
private sectors now regularly delegate decision-making to AI. Algorithms
have been used for employment decisions,50 welfare beneﬁts distribution
and denials,51 policing,52 housing advertisements,53 risk assessments at
criminal sentencing,54 COVID-19 vaccine allocation,55 and home-healthcare resources,56 among many other applications.
The use of AI is growing in large part because of efficiency: AI can be
cheaper and faster than human decision-makers. It may be the only viable

50. Ajunwa, Auditing Imperative, supra note 4, at 631–40 (discussing “the business case
for the trend toward automated hiring,” noting “the potential for automated hiring systems
to be misused to produce unlawful employment discrimination,” and describing how such
systems may serve to mask employment discrimination or impede its detection”); Ajunwa,
Paradox of Automation, supra note 4, at 1692–704 (“The automation of the hiring process
represents a particularly important technological trend and one that requires greater legal
attention given its potential for employment discrimination.”); Kim, supra note 4, at 867–
92 (considering “the potential for data models to eliminate” bias in the workplace).
51. Calo & Citron, supra note 3, at 799–801 (explaining that Idaho and Michigan are
among the states whose agencies have used ﬂawed systems to automate public-beneﬁts determinations); Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1256 (recounting how
the Colorado Beneﬁts Management System issues thousands of incorrect eligibility determinations and beneﬁt calculations, many as a result of coding errors); Engstrom et al., supra
note 3, at 17 (explaining that a study of AI and machine learning in U.S. federal agencies
found social welfare agencies to have the fourth-highest number of use cases).
52. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Rise of Big Data Policing: Surveillance, Race, and
the Future of Law Enforcement 18–19 (2017) (“Big data tools create the potential for big
data policing.”).
53. See Charge of Discrimination, Facebook, FHEO No. 01-18-0323-8, slip op. ¶¶ 7–21
(Mar. 28, 2019) (alleging that Facebook “uses machine learning and other prediction techniques to classify and group users” to determine the audience for advertisements, including
housing advertisements).
54. See Eaglin, supra note 6, at 67–88 (observing that “the use of actuarial tools heralds
a new, data-centric approach to prediction in sentencing”); Mulligan & Bamberger, supra
note 6, at 776–77 (discussing a case involving the constitutionality of risk assessment software
used in sentencing in Wisconsin); Wexler, supra note 6, at 1348 (observing that “[r]isk assessment instruments are among the most controversial” automated criminal justice
technologies).
55. Noah Weiland, At a National Kickoff Event, Officials Plead With the Public to Get
Vaccinated, N.Y. Times (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/12/14/
world/covid-19-coronavirus/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Jan. 4,
2021) (“The ﬁve people were selected by an algorithm the hospital used to assign the ﬁrst
doses, the result of a survey hospital employees ﬁlled out that asked about age and underlying medical conditions.”); see also Lenny Bernstein, Lateshia Beachum & Hannah Knowles,
Stanford Apologizes for Coronavirus Vaccine Plan That Left Out Many Front-Line Doctors,
Wash. Post (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/12/18/stanford
-hospital-protest-covid-vaccine/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
56. See Erin McCormick, What Happened When a ‘Wildly Irrational’ Algorithm Made
Crucial Healthcare Decisions, Guardian (July 2, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2021/jul/02/algorithm-crucial-healthcare-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/67MDSDDP] (explaining the effects of an algorithm the state of Idaho created to apportion home
care assistance).
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option when decisions must be made at scale.57 Proponents also claim that
algorithms can be fairer, less biased, and more accurate than human decision-makers.58 Indeed, despite substantial evidence of mistakes and discriminatory effects,59 scholars see an unsettling tendency for humans to
place excessive trust in algorithmic decisions,60 tempted by what Paul
Schwartz in 1992 called the “seductive precision” of computational outputs.61 There is evidence that human decision-makers may rely more readily on these machine decisions, trusting them as “objective” even when
they are not.62
But AI is not always accurate and does not eliminate human bias. In
some cases, it instead obfuscates bias with layers of ostensibly objective
mathematical authority. As the IBO example and others illustrate, the use
of and reliance on AI for signiﬁcant decision-making raises a host of concerns about inaccuracy, bias, discrimination, and other errors. For example, an algorithm used to allocate home-health-care resources in multiple
U.S. states failed to take into account important aspects of patients’ situations—including whether they had diabetes or cerebral palsy—resulting
in cuts in care, “incalculable human suffering,” and death.63 An algorithm
used by the Mass General Brigham health system to estimate kidney func-

57. See, e.g., infra note 358 and accompanying text (describing how receiving millions
or billions of copyright takedown notices impels online service providers to implement algorithmic processing systems).
58. E.g., Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1,
7–8 (2018); Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 654 –55.
59. See, e.g., Virginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Proﬁle,
Police, and Punish the Poor 168 (2018) (describing machines’ lack of empathy); Andrew D.
Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 Ga. L. Rev. 109, 120–21 (2017) [hereinafter
Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing] (noting examples of algorithm use with discriminatory outcomes).
60. See Bygrave, Minding the Machine, supra note 10, at 18 (observing that the
European Commission expressed a fear that “the increasing automatisation of decisionmaking processes engenders automatic acceptance of the validity of the decisions reached
and a concomitant reduction in the investigatory and decisional responsibilities of humans”); Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1271–72 (observing that “[t]he
cognitive system’s engineering literature has found that human beings view automated systems as error-resistant” and that “[o]perators of automated systems tend to trust a computer’s answers”); Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 10, at 83 (“The Commission also
expressed anxieties over the quality of fully automated decision-making processes, more
speciﬁcally a fear that such processes will cause humans to take for granted the validity of
the decisions reached . . . .”).
61. Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of
the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 Hastings L.J. 1321, 1341–42 (1992) (attributing the computer’s “seductive precision” to “the difference between the power that
we attribute to it and its actual capacities and limitations”).
62. See Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1271–72 (“Studies show
that human beings rely on automated decisions even when they suspect system
malfunction.”).
63. McCormick, supra note 56.
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tion assigned Black people healthier scores than it assigned to white people with similar kidney function, leaving Black patients less likely to be
referred to a specialist or referred for a kidney transplant.64 Amazon’s AI
recruiting tool consistently assigned women a lower score than men.65 The
Apple Card’s creditworthiness algorithm has been accused of giving
women lower credit limits.66
Biased outcomes like these do not necessarily occur because the programmers of algorithms intend to discriminate. A study of facial recognition software led by an MIT researcher revealed that baked-in bias from
training data (that primarily included white men) predictably resulted in
biased decisions (that failed, for example, to accurately recognize Black
women).67 Algorithms also reﬂect programmer decisions that implicate
substantive values, from what model programmers choose to deploy to
how they choose to weigh false positives versus false negatives.68
These issues apply across a range of technologies. Concerns about inaccuracy, bias, and discrimination are raised even by relatively simple actuarial algorithms—that is, statistically derived algorithms—used in
criminal sentencing.69 More complex machine-learning algorithms present additional challenging and important questions about transparency
and accountability.70 Some black-box algorithms cannot be assessed ex
64. See Tom Simonite, How an Algorithm Blocked Kidney Transplants to Black
Patients, WIRED (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/how-algorithm-blockedkidney-transplants-black-patients/ [https://perma.cc/QYW5-Y8SS] [hereinafter Simonite,
Kidney Transplants]. If the same formula used for white patients had been used for Black
patients, a full third of Black patients—more than 700 people—would have had their kidney
disease classiﬁed into a more severe category. Id.
65. See Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool That Showed Bias
Against Women, Reuters (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazoncom-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-biasagainst-women-idUSKCN1MK08G/ [https://perma.cc/V2S7-K4FP] (“[Amazon’s system]
penalized resumes that included the word ‘women’s,’ as in ‘women’s chess club captain.’ ”).
66. See Evelina Nedlund, Apple Card Is Accused of Gender Bias. Here’s How That Can
Happen, CNN Bus. (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/12/business/applecard-gender-bias/index.html/ [https://perma.cc/4U6T-RH3X].
67. See Larry Hardesty, Study Finds Gender and Skin-Type Bias in Commercial
Artiﬁcial-Intelligence Systems, MIT (Feb. 11, 2018), https://news.mit.edu/2018/study-findsgender-skin-type-bias-artificial-intelligence-systems-0212/ [https://perma.cc/E36B-S5VP].
68. See generally U.S. Dept. of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Records, Computers and the
Rights of Citizens: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal
Data Systems 23 (1973) [hereinafter HEW Report] (“[A] serious[] consequence of putting
record keeping in the hands of a new class of data-processing specialists is that questions . . .
which involve issues of social policy are sometimes treated as if they were nothing more than
questions of efficient technique.”); Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1267
(describing programmers’ substantive policy decisions); Lehr & Ohm, supra note 1 (explaining how the beneﬁt and harm “of choosing certain machine-learning algorithms is the
ability to place weight on particular types of errors over others”).
69. Eaglin, supra note 6, at 68–69 n.41.
70. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 Calif.
L. Rev. 671, 674 (2016) [hereinafter Barocas & Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact]
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post to determine how decisions were made, and programming decisions
can distort policy in application.71
At the limit, AI decision-making can raise concerns about “what it
means to be human.”72 In both the private sector and public sector contexts, human decision-makers who might employ discretion, exercise compassion, tailor statistics to a speciﬁc application, or otherwise apply human
expertise are being removed from the decisional loop.73 Eliminating human decision-makers and replacing them with a machine arguably affects
the dignity of the human subject of the decision.74 As an attorney for
home-health-care patients whose care was cut by a new algorithmic
decision-making system put it, “we move into unsettling territory when we
rely solely upon algorithms and data to make determinations about health
care needs . . . . We reduce a person’s humanity to a number.”75
This is not to say that human decision-makers are necessarily better
than algorithms. The same human who introduces compassion can also
introduce error or bias. Human judges can be racist, both explicitly and
implicitly.76 Discrimination by a human decision-maker can also harm the
dignity of a human subject.
(“[B]ecause the mechanism through which data mining may disadvantage protected classes
is less obvious in cases of unintentional discrimination, the injustice may be harder to identify and address.”); Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 108 (describing the privacy risk that
may arise due to the complex nature of Big Data); Lehr & Ohm, supra note 1, at 705–10
(laying out the importance of increasing the explainability of AI to reduce potential bias);
Surden, supra note 1, at 1311–12 (“[A]lgorithms improve their performance by examining
more data and detecting additional patterns in that data that assist in making better automated decisions.”).
71. Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1261 (“Policy is often distorted
when programmers translate it into code.”).
72. Meg Leta Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop: Political Constructions of
Computer Automation and Personhood, 47 Soc. Stud. Sci. 216, 219 (2017) [hereinafter
Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop].
73. See, e.g., Rebecca Crootof, “Cyborg Justice” and the Risk of Technological-Legal
Lock-In, 119 Colum. L. Rev. Forum 233, 236 (2019) (comparing human judges to AI
judges); A. Michael Froomkin, Ian Kerr & Joelle Pineau, When AIs Outperform Doctors:
Confronting the Challenges of a Tort-Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning, 61 Ariz.
L. Rev. 33, 37 (2019) (“The reduction in new data from physicians . . . creates scenarios in
which we cannot rule out the risk that sub-optimal conclusions are reached.”); Mulligan &
Bamberger, supra note 6, at 791 (describing how the algorithmic system used in the food
stamp program resulted in a discriminatory effect).
74. See Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop, supra note 72, at 219 (“[T]echnological developments . . . signiﬁcantly challenge our notions of human agency and autonomy—what it means to be human in light of computational technical advances like artiﬁcial
intelligence and robotics.”); Zarsky, The Trouble With Algorithmic Decisions, supra note 9,
at 129 (“Algorithmic decision-making processes raise . . . autonomy-related concerns that
also involve harms to individual dignity.”).
75. McCormick, supra note 56.
76. E.g., Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking,
and Misremembering, 57 Duke L.J. 345, 350 (2007); Gregory Scott Parks, Judging Racism,
2012 Cardozo L. Rev. de novo 238, 246–47, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004078 [https://
perma.cc/8SYU-VDE3].
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The shift from human decision-making to AI or hybrid human–AI
decision-making systems, however, decisively alters the policy landscape
and thus affects social values.77 For example, instead of having a human
decision-maker evaluate a particular individual’s particular circumstances
ex post, AI decision-making shifts some policy decisions early on to the
designers of an algorithm.78 In some cases, other policy decisions are
shifted into the “black box” of the algorithm itself, unobservable, perhaps,
even to the designers. Who makes decisions and when decisions are made
change. This can affect both the outcome of decisions and accountability,
as parts of the decision-making process become less visible. If a doctor tells
you that you have not been recommended for a kidney transplant, you can
ask why. If AI makes the decision, you can’t (currently) ask the programmer to explain it.79 As one patient whose home health care was drastically
cut by an algorithm described, neither she nor the assessor who entered
her data into the program could “quite understand what was happening.”80 In addition, at least one third-party software vendor implementing
the algorithm simply didn’t know that the program improperly accounted
for diabetes, saying, “As far as we knew, we were doing it the right way.”81
A shift to AI decision-making can entail, too, a shift to categorically
based decisions instead of individual tailoring.82 This leads to what has been
referred to as the long-tail problem, where an AI inappropriately applies
familiar categories to “[w]eird stuff that’s hard to deal with.”83 For example, a self-driving car trained to avoid cats, dogs, and deer can be incapable
of “seeing” kangaroos in the road.84 The USDA’s fraud alert algorithm for
food stamps (SNAP) that was trained to alert for fraud on whole-number
77. See Meg Leta Jones, Ironies of Automation Law: Tying Policy Knots With Fair
Automation Practices Principles, 18 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 77, 88–92 (2015) (explaining
the inherent ﬂaws and risks of automation); see also Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra
note 12, at 1538–40 (comparing human and algorithmic decision-making).
78. See Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1261 (“Code writers also
interpret policy when they translate it from human language to computer code.”); Eaglin,
supra note 6, at 88 (“Tools constructed to estimate recidivism risk reﬂect numerous normative choices.”).
79. See generally Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 Yale L.J. 1972 (2017) (offering
a framework for conceptualizing and regulating machine evidence).
80. Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, Verge
(Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaidalgorithm-arkansas-cerebral-palsy/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
81. Id.
82. Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1538–40 (“Algorithmic decisionmaking can be biased, reﬂecting biased decisions made by programmers or historic discrimination baked into the data sets on which algorithms are trained.”); see also Crootof, supra
note 73, at 236.
83. Evan Ackerman, Autonomous Vehicles vs. Kangaroos: The Long Furry Tail of
Unlikely Events, IEEE Spectrum (July 5, 2017), https://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-that-think/
transportation/self-driving/autonomous-cars-vs-kangaroos-the-long-furry-tail-of-unlikelyevents [https://perma.cc/S27X-7RBT].
84. Id.
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purchases mistakenly identiﬁed fraud at Somali-American grocers, where
customers would purchase meat in whole-dollar amounts.85 In practice,
the “long tail” can include things that aren’t “weird” in any objective
sense: For example, the error-prone home-health-care allocation
algorithms failed to appropriately consider diabetes or cerebral palsy,
hardly outlier conditions.86
All this is to say: Human decision-making may not always be better
than AI decision-making. But AI decision-making raises distinct challenges
to our assumptions about how decision-making works, which in turn structure how we have regulated—or not regulated—decision-making.
A.

A Right to Contest AI Decisions

As the use of AI decision-making grows, so does the importance of
addressing the challenges it presents. As discussed below, some U.S. scholars have responded to these concerns with calls for updated procedural
and substantive protections designed to address the risks created by algorithmic decision-making.87 One tool for addressing bad AI decisions, gaining traction in some parts of the world but largely ignored in the United
States, is contestation: giving individuals affected by AI decisions the right
to challenge those decisions.
Contestation is a core mechanism for establishing and preserving justice in the Western adversarial tradition. The right takes many forms.
Sometimes it appears within a broader adversarial process. For example,
criminal defendants have the right to confront witnesses against them,88
and civil defendants have the right to reply to plaintiffs’ complaints and
make counter-claims. Sometimes it requires the provision of “some kind

85. H. Claire Brown, How an Algorithm Kicks Small Businesses Out of the Food Stamps
Program on Dubious Fraud Charges, Counter (Oct. 8, 2018), https://thecounter.org/usdaalgorithm-food-stamp-snap-fraud-small-businesses/ [https://perma.cc/UEZ7-GYFH]; Chris
McGann, Somali Grocers Lose Right to Use Food Stamps, Seattle PI (Apr. 8, 2002), https://
www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Somali-grocers-lose-right-to-use-food-stamps-1084746.php/
[https://perma.cc/GPZ3-LPLN].
86. See Lecher, supra note 80; McCormick, supra note 56.
87. See infra section I.D.
88. The right to confront witnesses was established in the United States by the Sixth
Amendment. As Frank R. Herrmann and Brownlow M. Speer establish, the confrontation
right extends back at least 1,500 years and probably much further. Frank R. Herrmann &
Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the
Confrontation Clause, 34 Va. J. Int’l L. 481, 483 (1994). It can be found in recognizable
form in legislation of Emperor Justinian from 539 CE. As the Supreme Court noted in Coy
v. Iowa, Acts 25:16, which was composed between the years 80 CE and 90 CE, quotes a Roman
general explaining that the prisoner Paul will be afforded customary Roman confrontation
rights. The same rights were described by Cicero in 70 BCE. Id. at 482–83. As noted infra
section II.A.1, it is also found in the even more ancient Book of Proverbs, which teaches,
“The one who ﬁrst states a case seems right, until the other comes and cross-examines.”
Proverbs 18:17 (NSRV).
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of” process for challenging a decision—i.e., the contestation itself, effected.89 Accordingly, in the United States, administrative decisions with
signiﬁcant effects may be subject to appeal and are generally subject to the
recipient’s “opportunity to be heard.”90 Similarly, in the EU, the “right to
be heard” is considered a fundamental principle that both Member States
and individual citizens are guaranteed.91 Nor are contestation rights conﬁned to government decisions. Both legislatures92 and courts93 have imposed some forms of contestation (and other due process) responsibilities
on private companies.
The right to contest decisions is central to due process. Indeed, other
familiar due process protections—for example, transparency, notice, and
the right to an impartial arbiter—serve to strengthen contestation rights.
The U.S. Constitution guarantees additional procedural protections for
individuals, such as the right to trial by jury, and the right to counsel, which
allow individuals to contest certain decisions with serious ramiﬁcations.94
As Part II discusses below, contestation, in turn, serves to perfect more substantive rights of fairness and justice and to preserve rule of law values, by

89. Friendly, supra note 2, at 1274.
90. See id. at 1273, 1300 n.168 (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970) (ruling that a hearing including an “effective opportunity to defend” is required before terminating welfare beneﬁts). A sufficient “opportunity to be
heard,” however, does not necessarily mean an evidentiary hearing. Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 340 (1976).
91. See, e.g., Marco Borraccetti, Fair Trial, Due Process and Rights of Defence in the
EU Legal Order, in The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Declaration to Binding
Instrument 95, 105–06 (Giacomo Di Federico ed., Springer 2011). Article 41 of the Charter
reads:
Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially,
fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices, and
agencies of the Union. This right includes: the right of every person to be
heard, before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken; . . . [and] the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, 403–04.
92. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018) (imposing
dispute resolution requirements for consumer credit bureaus); Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2018) (imposing copyright dispute resolution responsibilities on Internet intermediaries in return for a safe harbor from secondary copyright
liability).
93. See, e.g., Cotran v. Rollings Hudig Hall Int’l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412, 422 (Cal. 1998)
(noting that “good cause” in the context of an implied employment contract requires an
“appropriate investigation” that includes “notice of the claimed misconduct and a chance
for the employee to respond”); Silva v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 382, 387 (Ct. App.
1998) (“[I]nvestigative fairness contemplates listening to both sides and providing employees a fair opportunity to present their position and to correct or contradict relevant statements prejudicial to their case, without the procedural formalities of a trial.” (citing Cotran,
948 P.2d at 422)); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
543, 589 nn.184 –88, 590 nn.189–90 (2000) (collecting cases).
94. See Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 625–26.
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correcting errors, preventing or changing unjust outcomes, and enhancing the predictability and consistency of decisions. A fair contestation process can enhance the perceived legitimacy of both the law itself and
speciﬁc outcomes.95
Despite this robust tradition, U.S. policymakers have largely eschewed
individual rights in recently proposed laws governing AI, both at the state
and federal levels.96 By contrast, in the EU, the GDPR’s Article 22 established an individual “right to contest” an AI decision, and this model has
recently gained traction in Europe and beyond.
B.

The GDPR’s Right to Contestation

The GDPR’s right to contestation, though largely ignored in the
United States, has become increasingly inﬂuential in AI policy discussions
around the world. In Article 22, the GDPR dictates that for certain automated decisions, affected individuals must be provided “at least the right
to obtain human intervention . . . to express his or her point of view and
to contest the decision.”97
The GDPR applies to all processing of personal data (with some exceptions). Thus Article 22 applies to automated decisions that entail processing personal data, which includes many if not most AI decisions
affecting individuals on an individual level.98 The GDPR applies to both
the government and the private sector.99 The GDPR’s right to contestation,
95. On legitimacy, see generally E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology
of Procedural Justice (1988) (exploring the view that people may be more interested in
issues of process than issues of outcome); John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Procedural
Justice: A Psychological Analysis (1975) (offering objective data indicating that individuals
feel more fairly treated in adversarial than in inquisitorial proceedings).
96. See supra note 12.
97. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(3) (emphasis added).
98. For AI that is not subject to the GDPR, the European Commission has recently
proposed draft regulations on AI. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (Artiﬁcial
Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, § 1.2, COM (2021) 206
ﬁnal (Apr. 4, 2021), https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/proposal-regulationlaying-down-harmonised-rules-artiﬁcial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/AG8H-FLD2]; see
also Proposal for a Regulation on a European Approach for Artificial Intelligence, Legislative
Train, Eur. Parl. (June 24, 2021), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/themea-europe-ﬁt-for-the-digital-age/ﬁle-regulation-on-artiﬁcial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc
/5X7L-2FH6] (noting that regulations on AI have been proposed and will be discussed in
the European Parliament). The proposed regulations are built on risk mitigation, and do
not include a right to contest AI that does not involve processing personal data. They would
act, however, as an overlay on the GDPR, leaving its right to contest in place.
99. See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 13, arts. 3(1), 4(7)–(8) (stating that “[t]his Regulation
applies to the processing of personal data” by a “controller or processor in the Union” and
deﬁning both “controller” and “processor” to include a “legal person, public authority,
agency or other body”). The GDPR has law enforcement exceptions for things like journalism or public health research, for example. Id. art. 23(1) (providing exceptions where necessary to safeguard, among other things, national security, public security, public health
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therefore, at least in theory, establishes due process rights for individuals
signiﬁcantly affected by many uses of AI in the EU. There are, however,
several limits to its scope, discussed further below: It applies only to decisions that are “based solely on automated processing” and that have “signiﬁcant[]” effects on the concerned individual.100
The GDPR’s right to contestation has its origins in earlier European
laws on automated decision-making. Prior to Europe-wide efforts to harmonize data protection laws, a subset of European countries enacted these
laws as part of their data protection regimes. A French data protection law,
enacted in 1978, proscribed both governmental and private decisions
“based solely on any automatic processing of data which describes the proﬁle or personality of the citizen concerned.”101 French law established an
early version of algorithmic due process, stating that a “person shall be
entitled to . . . dispute the data and logic used in automatic processing, the
results of which are asserted against him.”102 Both the ﬁrst Spanish data
protection law and the ﬁrst Portuguese data protection law contained similar provisions.103
The 1995 EU-wide Data Protection Directive (Directive), which preceded the GDPR, contained the direct precursor to the GDPR’s right to
contestation: a little-known, little-used provision on “Automated individual decisions,” Article 15(2).104 It required, in most cases where automated
decision-making was permitted, that a company or a state adopt “suitable
measures to safeguard [a person’s] legitimate interests.”105 These “suitable
measures” included “arrangements allowing [a person] . . . to put his point

objectives). In general, the GDPR starts from broad coverage, limited by EU “competencies”
(meaning, it doesn’t cover things the EU itself cannot reach, such as national security), and
then carves out exceptions. This differs from U.S. sectoral privacy laws, which start by covering a particular type of information or a particular sector or particular entities.
100. Id. art. 22(1).
101. Loi 78-17 du 6. Janvier 1978 Relative à l’Informatique, aux Fichiers et aux Libertés,
Section 2 of the Act, translated in Data Protection in the European Community: the
Statutory Provisions (Spiros Simitis, Ulrich Dammann, Marita Körner-Dammann & AnneArendt eds., 1992); see also Bygrave, Minding the Machine, supra note 10, at 17 n.2.
102. Loi 78-17 du 6. Janvier 1978, § 3 (emphasis added).
103. Bygrave, Minding the Machine, supra note 10, at 17 n.3; see also Art. 12 of ﬁrst
Spanish law (Ley organica 5/1992 de 29. De octubre 1992, de Regulacion del Tratamiento
Automatizado de los Datos de Caracter Personal; replaced and repealed by Law 15/1999 of
13.12.1999); Art. 16 of Portuguese data protection law (Lei. No. 10/91 de 12. De Abril 1991,
da Proteccao de Dados Pessoais face a Informatica), replaced and repealed by Law no.
67/98 of 26.10.1998.
104. Council Directive 95/46, art. 15, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 43 (EC) [hereinafter DPD].
105. Id. arts. 15(2)(a), 15(2)(b). The one case in which an automated decision was permitted but no suitable safeguards were required was when a data subject’s request for entering into a contract had been satisﬁed (meaning, there was a positive outcome for the data
subject). See DPD, supra note 104, art. 15(2)(a); Bygrave, Minding the Machine, supra note
10, at 21.
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of view” to the entity using automated decision-making.106 Article 15, however, lacked the GDPR’s explicit mention of a “right . . . to contest the
decision.”107
Lee Bygrave has noted that the Directive’s Article 15 had very little
effect on the ground.108 Article 15 applied only when “a large number of
conditions [were] satisﬁed.”109 Moreover, the Directive did not have direct
effect as law, and Member State implementation of Article 15 arguably
weakened it.110 Some Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, and others) implemented Article 15 as a prohibition on algorithmic decisionmaking; others, like the United Kingdom, implemented it as a right to opt
out of algorithmic decision-making.111 The opt-out approach put the onus
on individuals, few of whom invoked the right.112 Thus Article 15, in practice, became according to Bygrave a “second-class data protection right . . .
rarely enforced, poorly understood and easily circumvented.”113
Article 22 of the GDPR supersedes the Directive’s Article 15. Though
the two provisions exhibit strong similarities, the GDPR’s Article 22 appears to provide “broader, stronger, and deeper” protections than the
Directive’s Article 15.114 One of the ways in which Article 22 is deeper—
that is, provides more protections—than Article 15 is that it includes not
just a right to express one’s view, but a right to contest an automated
decision.
Like its predecessor, the GDPR makes the right to contestation available only in limited circumstances. The right arises only in cases in which
“solely” algorithmic decisions have legal or “similarly signiﬁcant[]” effects
on data subjects.115 Elsewhere, one of us has discussed these restrictions in
106. DPD, supra note 104, art. 15(2)(a) (emphasis added).
107. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(3).
108. Bygrave describes it as “[a]ll dressed up but nowhere to go,” and a “house of
cards.” Bygrave, Minding the Machine, supra note 10, at 21.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 17–18 (“[Article 15] directs each EU Member State to confer on persons
a right to prevent them being subjected to such decision making. Hence, a legally adequate
implementation of Art.15(1) may occur when national legislators simply provide persons
with the opportunity to exercise such a right.”).
111. Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a Right to Explanation
of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation,
7 Int’l Data Priv. L. 76, 94 –95 (2017) [hereinafter Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation
of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist].
112. Id. at 95 (“If Article 22 is interpreted as a right to object, automated decisionmaking is restricted only to cases in which the data subject actively objects.”).
113. Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 10, at 3.
114. Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 201.
115. We accept the Article 29 Working Party’s view that “Article 22(1) establishes a general prohibition for decision-making based solely on automated processing,” some exceptions to the general prohibition, and safeguards for the exceptions. Article 29 Data Prot.
Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and Proﬁling for the
Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 17/EN. WP 251rev.01, at 19 (Feb. 6, 2018) [hereinafter
Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making]; see also Kaminski, Right to
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greater detail and has argued that Article 22’s scope is nonetheless broader
than the Directive’s; it covers not only algorithmic decision-making but
also such decision-making with some degree of human involvement. Also,
Article 22 covers decision-making having a comparatively broad range of
signiﬁcant effects, including not just legal effects but also things like particularly manipulative targeted advertising.116
Article 22 begins with a general prohibition of automated decisionmaking with signiﬁcant effects. There are, however, three exceptions: if a
decision is necessary for a contract; if it is authorized by EU or Member
State law; or if it is based on the data subject’s explicit consent—a stronger
form of consent than envisioned elsewhere in the GDPR.117
Companies that use automated decision-making under one of these
exceptions are not unfettered. They must implement “suitable measures
to safeguard [an individual’s] rights and freedoms and legitimate interests.”118 Such safeguards must include “at least the right to obtain human
intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of
view and to contest the decision.”119

Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 197. Beyond the Guidelines’ persuasive power, we
think this is the most sensible interpretation. Others, however, interpret Article 22(1) as
only a “right” that the data subject must actively invoke. For a detailed account of the arguments for each interpretation, see Emily Pehrsson, The Meaning of the GDPR Article 22, at
17–22 (Stan.-Vienna Transatlantic Tech. L. F., Working Paper No. 31, 2018), https://wwwcdn.law.stanford.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/pehrsson_eulawwp31.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T566-EZDK].
In any event, these “limited cases” may be more common than they ﬁrst appear. Article
22(2) allows automated decision-making when “necessary” to execute a contract, when it is
authorized by Member State law, or when there is explicit consent, a set of exceptions that
Giancarlo Malgieri characterizes as “wide and general.” GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(2);
Gianclaudio Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States: The Right to
Explanation and Other “Suitable Safeguards” in the National Legislations, Comput. L. &
Sec. Rev., Oct. 2019, at 1, 4 [hereinafter Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU
Member States]. Article 23 allows Member States to create legislative exemptions to many
of the GDPR’s algorithmic process protections for a laundry list of purposes, such as
national security, criminal and civil enforcement, ethics investigations, and “other
important objectives of general public interest of the Union or a Member State.” GDPR,
supra note 13, art. 23(1). Further, it is still unclear at what point human involvement would
exempt a decision-making process from Article 22’s protections. The Guidelines on
Automated Individual Decision-Making and Proﬁling say that a human with “authority and
competence” must have an “actual inﬂuence on the result” to take a decision out of Article
22, Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making, supra, at 21, but some think that
“even nominal involvement of a human” would accomplish this, Wachter et al., Why a Right
to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist, supra note 111, at 88.
116. Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 201–03.
117. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(2). For further discussion, see Kaminski, Right to
Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 197–98 (explaining that both the contractual exception and the explicit consent exception could be interpreted to be broader or narrower,
depending on the interpretation of when a decision is “necessary” for a contract).
118. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(3).
119. Id. art. 22(3) (emphasis added).
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What this right to contest means is unclear from the text. It is clear,
however, that the right to contest is more than a right to correct inaccurate
data on which a decision is based.120 Elsewhere, the GDPR provides general
access and correction rights for data processing.121 The right to contest must
be something more than just the generally applicable right to correction.
The relationship between the three safeguards/rights named in
Article 22 is also unclear. These rights—to human intervention, expression
of a point of view, and contestation—could be understood independently.
Or they could be understood to be redundant, naming aspects of the same
envisioned process.122
Arguably, however, the “right to contest is the backbone” of Article 22’s
protections.123 As Emre Bayamlıoğlu observes, the GDPR’s new wording
compared to the Directive’s “points at . . . at least, an obligation to hear the
merits of the appeal and to provide a justification for the decision.”124 This
right “obliges the data controller either to render automated decisions contestable or to cease [automated decision-making] at all.”125 Thus other individual rights in the GDPR, including both transparency and process rights,
are understood to be necessary for, or precursors to, this central right to
contestation.126
Contestability relies on transparency—just as due process requires notice, in addition to an opportunity to be heard. The GDPR compels multiple forms of transparency, including a general right to notice of personal
data processing, and a more speciﬁc right to “meaningful information
about the logic involved” in automated decision-making.127 It also contains

120. For a related query, see Sandra Wachter & Brent Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable
Inferences: Re-Thinking Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI, 2019 Colum. Bus.
L. Rev. 494, 568–71 (“Although there is no consensus about the legal rights over inferences,
there is an argument to be made that even the GDPR goes beyond procedural data control
and management (informational self-determination), and provides safeguards against inferences and decisions based on inferences with the right to contest in Article 22(3).”).
121. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 15 (access) & art. 16 (correction).
122. Emre Bayamlıoğlu, The Right to Contest Automated Decisions Under the General
Data Protection Regulation: Beyond the So-Called “Right to Explanation”, Regul. &
Governance, Mar. 2021, at 1, 5 [hereinafter Bayamlıoğlu, Beyond the So-Called “Right to
Explanation”] (explaining that the rights are usually treated as though they are on equal
footing as alternatives, without clarity regarding whether they are “complementary, gradual,
or distinct rights, or they should be treated as a unity”).
123. Id. at 5; Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1592 (characterizing
Article 22 as establishing a version of algorithmic due process).
124. Bayamlıoğlu, Beyond the So-Called “Right to Explanation”, supra note 122, at 6.
125. Id.
126. Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 27
(providing that an individual “will only be able to challenge a decision or express their view
if they fully understand how it has been made and on what basis”).
127. See Andrew D. Selbst & Julia Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to
Explanation, 7 Int’l Data Priv. L. 233, 235 (2017) (“When an individual is subject to ‘a deci-
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a right to an explanation of automated decisions.128 While Article 22 is by
its nature procedural and not substantive,129 the existence of an underlying
right to contest gives substance to its transparency requirements.130 That is,
according to regulators’ guidance, the “right to explanation” of an automated decision requires processors to disclose at least enough information
to affected individuals to make contestation actionable.131 The GDPR’s individualized algorithmic transparency requirements are “not about informing
or disclosing but rendering the decision contestable at least against a human
arbiter.”132
The right to contestation, like other aspects of the GDPR, in effect obligates companies to both comprehend and to disclose, in the words of
Mireille Hildebrandt, “the justification of such decision-making rather than
its explanation in the sense of its heuristics.”133 For complex machine-learning systems, this may be challenging if not impossible. It will require creative
thinking about how to build such systems so they are not just “explainable”
in terms of counterfactuals, but “justifiable” in terms of understanding, revealing, and making challengeable the normative grounds of a decision.
The right to contestation is thus strangely both central to the GDPR’s
system of algorithmic accountability and barely articulated. Despite its centrality to the GDPR’s Article 22, it is not spelled out in the text. Nor does
it receive much coverage in the Guidelines issued by the central EU data
privacy regulator (the European Data Protection Board) or in the Recitals
(the nonbinding preambulatory text accompanying the GDPR).134 Recital
71 simply and redundantly characterizes the right to contest as a right to
“challenge” a decision.135 The Guidelines largely parrot the text of the
sion based solely on automated processing’ that ‘produces legal effects . . . or similarly signiﬁcantly affects him or her,’ the GDPR creates rights to ‘meaningful information about the
logic involved.’ ” (quoting GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(1))).
128. Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 204 (“[A]n individual
has a right to explanation of an individual decision because that explanation is necessary
for her to invoke the other rights—e.g., to contest a decision, to express her view—that are
explicitly enumerated in the text of the GDPR.”).
129. Bayamlıoğlu, Beyond the So-Called “Right to Explanation”, supra note 122, at 5–6
(“Due to its procedural character, Article 22/3 is inevitably silent on the substantial grounds
which could be relied upon to challenge the reasoning or the criteria underlying the automated decisions . . . whether or when certain [machine-learning] outcome[s] could be regarded as unfair or unlawful is a conclusion . . . [requiring] . . . normative propositions . . . .”).
130. Id. at 6 (“In principle, the data controller has to ‘explain’ the decision in such a
way that enables the data subject to assess whether the reasons that led to a particular outcome were legitimate and lawful.”).
131. Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 204 – 05.
132. Bayamlıoğlu, Beyond the So-Called “Right to Explanation”, supra note 122, at 6.
133. Hildebrandt, Privacy as Protection of the Incomputable Self, supra note 26, at 113.
134. For an explanation of the difference between GDPR text, Recitals, and Guidelines,
see Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 193–95.
135. See GDPR, supra note 13, Recital 71 (advocating for individuals’ right to “obtain
human intervention,” receive “an explanation of the decision,” and “to challenge the
decision”).
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GDPR, and appear in places to conflate contestation with the parallel rights
to human intervention and to express one’s view.136
There has previously been little academic attention to the GDPR’s
right to contest, and effectively none by U.S. scholars.137 At one level, this
is surprising. The GDPR is one of the ﬁrst regulatory regimes in the world
to regulate AI decision-making, and the right to contestation appears central to its approach, arguably at the core of the individual rights envisioned
by the GDPR.138
At another level, the lack of attention is understandable. The GDPR
is complex and challenging for a U.S. audience to understand.139 The right
to contest may yet be a “paper tiger”—existing on paper but limited in
practice.140 There is little information, even now several years after the
GDPR went into effect, about what the right to contestation looks like.141
The GDPR’s contestation rights arise only for “solely automated” decisions
with signiﬁcant effects.142 And, as is generally the case with individual due
process measures, the right to contestation is deeply, and sometimes confusingly, intertwined with other due process measures, especially the morediscussed transparency and notice rights that give it effect.
As section III.B discusses below, the GDPR’s right to contestation exists largely for now as a standard, rather than a set of speciﬁc procedural
rules.143 Companies must allow individuals to challenge certain automated
decisions, but there are as of yet few details about what that process must
136. Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 27, 32.
137. But see Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 620–24 (discussing
Article 22 as an example of a “right to a human decision,” but forgoing deep analysis of its
requirements).
138. The regulators that interpret the GDPR have explained that the GDPR’s muchdebated algorithmic transparency provisions (the “right to explanation”) are in service of a
more central right to contestation. Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making,
supra note 115, at 27. These regulators explain that individuals need a right to explanation
in order to be able to contest automated decisions. See Bayamlıoğlu, Contesting Automated
Decisions, supra note 27, at 2 (“[T]he right to contest is regarded as the backbone provision
with a key role in determining the scope of algorithmic transparency under the GDPR.”).
But see Antoni Roig, Safeguards for the Right Not to Be Subject to a Decision Based Solely
on Automated Processing (Article 22 GDPR), 8 Euro. J.L. & Tech. 1, 6 (2017) (claiming that
these rights all could be meaningless).
139. See Meg Leta Jones & Margot E. Kaminski, An American’s Guide to the GDPR, 98
Denv. L. Rev. 93, 106–11 (2020) (discussing common errors U.S. readers make when trying
to understand the GDPR).
140. Bygrave, Minding the Machine, supra note 10, at 21.
141. Raphaël Gellert, Marvin van Bekkum & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, The Ola &
Uber Judgments: For the First Time a Court Recognises a GDPR Right to an Explanation
for Algorithmic Decision-Making, EU L. Analysis (Apr. 28, 2021), http://eulawanalysis.
blogspot.com/2021/04/the-ola-uber-judgments-for-ﬁrst-time.html [https://perma.cc/7KP
3-2JFV] (“This is the ﬁrst time that a court in the Netherlands recognises such a right . . . .
[I]t is also the ﬁrst time that a Court anywhere in Europe recognises such a right.”).
142. See Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 197, 207.
143. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
Duke L.J. 557 (1992).
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be. This leaves companies, regulators, EU Member States, and eventually
courts with a fairly blank (but not entirely blank) slate for implementing
the right.
C.

The Right to Contestation Beyond the GDPR

Despite the nascent state of the GDPR’s right to contest, other institutions beyond the EU have already picked up on its importance to algorithmic accountability. The Council of Europe is an international
organization, distinct from the EU, that was founded in 1949.144 At its core
is a human rights system, comprising the 1953 European Convention on
Human Rights, which is interpreted by the European Court of Human
Rights. In April 2020, the Council of Europe adopted a recommendation
setting out guidelines to address the human rights impacts of algorithmic
systems. It included the guideline to provide “effective means to contest relevant determinations and decisions.”145
The right to contest has also begun to appear in contexts beyond
Europe. The 2020 Recommendation of the OECD Council on AI includes
a recommendation that users of AI should “enable those adversely affected
by an AI system to challenge its outcome based on plain and easy-tounderstand information on the factors, and the logic that served as the
basis for the prediction, recommendation or decision.”146 The OECD recommendations may inﬂuence lawmaking and practices in countries
around the world.
Individual countries have already adopted or are considering
adopting the right to contest. As noted above, Brazil adopted the right in
2018.147 In November 2020, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of
Canada recommended that Canada revise its data privacy law to afford a
right to contest automated decisions.148 Reasoning that AI decisionmaking “introduces unique risks that warrant distinct treatment in the

144. Jones & Kaminski, supra note 139, at 101. Note that all EU Member States are parties to the Council of Europe. See Our Member States, Council of Eur., https://www.coe.int
/en/web/about-us/our-member-states [https://perma.cc/72W5-ZSGT] (last visited Sept.
7, 2021).
145. Council of Eur., Recommendation CM/Rec (2020) of the Committee of Ministers
to Member States on the Human Rights Impacts of Algorithmic Systems 9, 13 (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://rm.coe.int/09000016809e1154 [https://perma.cc/2MMJ-WVVC].
146. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, § 1.3.iv, at 8,
OECD Legal Instruments (May 22, 2019), https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instrume
nts/OECD-LEGAL-0449 [https://perma.cc/6KCV-BL2R].
147. LGPD, Art. 20, Law No. 13,709 (Aug. 18, 2018), https://lgpd-brazil.info/chapter_
03/article_20 [https://perma.cc/W2CL-SFTW] (Braz.).
148. A Regulatory Framework for AI: Recommendations for PIPEDA Reform, Off. of
the Priv. Comm’r of Can. (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/whatwe-do/consultations/completed-consultations/consultation-ai/reg-fw_202011/ [https://
perma.cc/E6ZL-AP7H].
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law,” the Commissioner recommended establishing two speciﬁc individual
rights: a right to explanation and a right to contest.149
The Commissioner called for the right to contest to be similar to the
GDPR, but explicitly rejected including qualiﬁers like “solely” in order to
ensure that the right applies when automated decisions include more human involvement.150 The right to contest would, per the Commissioner’s
Recommendations, entail the ability to “express [one’s] point of view to a
human intervener, and contest the decision.” The Commissioner distinguished between the right to contest and the already existing right to object to data processing, since “contestation provides individuals with
recourse even when they choose to continue to participate in the activity
for which automated decision-making was employed.”151
Yet in the United States, proposed and enacted laws fail to include a right
to contest AI decisions. The proposed federal Algorithmic Accountability Act
of 2019 aimed to create risk assessments for AI systems but did not establish
individual rights.152 A proposed law in Washington State, too, focused on
risk assessments and did not establish a right to contest.153 The newly
enacted California Privacy Rights Act, the ﬁrst in the country to address AI
decision-making writ large, tasks the new California Privacy Protection
Agency with establishing through regulations a right to opt out of certain
kinds of automated decision-making, accompanied by a right to access
“meaningful information” about the decision-making process.154 It does
not, however, explicitly describe a right to contest.
One can argue that a number of technology-neutral laws effectively
establish a right to contest AI decisions in the United States in certain
policy contexts. Litigants have already successfully used due process and
administrative procedure claims to challenge government use of AI.155

149. Id.; see also Cofone, supra note 23.
150. A Regulatory Framework for AI: Recommendations for PIPEDA Reform, supra
note 148 (“Unlike the GDPR or Quebec’s Bill 64, the term should drop any qualiﬁer such
as ‘solely’ or ‘exclusively’, which scopes the applicability of speciﬁc protections very narrowly.
These also make the term susceptible to subversion where a human role is added in the
process to merely evade additional obligations.”).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Algorithmic Accountability Act, S. 1108, 116th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2019).
153. H.B. 1655, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019) (attempting to establish “algorithmic accountability reports”). Additionally, the latest proposed Washington Privacy Act
mimics the GDPR in calling for data impact assessments but fails to establish an individual
right to contest automated decisions. See S.B. 5062, 67th Leg., 2021 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021).
154. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.185(16) (2021).
155. Huq, Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State, supra note 8, at 1895–
98 (citing successful due process claims against the government’s use of machine-learning
algorithms for signiﬁcant decisions); see also Rashida Richardson, Jason M. Schultz &
Vincent M. Southerland, AI Now Inst., Litigating Algorithms 2019 US Report: New
Challenges to Government Use of Algorithmic Decision Systems 28–32 (2019), https://
ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.html [https://perma.cc/MJF4-3T3E].
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Antidiscrimination law, too, might in some circumstances be used to challenge decisions made using AI.156 Existing doctrines, however, present hurdles in the AI context, not the least of which is evidentiary.157 There are
beneﬁts to a clearly established and cross-contextual right to contest AI.
D. Academic Views on Regulating AI
Academic views on regulating AI can both illustrate and inﬂuence policymakers’ thinking on whether to establish a right to contest AI. There is
a fast-growing literature considering how to regulate complex computer
algorithms. Yet while earlier scholars called for some kind of due process,
the recent trend has been to favor systemic governance over the companies or government entities that build and use AI over establishing individual rights such as a right to contest.158
A ﬁrst wave of scholars on algorithmic accountability called for “technological due process” or “big data . . . due process.”159 In Technological
156. Plaintiffs do face an “uphill battle,” both for disparate impact claims generally and
with regards to big data inferences in particular. See Ajunwa, Auditing Imperative, supra
note 4, at 647 (“[P]laintiffs aiming to bring an employment discrimination claim on a theory of disparate impact, rather than disparate treatment, face an uphill battle.”); Barocas &
Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, supra note 70, at 674 (“[A]ttempts to certify the absence
of prejudice on the part of those involved in the data mining process may wrongly confer
the imprimatur of impartiality on the resulting decisions.”). Ajunwa has instead proposed a
third cause of action under Title VII of “discrimination per se” whereby:
[A] plaintiff [could] assert that a hiring practice (for example, the use of
proxy variables [in automated hiring] resulting or with the potential to result
in adverse impact to protected categories) is so egregious as to amount to
discrimination per se, and this would shift the burden of proof from the
plaintiff to the defendant (employer) to show that its practice is nondiscriminatory.
Ajunwa, Paradox of Automation, supra note 4, at 1728.
157. Huq, Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State, supra note 8, at 1897
(“I have not been able to ﬁnd examples of challenges to algorithmic allocation systems
based on equality or privacy concerns. This may be because due process claims are easier to
allege.”); see also Barocas & Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, supra note 70, at 694 –714
(describing challenges for Title VII claims about machine-learning algorithms).
158. Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1540 n.34; see also Huq,
Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State, supra note 8, at 1550 (“Those scholars
who reject individualized algorithmic due process and individualized transparency largely
implicitly reject both the dignitary and justiﬁcatory rationales for them. They understand
regulating private-sector algorithms as being largely about correcting error or discrimination and bias.”); id. at 1557 (“A growing body of literature calls for moving away from ex
post, individualized transparency and due process or, at least, supplementing them with regulations that target algorithmic design at earlier stages and target the human systems around
algorithms.”).
159. Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1301; Citron & Pasquale,
Scored Society, supra note 8, at 27; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 124; see also Maayan
Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 Stan.
Tech. L. Rev. 473, 496 (2016) (“Affected individuals should have the rights to inspect, correct, and dispute what they believe to be inaccurate adjudication decisions made with respect to their online conduct.”); Schwartz, supra note 61, at 1343–74; Daniel J. Steinbock,
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Due Process, Danielle Citron observed the increasing governmental use of
computer algorithms for decision-making.160 Citron called for systemic
regulation, drawing on the Administrative Procedure Act as both a model
and a legal constraint, and for individualized due process. She noted,
however, that Mathews v. Eldridge could present hurdles to individual
challenges in practice because of the potential expense involved in challenging algorithmic systems.161
Several years later, two sets of scholars called for extending “due process”-like protections to private sector decisions.162 Kate Crawford and
Jason Schultz drew heavily on due process theory—drawing on the work
of Martin Redish and Lawrence Marshall,163 and Judge Henry Friendly164—
to build an argument for individualized process in the face of predictive
data analytics.165 In The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions,
Citron and Frank Pasquale similarly explained that “[p]rocedural protections should apply not only to the scoring algorithms themselves (a kind
of technology-driven rulemaking), but also to individual decisions based
on algorithmic predictions (technology-driven adjudication).”166 These
scholars called for systemic regulatory oversight, but not to the exclusion
of process protections (or rights) for individuals.
These pathbreaking works, however, do not provide much guidance
for implementing an individual right to contest automated decisions.
Citron suggested that government decision-makers could be required to
explain their use of an automated system’s decision and should be educated about such systems’ biases, while the systems should be tested for
error and bias.167 Crawford and Schultz called for a “neutral data arbiter”
such as the FTC to investigate complaints against private parties “based on
predictive privacy harms and, in the process of those complaints, investigate the basis of the predictions.”168 It is not clear whether every individual
complaint would result in an individualized hearing; this seems unlikely
Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 64 –81 (2005) (addressing
government use of data mining in the context of air passenger screening and the creation
of watch lists); Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, supra note 9, at 1553–68 (offering an exhaustive analysis of transparency in algorithmic decision-making and calling for procedural
protections).
160. Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1259, 1263–67.
161. Id. at 1284 –85.
162. Citron & Pasquale, Scored Society, supra note 8; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8.
163. See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and
the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 Yale L.J. 455, 474 (1986) (describing the need for
“a model of procedural due process that simultaneously allows the ﬂexibility central to the
due process concept as it has evolved, while providing a principled and workable
structure”).
164. See Friendly, supra note 2, at 1268–1304.
165. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 114 –20.
166. Citron & Pasquale, Scored Society, supra note 8, at 19.
167. Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1304 –11.
168. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 127.
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given the limited capacities of the FTC.169 Citron and Pasquale called, too,
for regulatory oversight by the FTC.170 They also called for individualized
notice guaranteed by audit trails,171 and interactive modeling to let individuals better understand the scoring algorithms used against them.172
While they referred to “challenge[s]” against algorithmic scoring, they did
not go into detail about what such an “opportunity to be heard” might
constitute in practice.173
In any event, despite this initial enthusiasm for individual due process,
more recent proposals have largely shied away from it. Some scholars have
simply ignored individual due process and related transparency rights;
others have explicitly rejected them. In Accountable Algorithms, a bevy of
interdisciplinary authors listed potential harms of transparency—obviating the “notice” portion of individual due process rights.174 Other scholars
have critiqued individual rights as ineffective fallacies, citing a lack of individual capacity and access to justice issues.175 Several scholars have noted
that due process applies only in the context of state action.176
Aziz Huq has gone further, arguing that due process rights should not
apply even to state action—or rather, that instead of individualized challenges to algorithmic decision-making, individuals should be able to challenge whether the algorithm is systemically “well-calibrated.”177
There are limited exceptions to the trend. Rory Van Loo, for example,
calls for a complex appeals system to apply to platform decision-making,
involving transparent precedent established by neutral human arbiters.178
In the criminal trial context, Andrea Roth calls for a confrontation right
with respect to machine-created evidence, including tools ranging from

169. Crawford and Schultz seem more concerned about obtaining transparency and
checking bias at the level of the general public. Id. at 127 (“The presence of a neutral data
arbiter would provide the public with an opportunity to be heard, to examine the evidence
used in adjudicative predictions, and to challenge it.”).
170. Citron & Pasquale, Scored Society, supra note 8, at 20–27.
171. Id. at 28.
172. Id. at 28–29.
173. Id. at 27–28, 33.
174. See Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R.
Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev.
633, 657–60 (2017).
175. See, e.g., Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to
an Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking for, 16 Duke L. & Tech. Rev.
18, 74 –75 (2017).
176. See, e.g., Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms
and the Law, 31 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 43, 46 (2017) (“Although due process concerns explain
why we would require the creation of robust trails of evidence for software-driven decision
processes in government, whether the same is true for private sector uses turns on the nature
of the private activity at issue.”).
177. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 686; Huq, Constitutional
Rights in the Machine-Learning State, supra note 8, at 1909–10.
178. Van Loo, supra note 5, at 867–78.
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courtroom testing to cross-examination of responsible programmers.179
These arguments, however, are site speciﬁc, and do not call for a general
right to contest AI.
We turn, then, to the limited academic literature on the legal right most
analogous to what we propose: the GDPR’s right to contest an automated
decision. The GDPR’s right to contestation has received surprisingly little
scholarly attention. Instead, much ink has been spilled over the related
“right to explanation” of an algorithmic decision.180 There, again, we see
considerable backlash against an individualized transparency right.181
Even in Europe, where there is a relatively robust conception of data privacy as a human right that contributes to protecting individual dignity,
much of the literature has focused on the efficacy of systemic oversight,
rather than the individual rights the GDPR has to offer.182 One of the only
European scholars to examine the GDPR’s right to contestation, Emre
Bayamlıoğlu, does argue that contestation is a necessity and “requires a
mechanism which will enable data subjects to have their objection heard
in a process intelligible to them—with the possibility of an outcome for
the annulment or the amendment of the decision.”183 By contrast, Huq,
who is one of the only U.S. scholars to directly address the GDPR’s right
to contestation, explicitly rejects it in favor of a “right to a well-calibrated
machine decision”—that is, a right not to an individual challenge, but to
a systemically well-functioning machine.184
Instead of an individualized right to contest, scholars recently have proposed systemic measures that regulate the companies or government agencies that build or use the AI. These measures include: ex ante testing, design
requirements, impact assessments, recording requirements that document
how an algorithm was trained and what data was chosen to train it, whistleblower protections, and creation of a public interest cause of action.185

179. Roth, supra note 79, at 2050 (suggesting the use of programmer testimony before
an expert panel, written interrogatories to programmers, access to source code, and the
disclosure of prior statements of machines).
180. Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 192 n.8.
181. See, e.g., Edwards & Veale, supra note 175, at 74 –75; Wachter et al., Why a Right
to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist, supra note 111.
182. See, e.g., Edwards & Veale, supra note 175, at 74. On the EU and dignity, see Jones,
The Right to a Human in the Loop, supra note 72, at 231; Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The
GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 Seton Hall L. Rev. 995, 1016–17 (2017) [hereinafter Zarsky,
Incompatible].
183. Bayamlıoğlu, Transparency of Automated Decisions, supra note 9, at 39.
184. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 686.
185. See Desai & Kroll, supra note 176, at 43 (“We begin this Part by looking at public
sector decision-making and explain why technical accountability is necessary as a matter of
due process . . . we [also] offer a possible statutory change—the passage of law to encourage
and protect whistleblowers who know of prohibited practices.”); Huq, Constitutional Rights
in the Machine-Learning State, supra note 8, at 1940 (“Aggregate challenges (such as class
actions, facial challenges, and the like) usefully direct attention to system-wide causes of
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These systemic governance proposals have value. Systemic
governance is likely necessary for governing AI, given the very real challenges individuals face in contesting such systems.186 An individual right to
contest by itself would likely fail to fully address or mitigate harms. Because
of the nature of the technology and the locus of expertise in the private
sector, AI, too, may be particularly well suited to innovative “new governance” or “collaborative governance” models that harness the strengths of
both government and industry.187
But current scholarship leaves largely unsettled the question of
whether there also is value in subjecting algorithmic decision-making to
contestation. Consequently, it also fails to address how to design and implement an effective contestation right.
II. WHY HAVE A RIGHT TO CONTEST AI?
This Part takes a deeper look at the theory underpinning the Western
tradition of individual due process and considers whether it provides purchase for an individual right to contest AI decisions.

constitutional harm.”); Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. Rev. 54, 115–17, 126–29 (2019) (encouraging a thorough examination
ex ante and ex post of the algorithm and the training data employed to reﬁne the algorithm); Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, supra note 59, at 169–72 (discussing
the possibility of an Algorithmic Impact Statement requirement in the model of
Environmental Impact Statements); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive
Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 1085, 1100–05, 1110–17 (2018) [hereinafter Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal] (discussing how the techniques available within
machine learning for ensuring interpretability correspond well to the different types of explanation required by existing law); Andrew D. Selbst, An Institutional View Of Algorithmic
Impact Assessments, 35 Harvard J.L. & Tech. (forthcoming 2021) (UCLA Sch. of Law, Public
Law Research Paper No. 21–25) (manuscript at 4 –5), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3867634
[https://perma.cc/667V-3XAG] (discussing the goals and potential efficacy of [algorithmic
impact assessments] and arguing that the regime requires good-faith participation by the
private sector).
186. Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1557 (“While individual rights can
address important dignitary and justiﬁcatory concerns, there are better ways to identify and
ﬁx systemic problems in algorithmic decision-making.”).
187. Id. at 1559–77 (discussing the promises and pitfalls of collaborative governance of
algorithms, including a lack of accountability and enforcement mechanisms); Michael
Guihot, Anne F. Matthew & Nicolas P. Suzor, Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions to
Regulate Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 20 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 385, 427, 441, 445 (2017) (calling
for a mix of self-regulation and risk regulation in the form of soft-law, regulatory
“nudge[s]”); Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 159, at 529–31 (“We advocate a collaborativedynamic regulation . . . .”); Alicia Solow-Niederman, Administering Artiﬁcial Intelligence,
93 S. Cal. L. Rev. 633, 640, 645 (2020). On collaborative governance generally, see Orly
Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in The Oxford Handbook of Governance
65, 66–67 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 21–33 (1997); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The
Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn.
L. Rev. 342, 371–76 (2004).
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As discussed above, contestation is an ancient concept that remains
core to the Western tradition of justice.188 In the U.S. legal system, contestation rights most prominently extend from the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.189 Contrary to what some may believe, however, in the
United States, contestation is not limited to government decisions. Layers
of positive law developed in speciﬁc policy contexts afford individuals procedural protections, including rights to access and correct personal information190 and rights to contest credit card charges.191 Understanding that
U.S. law already imposes rights to contest the decisions of private companies is important context for any discussion of a right to contest AI, as private companies’ algorithms can make decisions as signiﬁcant as any
government body’s.192
Contestation rights do not always provide justice. Contestation may
occur ex post, when some harms cannot be undone or ameliorated.
Contestation may be too slow. It may be too costly.193 Information, power,
and inﬂuence asymmetries between the disputants may tilt the process toward unfairness. A right to contest may be neither sufficient to protect
fundamental rights nor self-executing.
But while a right to contestation may not be sufficient to protect fundamental rights, it may yet be necessary. The next section discusses the reasons
frequently given for establishing individual process rights and notes their
resonance with recent discussions of rights to contest AI decisions.
A.

Why Have Due Process?

As discussed above, a few scholars have called for establishing individual due process for algorithmic decision-making, drawing on several core
188. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
189. Rules of evidence, too, can be understood as an important aspect of contestation,
mandating disclosure or limiting the use of particular pieces of information in legal challenges. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 79, at 2039–51; Wexler, supra note 6, at 1395–429.
190. See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100–
1798.199.100; California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, Proposition 24 (2020) (to be codiﬁed
at Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100–1798.199.100); Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act, 2021
Va. Special Sess. Law I, ch. 52 (2021) (to be codiﬁed at Va. Code Ann. §§ 59.1-571–59.1-581
(2023)).
191. Van Loo, supra note 5, at 851.
192. See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, Scored Society, supra note 8, at 8–13 (discussing credit
scoring and other algorithmic ranking systems); Van Loo, supra note 5, at 836–50 (discussing decisions made by technology platforms about speech, lodging, commerce, elections,
and reputation).
193. Procedural safeguards that are too costly may not be required. See, e.g., Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–35 (1976) (providing for a cost-beneﬁt analysis to decide
which speciﬁc safeguards will be required as part of an “opportunity to be heard”). In
Technological Due Process, Citron observes that Mathews likely poses a challenge to requiring
expert analysis of automated decisions, though she argues that the cost of an expert to correct the computer logic in one case of erroneous automated decision-making should be
weighed against the benefits the correction provides for all future cases. Citron, Technological
Due Process, supra note 3, at 1284 –86.
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texts of due process theory.194 Further exploration of the due process literature sheds additional light on the role of a right to contest.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that “[n]o
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”195 In practice this requires notice and an opportunity to be
heard “appropriate to the nature of the case.”196 But why? The rationales
for due process include obtaining accuracy, supporting rule of law values,
and liberal theory—that is, theory that emphasizes the importance of the
individual who is affected by a given decision.
1. Accuracy. — A common answer to the question of why we have due
process is an instrumentalist one: to ensure accuracy.197 The Supreme Court
has stated more than once that “[t]he function of legal process . . . is to
minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.”198 Accuracy is commonly named as
a reason for robust contestation mechanisms.199 This is ancient reasoning:
The Bible cautions that “[t]he one who first states a case seems right, until the
other comes and cross-examines.”200 This reasoning also retains force today.
For example, only individual administrative appeals and lawsuits revealed the
problems with the home-health-care allocation algorithm discussed above.201
But our legal system does not even in the highest-stakes contexts guarantee individuals an accurate decision.202 Rather, accuracy is often treated
as a goal or value to be balanced against other goals or values, such as cost
and efficiency.203 Some scholars have thus taken accuracy to be a systematic
194. See, e.g., Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1258; Cary Coglianese
& David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 40–43
(2019); Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 127.
195. U.S. Const. amend. V.
196. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Mullane
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
197. See Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 653; Redish & Marshall,
supra note 163, at 476–81 (naming accuracy as one of seven values protected by procedural
due process).
198. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1989);
Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 653 n.201 (citing Heller v. Doe ex rel.
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 332 (1993)); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of
a Theory of Value, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28, 48 (1976) (“The Eldridge Court . . . views the sole
purpose of procedural protections as enhancing accuracy . . . .”).
199. See, e.g., Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 126–27 (touting a hearing before a
neutral arbiter as a way to preserve fairness, accuracy, and other values); Redish & Marshall,
supra note 163, at 476.
200. Proverbs 18:17 (NSRV).
201. See Lecher, supra note 80; McCormick, supra note 56.
202. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 653 (“But even in high-stakes
contexts such as criminal cases or post-conviction review of capital punishment, the
Supreme Court has shied away from a personal right to a true determination.”).
203. See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 115; Friendly, supra note 2, at 1276 (“[A]t
some point, the benefit to individuals from an additional safeguard is substantially out-weighed
by the cost of providing such protection . . . .”).
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management goal, meaning that to the extent individual due process can
in the aggregate make a decisional system more accurate, it is worth protecting.204 If this were the only reason for protecting individual process,
however, individual process would not be worth protecting to the extent it
failed to make a decisional system more accurate. Accuracy thus may be a
central goal of individual process, but it alone cannot account for strong
intuitions people have about what is just or fair.
2. Rule of Law Values. — A second reason to establish individual rights
to contest is to respect rule of law values. These values suggest that a decisional system should be fair, consistent, predictable, and rational across
different individuals.205 Allowing individuals to contest decisions reveals
whether a decisional system is unfair, inconsistent, arbitrary, unpredictable, or irrational. Contestation and its accompanying procedural protections, such as reason giving, require that a decision-maker demonstrate
examinable commitment to an outcome and describe the reasons for it.206
This aims to prevent arbitrariness and allow for quality control of decisions, including sniffing out bias or discrimination.207 That is, contestation
might help eliminate the pitfalls of decisional discretion, while leaving decision-makers the ability to tailor rules to individual circumstances.
But again, the rule of law rationale could be characterized as arguing
for individual protections from an underlying focus on the decisional system as a whole. The central concern with the rule of law rationale is over
the legitimacy of the system of decision-making, not necessarily the individuals within it. Thus, rule of law reasoning might leave space, like the
accuracy rationale, for arguments that individual rights to contest are necessary only to the extent that they reveal unfairness, arbitrariness, unpredictability, and irrationality. Indeed, we see echoes of this reasoning in the
literature on algorithmic accountability, with scholars rejecting individual
rights in favor of other measures that in their view are adequate for ensuring that a decisional system as a whole is not arbitrary or irrational.208
3. Liberal Theory. — To fully consider the potential value of an individual right to contest, we need theory that is grounded in individuals. This
204. See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 121; Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management
Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy,
Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 Cornell L. Rev.
772, 815–16 (1974) (asserting that due process requires greater protection for the claimant
and should include the application of systematic management).
205. See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 119 (citing Redish & Marshall, supra note
162, at 483–86).
206. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 633, 649 (1995) [hereinafter
Schauer, Giving Reasons].
207. See id. at 657 (“But when institutional designers have grounds for believing that
decisions will systematically be the product of bias, self-interest, insufficient reﬂection, or
simply excess haste, requiring decisionmakers to give reasons may counteract some of these
tendencies.”).
208. See Kroll et al., supra note 174, at 662–72 (discussing computational methods that
can provide accountability for procedural regularity while balancing privacy concerns).
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section turns to what Jerry Mashaw terms “the liberal tradition” in U.S.
constitutional theory, which “has at its core the notion that individuals are
the basic unit of moral and political value.”209 Mashaw has argued, convincingly, that there is a long tradition of at least three categories of liberal
theory that could be behind calls for individual due process: Benthamite
(utilitarian), Lockean (natural rights), and Kantian (personhood) theories.210 This section examines each in turn.
At ﬁrst glance, utilitarianism might seem an ill ﬁt for an argument that
individual rights matter. Utilitarianism, after all, is primarily concerned
with maximizing outcomes for society as a whole.211 There are, however,
three ways in which utilitarianism can support an individual right to contest.212 First, utilitarians might argue through classic cost-beneﬁt analysis
that individual process produces acceptance or even happiness on the part
of affected individuals, which makes it more likely that the decisional system as a whole will achieve social welfare goals. Second, utilitarians sometimes (albeit rarely) argue for individual rights based on the idea that
certain protections are so likely to be correct in terms of social welfare
maximization that it makes sense to establish those protections as default
rules (“rule utilitarianism”).213 Under rule utilitarianism, society should
establish individual process as a rule when it is more likely to maximize
social welfare—if it prevents pain or other seriously negative consequences.214 Finally, utilitarians do recognize the existence of a private
sphere for individuals in which social welfare calculations have no place.215
If a decisional system threatens to impinge on that private sphere, individual process rights arguably should apply.
From a Lockean or natural rights perspective, individual due process
is understood as a means of protecting underlying natural entitlements.
Lockean analysis centers around the idea of the “natural rights” inherent
in individuals, such as the rights to life, liberty, and property.216 If the government reallocates or signiﬁcantly impinges upon these rights, it must do
so through adequate process. The goal of process under a Lockean analysis is to (1) avoid errors, or if that is not possible, (2) indicate “consent” to

209. Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61
B.U. L. Rev. 885, 907 (1981) [hereinafter Mashaw, Administrative Due Process] (emphasis
added).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 910.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 911.
214. Id.
215. Id. (referencing the work of John Stuart Mill in noting that “the approach [of separating the individual and the social] does yield at least a dignitary process restraint—some
notion of individual privacy that is beyond social invasion because it is necessary to social
welfare”).
216. Id. at 908–09 (discussing the work of John Locke and Robert Nozick).
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such reallocations or impingements by the affected individuals.217 Thus in
circumstances where natural rights are affected, process is intended to
help mitigate error, and evidences individual buy-in (if not consent). The
limit to the Lockean argument for due process is that process is tied to
protection of these certain core substantive rights; it is not justiﬁed in and
of itself.
Finally, we turn to Kantian or dignitary theory. Current scholarship
on algorithmic accountability largely ignores or rejects the dignitary tradition in U.S. thought.218 More broadly, privacy scholarship for the most part
concedes that while Europe is concerned about dignity, the United States
is not.219 This overstates the case. Examining due process theory shows that
there is a long dignitary tradition in the United States, and we overlook it
to our detriment.
The Kantian categorical imperative is that individuals must be treated
as an end in themselves, not as the means to an end.220 A right to contest
signiﬁcant decisions is an expression of this value. The strongest form of a
Kantian/dignitary argument for process is that using proxy categories to
make decisions about individuals treats them as objects and thus violates
their dignity—unless they are afforded opportunities for individualized
judgment.221 One need not subscribe to this strongest form, however, to
acknowledge the dignitary argument for due process.
A Kantian approach argues that due process rights are necessary to
respect individual selfhood. Opaque or arbitrary decisions fundamentally
interfere in such self-respect. Offering a reason for a decision, by contrast,
217. Id. at 909.
218. See Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 652 (describing dignity as
an “ambiguous and contested” concept); Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 185,
at 1119 (“To the extent that the personhood rationale can be converted to a more actionable legal issue, it is reﬂected in the concept of ‘procedural justice[]’ . . . .”).
219. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conﬂicting International Data Privacy
Rules in Cyberspace, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1315, 1341–54 (2000) (contrasting the United States’
liberal approach to information privacy with Europe’s social-protection approach); James
Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 Yale L.J. 1151,
1180–89 (2004) (describing the philosophical origins of privacy law); see also Jones, The
Right to a Human in the Loop, supra note 182, at 217.
220. Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals: And What is
Enlightenment? 47 (Lewis White Beck trans., 1959) (1785) (“Act so that you treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means
only.”); Edmund L. Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity, and a Kantian Injunction, in Due
Process: NOMOS XVIII 172, 179 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977)
(“[P]articipation is an instrument by which the valuation of persons as ends in themselves
is expressed.”); Mashaw, Administrative Due Process, supra note 209, at 915 (“The direct
application of the Kantian categorical imperative, in which dignity may be said to consist in
being treated as an end in oneself rather than as instrumental to the ends of others, may
thus yield a robust set of procedural rights.”).
221. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process, supra note 209, at 897, 901. According to
Mashaw, this “principle has no obvious limits.” Id. at 897; see also Kaminski, Binary
Governance, supra note 12, at 1541–42.
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shows a sign of respect for the decisional subject.222 So does enabling participation in the legitimacy of the system by establishing a right to contest
its outputs. When a decision affects certain fundamental rights, process is
necessary as both a means for promoting accuracy with respect to rights
deprivation and an end for enabling self-respect.223
B.

AI Decisions and Due Process Values

Centering the individual in the due process inquiry is thus not a foreign concept. The question remains whether AI decision-making, including by private entities, should be subject to a right to contest. This section
begins with some history, addressing the inﬂuential 1973 HEW Report and
its emphasis on due process. It then applies the reasoning above—instrumentalism, rule of law values, and liberal theory—to the question of
whether individuals should be afforded due process in the face of signiﬁcant decision-making by AI.
1. The HEW Report: Due Process for Data Processing. — The idea that
automated data processing—including by private entities—implicates due
process values has deep roots in the United States. In the early 1970s, thenSecretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Elliot L. Richardson established an Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data systems.224 In
establishing the Committee, Richardson declared that “there is a growing
concern that automated personal data systems present a serious potential
for harmful consequences, including infringement of basic liberties. This
has led to the belief that special safeguards should be developed to protect
against potentially harmful consequences for privacy and due process.”225
In 1973, the Committee published an influential report (the HEW
Report),226 often characterized as a foundational document for data privacy
lawmaking. Data privacy laws both in the United States and around the
world have since been based on the Report’s core principles, though the
United States diverged in significant ways from its counterparts abroad.
The HEW Report takes a highly procedural approach to information
privacy, with due process principles running throughout. The Report notes
that conventionally, privacy is often equated with secrecy or seclusion.227
That is, shared information is presumed to be no longer private.228 This conception of privacy is a poor fit, however, for the privacy interests in personal
222. Schauer, Giving Reasons, supra note 207, at 658.
223. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process, supra note 209, at 919–20.
224. HEW Report, supra note 68, at viii.
225. Id.
226. Id. at vi–vii.
227. See id. at 38 (“Dictionary deﬁnitions of privacy uniformly speak in terms of seclusion, secrecy, and withdrawal from public view. They all denote a quality that is not inherent
in most record-keeping systems.”).
228. See Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 90 Wash. L. Rev.
1113, 1124 (2015) [hereinafter Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance] (“Courts
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data held and processed as part of a system of record keeping. Individuals
often deliberately hand over personal data for limited use, yet still retain
some expectation of privacy in them.229
The HEW Report thus formulates a conception of data privacy intended to both allow “some disclosure of data” and afford affected individuals at least some agency in deciding “the nature and extent of such
disclosure.”230 That is, the Report’s founding principle is that both the organizations that process records and the individuals affected by such records should be able to participate in constructing what data privacy means
in practice.231 As organizations typically control such decisions with little
input by affected individuals, the HEW Report’s safeguards (later known
as the fair information practice principles or “FIPPs”) are largely geared
toward providing procedural protections for affected individuals.
The result is a set of procedures and standards rather than substantive
determinations. The Report notes that its safeguards do not
provide the basis for determining a priori which data should or
may be recorded and used, or why, and when. [They do], however, provide a basis for establishing procedures that assure the
individual a right to participate in a meaningful way in decisions
about what goes into records about him and how that information shall be used.232
Like due process, such procedural safeguards include notice233 and various
rights to be heard.234 As scholars later note, these are the foundations of a
kind of due process for data processing.235
The HEW Report stands as a counterargument to the idea that only
Europeans care about dignity and due process in the context of automation.236 The Report’s reasoning reflects the range of concerns about
have tended to rely on a privacy binary: information is either withdrawn and thus private, or
available to others and thus public. Once information is shared with others under this rubric,
it can no longer be protected as private.”); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s
Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1887, 1920 (2010) (noting that the all-or-nothing
nature of privacy makes it nearly impossible to keep information completely hidden).
229. See Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, supra note 228, at 1127 (“[People] choose to reveal information under particular circumstances, expecting that it will not
travel beyond those settings.”).
230. HEW Report, supra note 68, at 39–40.
231. The HEW Report refers to this as “mutuality.” Id. at 40.
232. Id. at 41.
233. See id. (“There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret.”).
234. See id. (“There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a
record . . . .”).
235. See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 108 (noting that the FIPPS provide “notice, choice, and control to users ex ante any privacy harm” and observing the challenges of
doing so for Big Data privacy harms).
236. See generally supra note 218 (questioning or dismissing dignitary concerns as the basis
of algorithmic due process and transparency). On the EU and dignity, see Jones, The Right to a
Human in the Loop, supra note 72, at 220–24; Zarsky, Incompatible, supra note 182, at 1016–17.
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computerized decision-making articulated in this Article: concerns about
accuracy, fairness, individualized flexibility, dignity, and dehumanization.
The Report observes that data processing can “sacrifice flexibility and accuracy” in the name of efficiency, contributing to the “the so-called ‘dehumanizing’ image of computerization.”237 It evinces concern about both inaccuracy
and unfairness.238 It identifies the problem of “statistical stereotyping,” in
which data processing is used to predict an individual’s future behavior
based on his placement into a “statistically defined group.”239 The way to
mitigate problems, the Report notes, is to “permit[] an individual to know
that he has been labelled a risk and to contest the label as applied to him.”240
The HEW Report, whose principles now form the backbone of federal
U.S. sectoral data privacy laws such as HIPAA and COPPA, is thus as much
about due process as it is about what most people would term privacy. It proposes process safeguards to mitigate the power asymmetries between individuals and the organizations, public and private, that hold records on them.241
To be clear, there have been many valid critiques of how the United States
has since operationalized privacy regulation, outside of the above-named statutory regimes, around a watered-down version of individual control.242 The
dominant U.S. approach to privacy protection has been “notice and choice,”
in which individuals are expected to “read [privacy] notices and make decisions according to their overall preferences.”243 This approach has been criticized for, among other things, creating a legal fiction of consent when nobody
in fact reads privacy policies; overly relying on individuals’ time, attention, and
expertise; and overlooking the extent to which technology platforms manip-

237. HEW Report, supra note 68, at 14.
238. See id. at 19 (“[T]he likelihood of unfair or inappropriate decisions about the individual to whom any given record pertains will be a problem . . . .”).
239. See id. at 26.
240. Id. (emphasis added).
241. See id. at 28–29 (“[A]n individual’s control over the personal information that he
gives to an organization, or that an organization obtains about him, is lessening as the relationship between the giver and receiver of personal data grows more attenuated, impersonal,
and diffused.”).
242. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Conﬁguring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play
of Everyday Practice 10 (2012) (“The consensus view in U.S. privacy theory tends to be that
there is essentially no legitimate expectation of privacy under these circumstances and that
the surveillance therefore should not trouble us.”); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126
Harv. L. Rev. 1904, 1927–30 (2013) (noting how the paradigm of “new privacy governance”
evolving in the U.S. legal system is rooted in a regulatory ideology that downplays the “need
to hold market actors accountable for harms to the public interest”); Daniel J. Solove,
Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1880,
1880–82 (2013) [hereinafter Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma]
(“Although privacy self-management is certainly a laudable and necessary component of any
regulatory regime, I contend that it is being tasked with doing work beyond its capabilities.
Privacy self-management does not provide people with meaningful control over their data.”).
243. Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer M. Urban, Alan Westin’s Privacy Homo Economicus,
49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 261, 261–62 (2014).
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ulate individuals into making choices that benefit companies and not individuals.244 Emphasizing individual rights to the exclusion of collective
governance, too, ignores that many privacy problems—surveillance of neighborhoods or communities, discrimination against particular groups, and
chilling minority viewpoints or speech—are collective in nature.245
Yet as both sectoral statutory schemes within the United States and contrasting data protection regulation around the world illustrate, operationalizing the HEW Report’s principles need not mean idealizing ineffective
individual control—especially if individual rights are coupled with more robust systemic regulation.246
At the time of the Report, the kind of AI decision-making discussed here
was still a hypothetical future.247 The Report reads as a prescient call for an
American version of the right to contest: “Sometimes the individual does not
even know that an organization maintains a record about him. Often he may
not see it, much less contest its accuracy, control its dissemination, or
challenge its use by others.”248
2. Due Process Theory and AI Decision-Making. — One of the only U.S. scholars to directly address the GDPR’s right to contestation explicitly rejects it.249
244. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, supra note 242, at 1925, 1930 (“[Big Data techniques]
subject individuals to predictive judgments about their preferences, and the process of modulation also shapes and produces those preferences . . . . [The] emphasis on privatized regulation and control of information ﬂows via notice and choice reinforces precisely those
aspects of modulation that are most troubling and most intractable.”); see also Woodrow
Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 423, 426, 429 (2018)
[hereinafter Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control] (noting that control individuals
“are given online is mediated, which means it cannot help but be engineered to produce
particular results” and observing that control can be “overwhelming,” creating a bandwidth
problem); Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, supra note 242, at
1880–82 (noting how privacy self-management relies on consent but does not provide people with meaningful control over their data).
245. See Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, supra note 244, at 430 (“Notions of
individual control don’t fit well with privacy as a collective value . . . . ‘Data privacy is more like air
quality or safe drinking water, a public good that cannot be effectively regulated by trusting in the
wisdom of millions of individual choices.’” (quoting Zeynep Tufekci, Opinion, The Latest Privacy
Debacle, N.Y. Times (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/opinion/stravaprivacy.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review))); Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the
Consent Dilemma, supra note 242, at 1881 (“Privacy costs and benefits . . . are more
appropriately assessed cumulatively and holistically—not merely at the individual level.”).
246. Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1579 (“An accountable collaborative governance regime can also complement individual procedural rights. Establishing systemic accountability in a collaborative governance regime can bolster individual rights by
providing oversight in the name of affected individuals.”).
247. See HEW Report, supra note 68, at 22 (“‘Machine intelligence’ is a subject with
fascinating technical and philosophical aspects. To date, however, there is no evidence that
a computer capable of ‘taking over’ anything it was not speciﬁcally programmed to take over
is attainable.”).
248. Id. at 29.
249. See Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 651 (“[N]one of these
clusters of reasons provide secure normative ground for a right to a human decision.”).
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Huq queries whether such a right can be justified. He rejects calls for transparency and accuracy, reasoning that human decision-makers can be just as
opaque250 and just as inaccurate251 as machines. He rejects dignity as too nebulous a ground for a contestation right.252 He concludes that none of a host
of concerns can justify a right to a human-made decision, even in the criminal
law context.253
Instead, Huq reasons that the purpose of individualized due process
is largely utilitarian: to ensure systemic accuracy and lack of bias.254 Instead
of individual due process challenges, he calls for a “right to a well-calibrated machine decision”—that is, a right to an unbiased and accurate
system, rather than a right to engage with its individualized outputs.255
Such a right could, per Huq, be vindicated through ex ante and systemic
measures, or through ex post class action litigation.
We disagree. Challenges aimed at systemic issues are advisable, but
cannot replace the ability of individual contestation rights to ameliorate real
harms. This section applies the rationales we have identified for individual
process in human decision-making—accuracy, rule of law considerations,
utilitarianism, natural rights, and, yes, dignity—to decision-making by AI.
Decisions made by AI can be inaccurate. Due process mechanisms can
improve the accuracy of the system as a whole.256 For example, an individual person can best identify when the long-tail problem has occurred.257
The Somali-American grocers who were not permitted to accept food
stamps because the USDA’s algorithm mistakenly found fraud could have,
through contestation, established that their customers were in fact making

250. See id. at 643 (“Given the availability of mechanisms for investigating machinelearning decisions—some of which parallel methods for understanding human decision
making—it cannot be said a priori that machines are any more opaque than humans.”).
251. See id. at 654 (arguing that, for the tasks that can be performed by both humans
and machines, evidence suggests that machines will generate fewer false positives and negatives than most human decision-making).
252. See id. at 652 (“I also try to avoid tautological reliance on ambiguous and contested
concepts such as ‘autonomy’ and ‘dignity.’ ”).
253. Id. at 685. In a second article, Huq does argue for ex post litigation to challenge
ﬂawed algorithmic systems, but prefers what he calls “wholesale and not retail” litigation—
that is, litigation focused on “system-level operation” of machine-learning tools. Huq, Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State, supra note 8, at 1949. This litigation would
complement ex ante regulation and would take the form of agency-directed or class action
litigation. Id. at 1950–51.
254. See Huq, Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State, supra note 8, at
1948 (“Indeed, a takeaway from my analysis is that there is a wide array of ex ante tools
available to regulators wishing to promote constitutional norms in the machine-learning
state.”).
255. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 686.
256. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 121 (“[D]ue process can serve as a systematic
management technique for Big Data by uncovering errors, identifying their causes, and
providing schemes and incentives to correct them . . . .”).
257. For a discussion of the long-tail problem, see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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whole-number purchases.258 Similarly, individual actions contesting an algorithm’s decisions about allocating home care visits for severely disabled
individuals revealed both individual and broader inaccuracies.259 Court
proceedings revealed that the algorithm accounted for only about sixty
factors from a much longer list collected from patients, didn’t account for
diabetes issues, and was improperly coded for cerebral palsy.260 The cerebral palsy mistake alone had “caused incorrect calculations for hundreds
of people, mostly lowering their hours [of home care].”261 Only an individual contestation in which “the other c[ame] and cross-examine[d]”262
allowed these systemic accuracy problems to be identiﬁed.
Individual contestation rights can also support rule of law values. Rule
of law values suggest that decisions should be fair, consistent, predictable,
and rational across different individuals.263 But AI decisions can be arbitrary or subject to a logic we cannot understand or normatively reject. For
example, an algorithm may ﬁnd that credit risk correlates to the color of
a person’s socks.264 People with pink socks might get better credit than
people with blue socks, or vice versa. Even if this correlation is backed by
unimpeachable studies, it may still feel unreasonable, arbitrary, or even—
if sock color correlates with other features such as gender or sexual orientation—discriminatory.
An individual right to contest AI-made credit decisions could uncover
the sock color irrationality. It could uncover, too, whether such rules are
being applied consistently across individuals or whether the system instead
has created sock color loopholes that make it normatively unfair.
A utilitarian argument for a right to contest AI could take three forms.
First, giving individuals a right to contest AI decisions could produce
greater acceptance of such decisional systems.265 Second, where such deci-

258. See generally McGann, supra note 85.
259. See Lecher, supra note 80 (noting how algorithms regarding home visits can work
to the detriment of disabled individuals); McCormick, supra note 56 (explaining how disabled and elderly people have had to ﬁght against decisions made by an algorithm to get the
support services they need).
260. Lecher, supra note 80.
261. Id.
262. Proverbs 18:17 (NSRV).
263. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 119.
264. See Ed Felten, What Does It Mean to Ask for an “Explainable” Algorithm?,
Freedom to Tinker (May 31, 2017), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2017/05/31/whatdoes-it-mean-to-ask-for-an-explainable-algorithm [https://perma.cc/BKJ8-LERE] (“For example, imagine that an algorithm for making credit decisions considers the color of a person’s socks, and this is supported by unimpeachable scientiﬁc studies showing that sock
color correlates with defaulting on credit, even when controlling for other factors.”). Felten
calls this “unreasonableness.” Id.
265. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30
Crime & Just. 283, 291 (2003) (“[D]eclining conﬁdence in law and legal authorities may
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sions have very signiﬁcant effects, such as the deprivation of welfare beneﬁts or the denial of child custody,266 “rule utilitarianism” might suggest
that process protections are more likely to maximize social welfare by
preventing serious pain. Third, if AI decisions threaten the private sphere,
even utilitarians may ﬁnd that individual process rights should apply. The
denial of child custody could be characterized as impinging upon the
private sphere;267 so could, for example, an employer’s use of AI to
intrusively track employee behavior or attributes.268
From a Lockean perspective, individuals should have a right to contest AI decisions where such decisions impinge on natural entitlements
such as the rights to life, liberty, and property. A right to contest could help
mitigate error. Equally important is that a contestation process could evidence individual buy-in or even consent.
Finally, we come to dignity. The dignitary argument for a right to contest is perhaps the strongest, despite Huq’s and others’ objections to it.
Decisions that affect people’s lives implicate dignity. Speciﬁc examples are
clear on this point. It is offensive to the dignity of Black kidney patients to
deny them the same chance at life-saving treatment as white patients with
kidney disease of the same severity.269 It is offensive to the dignity of homehealth-care patients to severely limit their existing independence, to leave
“people lying in their own waste . . . getting bed sores . . . being shut in . . .
skipping meals,” and fearing institutionalization, and to “reduce [their]
humanity to a number.”270 AI, by its nature, categorizes people in order to
make decisions. Categorizing individuals arguably objectiﬁes them;
affording a right to contest that categorization restores at least some form
of dignity.271 Affording a right to contest affords a form of respect to
lead to declining feelings of obligation to obey the police, the courts, and the law . . . , raising the possibility that compliance may be increasingly problematic.”); Tom R. Tyler, What
Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures,
22 Law & Soc’y Rev. 103, 128 (1988); see also Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note
185, at 1119 (“Tyler and others have shown that people care deeply about procedural justice,
to the point that they might ﬁnd a proceeding more tolerable and fair if their proceduraljustice concerns are satisﬁed even if they do not obtain their preferred outcome in the
proceeding.”).
266. Dan Hurley, Can an Algorithm Tell When Kids Are in Danger?, N.Y. Times (Jan. 2,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/magazine/can-an-algorithm-tell-when-kidsare-in-danger.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
267. Stephanie Cuccaro-Alamin, Regan Foust, Rhema Vaithianathan & Emily PutnamHornstein, Risk Assessment and Decision Making in Child Protective Services: Predictive
Risk Modeling in Context, 79 Child & Youth Servs. Rev. 291, 295 (2017).
268. Pegah Moradi & Karen Levy, The Future of Work in the Age of AI: Displacement
or Risk-Shifting?, in The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of AI 271, 282–83 (Markus D. Dubber,
Frank Pasquale & Sunit Das eds., 2020).
269. See Simonite, Kidney Transplants, supra note 64.
270. See McCormick, supra note 56.
271. See Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1541 (“The dignitary argument—which for U.S. readers skeptical of dignity includes what are often characterized as
autonomy concerns—posits that an individual human being should be respected as a whole,
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individual people in the system. It permits participation. It establishes
agency.
Rather than acting as mere “abstract and vague” concepts, dignity and
autonomy interests animate calls for accuracy (to root out harmful mistakes) and rule of law constraints (to root out unequal, inconsistent effects), as well as values of rationality, respect, and individual participation
in decision-making. Though dignity and autonomy may not, by themselves, provide sufficient justiﬁcations for contestation, they provide essential justiﬁcations. And because respecting dignity and autonomy enhances
acceptance, including them in design rubrics may ultimately contribute to
a decision-making system’s legitimacy.
As noted above, dignitary theory is not new to U.S. law. It is not even
new in the data privacy context. In fact, early calls for data governance
echoed concerns about individual powerlessness and lack of autonomy
that sound in similar dignitary notes.272 These calls resulted in existing U.S.
privacy laws that, while not as comprehensive or consolidated as European
data privacy law, are founded on the notion that affording transparency
and participation mitigates power disparities.
Thus, theories from the due process literature support a call for a
right to contest AI. And when we look to the legal systems that have established or suggested establishing a right to contest, we see echoes of each
of these theories.
For example, Europe’s 1995 Directive protections grew, in part, from
a concern about automation bias that sounded in accuracy—that human
decision-makers “may attach too much weight” to an automated decision
and fail to question its reasoning or catch its errors.273 The Council of
Europe, in its 2020 Recommendation, notes that “algorithmic systems are
based on statistical models in which errors form an inevitable part,” and
that, owing to algorithmic systems’ large-scale effects, the “number of people . . . who are affected by these errors and inbuilt bias, will also
expand.”274
Rule of law values, too, animate concerns about algorithmic decisionmaking. Both the scholarly literature and European policy-makers voice
free person. Being subjected to algorithmic decision-making threatens individuals’ personhood by objectifying them.”); see also supra note 182.
272. See HEW Report, supra note 68, at 223 (noting how there had been little effort to
examine new systems’ potential to erode privacy and individual autonomy); Daniel J. Solove,
A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 487 (2006) (referring to the dignitary harms).
273. Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 10, at 83–84 (quoting Amended Proposal for a
Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, at 26, COM (92) 422 ﬁnal (Oct. 15,
1992)).
274. Council of Eur., Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1 of the Committee of Ministers
to Member States on the Human Rights Impacts of Algorithmic Systems, app. at 4 (2020),
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?docum
entId=09000016809e1154 [https://perma.cc/YC8H-QUTX].
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concerns about fairness, predictability, accountability, and the need to discipline algorithmic decisions. The Council of Europe, in its
Recommendation, directly invokes the rule of law, admonishing that “the
rule of law standards that govern public and private relations, such as legality, transparency, predictability, accountability, and oversight, must also
be maintained in the context of algorithmic systems.”275
Both the GDPR and Council are motivated by autonomy and dignity
rationales as well as accuracy.276 Article 15 of the Directive was, ﬁrst, intended to protect an autonomy interest that an individual has in actively
“participating in the making of decisions which are of importance to [an
individual].”277 The second, closely related, rationale was to protect individual dignity, by preventing machine decisions from being made based
on objectiﬁed and uncontestable “data shadows.”278
3. Open Questions. — Once we establish that a right to contest should
exist, challenging questions remain, such as (1) when are process rights
triggered? and (2) what sort of process might each theory require?
The ﬁrst question—the threshold question—is beyond the scope of
this Article and worthy of signiﬁcant additional work.279 However, due process theory provides some clues. Each of the theories discussed above suggests that due process is triggered when a signiﬁcant right of some kind is
meaningfully affected. Due process doctrine in practice does the same,
asking whether an individual has been deprived of a liberty or property
right.280 The GDPR’s right to contestation, similarly, is triggered only when
a decision based solely on automated processing, including proﬁling, produces “legal effects” or “similarly signiﬁcant effects,” or “similarly signiﬁcantly affects” an individual.281
As to the kind of process required, much of the remainder of this
Article is dedicated to answering that question. We brieﬂy note here, however, that the arguments for reason giving are particularly salient to our
task.282 AI decisions do not naturally provide reasons for outcomes. In fact,
275. Id. at 1.
276. See Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 10, at 82–83; supra note 182.
277. Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 10, at 83 (quoting the Commission Proposal for a
Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in Relation to the Processing of
Personal Data, at 29, COM (1990) 314 ﬁnal (Sept. 13, 1990), http://aei.pitt.edu/3768/1/
3768.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4Q5-XETS]).
278. Id. at 84 (discerning “a concern to uphold human dignity by ensuring that humans
(and not their ‘data shadows’) maintain the primary role in ‘constituting’ themselves”).
279. See Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1550–52 (discussing possible
thresholds and reserving the question).
280. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263
(1970).
281. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(1).
282. See Schauer, Giving Reasons, supra note 207, at 657 (“[W]hen institutional designers have grounds for believing that decisions will systematically be the product of bias . . . or
simply excess haste, requiring decisionmakers to give reasons may counteract . . . these
tendencies.”).
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some technologies cannot provide explanations unless they are programmed to do so. Reason giving is central to contestation, not just because it might increase accuracy, but because it commits to treating
decisional subjects equally, contributes to consistency, allows for quality
control, and demonstrates respect for the subject of a decision.283 Contestation without an explanation, in other words, is largely meaningless.284
Taken all together, the rationales behind individual process rights apply with force to AI decision-making. Effective contestation rights can ameliorate individual harms and give life to broader rule of law values.
Contestation can play a valuable role in policing AI decision-making and
directing it toward accuracy, consistency, reliability, and fairness.
However, a right to contest by itself is not a panacea. There has been
an understandable backlash against mere process, or “procedural fetishism.”285 And as Parts III and IV discuss, effective contestation is heavily dependent on both design and context. Systemic solutions—for example,
testing, audits, algorithmic impact assessments, and documentation requirements286—are all important, too.287 Substantive law matters. Access to
legal representation or expertise matters. Correcting historic and embedded systemic injustice matters.
The point is not that process alone matters. The point is that it matters,
too.
III. CONTESTATION MODELS
Under this normative analysis, the EU, Council of Europe, OECD,
Brazil, Quebec, and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada are
all correct in calling for or establishing a right to contest AI. What that
right to contest should look like in practice, however, is an open question.
The GDPR’s right to contest AI, as noted, is more cipher than road map.
The second half of this Article thus turns to how the right to contest
might be operationalized. The constitutional due process model, which
283. See id.; see also Hildebrandt, Privacy as Protection of the Incomputable Self, supra
note 26, at 109.
284. See Bayamlıoğlu, Transparency of Automated Decisions, supra note 9, at 34.
285. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 Mich. L. Rev. 345 (2019).
286. Desai & Kroll, supra note 176, at 6 (calling for ex ante testing); Selbst, Disparate
Impact in Big Data Policing, supra note 59, at 169 (calling for Algorithmic Impact
Statements); Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 185, at 1100–05 (calling for algorithmic impact assessments and recoding requirements).
287. Indeed, each of us in different policy contexts has spent a good amount of time
and ink discussing a number of them. See Margot E. Kaminski & Gianclaudio Malgieri,
Algorithmic Impact Assessments Under the GDPR: Producing Multi-Layered Explanations,
11 Int’l Data Privacy L. 125, 125–26 (2021) [hereinafter Kaminski & Malgieri, Impact
Assessments]; Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis & Brianna L. Schoﬁeld, Notice and
Takedown in Everyday Practice 133–40 (2017) (U.C. Berkeley Pub. L. Rsch. Paper No.
2755628), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2755628 [https://perma.cc/K2LF-NTBL] [hereinafter Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice].
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affords notice and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral arbiter,
encounters signiﬁcant obstacles when applied to AI decision-making.288 AI
decisions are made at speed and at scale—features that in fact can be core
justiﬁcations for using AI in the ﬁrst place.289 To impose full judicial process on each AI decision would be to impose costs, both monetary and
temporal, that might make the use of AI unwieldy.
Sometimes, as in the criminal context, this may be a good thing: The
benefits of using AI may be so outweighed by the consequences of potential
injustice that nothing short of full judicial process might suffice. Others have,
for similar reasons, called for a moratorium on law enforcement use of facial
recognition (a form of AI), reasoning that the costs in the law enforcement
context are not worth any benefits the technology might afford.290
Often, however, AI decision-making may be either so useful or so established that an outright ban is not possible.291 Affording judicial process
in every contestation would outpace the resources of our judicial system.292
What, then, should be done to afford process that is not perfect, but instead is good enough?
This problem is not new. The question of how to afford adequate individual process at speed and at scale has been at the core of several policy
debates.293 There are “offline” models for abbreviated process, too.294 This
Part identiﬁes and examines four archetypes for process at speed and at
scale: the GDPR’s right to contestation, the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act’s “notice-and-takedown” process, the EU’s so-called “Right to be
Forgotten,” and the Fair Credit Billing Act’s process for challenging credit
288. Scholars who are proponents of individual “due process” in this context have considered ways in which process might be adapted from the traditional model. See, e.g., Citron
& Pasquale, Scored Society, supra note 8, at 8; Citron, Technological Due Process, supra
note 3, at 1258; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 107–09 (advocating a procedural data
due process model that goes beyond existing government frameworks that rely on ex ante
notice, choice, and control).
289. Large-scale online copyright infringement, for example, has prompted both copyright holders and OSPs to use automated tools. See, e.g., Urban et al., Notice and Takedown
in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 8.
290. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Facial Recognition Is the Perfect Tool
for Oppression, Medium (Aug. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/facial-recognitionis-the-perfect-tool-for-oppression-bc2a08f0fe66 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
291. For examples of automated decision-making that span sectors as diverse as employment, medical care, and copyright, see the archetypes described infra sections III.B–.E; supra text accompanying notes 50–67.
292. Similarly, Van Loo observes that “[i]t would be unrealistic to require a full trial for
every account suspension, even if the risk of error would decrease. We must therefore examine what the burden would be of imposing a given procedure.” Van Loo, supra note 5,
at 864.
293. Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform Governance: Private Power in the Shadow
of the State, 72 SMU L. Rev. 27, 60 (2019) (“Scholars and civil society organizations have . . .
criticized the procedural deﬁcits of global speech governance.”).
294. See generally Van Loo, supra note 5, at 851–58 (describing longstanding procedures used by credit card companies and credit bureaus).
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card transactions. We show how the GDPR’s right to contestation has been
implemented by different EU Member States in ways that map onto the
archetypes. After establishing these archetypes and observing them in action, this Article turns, in the next and ﬁnal Part, to crafting a meaningful
right to contest AI.
A.

The Design of Privatized Process: Four Contestation Archetypes

This Part establishes four contestation archetypes, drawn from models
used in practice. These archetypes can frame discussions of contestation
and provide theoretical clarity to often myopic conversations about process at speed and scale.
In this examination of extrajudicial contestation models, the devil is
usually in the details. Contestation varies along a number of axes, with signiﬁcant consequences for the efficacy and legitimacy of the system. How
any one of these axes is calibrated can affect the success of the entire system. For purposes of the archetypes, contestation varies along two key
axes; other considerations are addressed in section III.F below.
The ﬁrst key axis is whether the contestation mechanism itself is established by what we call a “contestation rule” or by a “contestation standard.”295 This distinction is related, but not identical, to the more general
distinction between rules and standards in the law. The literature on legal
rules and standards is robust.296 One way to understand the difference between a legal rule and a legal standard is that a legal rule provides clear
and precise content ex ante (“do not drive above 75 mph”), while a standard’s content is determined by an interpreter ex post (“drive reasonably”—what is reasonable?).297 Another way to understand the distinction
is that a rule ties the hands of future decision-makers, requiring them “to
respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering
facts,”298 while a legal standard provides more discretion, asking decisionmakers to apply a “background principle or policy . . . to a fact situation.”299 Rules may have the beneﬁt of being clear and providing notice;300
295. See Kaplow, supra note 143, at 559–62. We describe this as a “contestation standard” rather than a “standard” because this could be understood as a rule in a more general
sense: It clearly contains some rule-like substance, and it decides there should be some sort
of contestation right, rather than delegating whether there should be such a right to a later
decision-maker.
296. E.g., Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of RuleBased Decisionmaking in Law and in Life (1991); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 Yale L.J. 65 (1983); Kaplow, supra note 143; Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 Harv. L. Rev.
1214 (2010).
297. Kaplow, supra note 143, at 559.
298. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 58 (1992).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 62.
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standards may have the beneﬁt of avoiding under- or over-inclusivity.301
Standards also arguably have the beneﬁt of inducing moral deliberation
in citizens, including in the corporate context (what is “hostile”? or “offensive”?)302—but the corresponding disadvantage of leaving discretion to
actors whose interpretations of such broader principles may be selfserving.
A contestation rule, as this Article deﬁnes it, is similar to a legal rule in
that its precise details are spelled out ex ante, by legislators or regulators,
including: a notice requirement, a timeline for complaining, a timeline
for responses to complaints, or formal requirements for how to complain.
A contestation standard, by contrast, merely states that there is a right to
contest, leaving the procedural details to future decision-makers, private
or public.
For example, a law could dictate that “individuals should be afforded a
right to contest,” without saying more about the parameters of the right,
when and how it should be “afforded,” and so forth. This would establish
what this Article describes as a contestation standard, in the sense that without
more information, someone other than the legislature will be left to fill in
the gaps. At another level, however, a contestation standard still provides a
legal rule: It establishes that there is a right to contest, rather than leaving
that question vague. As another way of distinguishing the concepts, a
contestation rule may itself contain legal standards—for example, requiring a
business to respond to contestation within a “reasonable” time frame. As
with legal rules and standards more generally, in practice these are not
“pure types,” as “legal commands mix the two in varying degrees.”303
A contestation rule, or really, a set of contestation rules, could dictate not
just the existence of a right to contest, but its granular details: whether, when,
and how notice should be afforded; how decisions should be made; by whom;
and on what timeline. For example, a law could state: “Individuals should
be notified as to an adverse decision within 5 business days, using the following format, and challenges must be heard before a neutral arbiter within 10
business days, with individuals afforded the following procedural rights.”
As with rules and standards more generally, there are costs and benefits
to designing a right to contest as more rules based or standards based. A
contestation standard has the benefit of flexibility. It allows decision-makers to
tailor the right in response to particular circumstances, including to particular technologies or sectors. It allows other actors, such as regulators or
judges or even regulated entities, to fill in the gaps in the afforded process
over time, or to modify approaches as technology, practices, and norms
evolve. Thus a contestation standard, like standards more generally, arguably “future-proofs” the law against changing circumstances, requiring less
future intervention through legislation or regulation.
301. Kaplow, supra note 143, at 590.
302. Shiffrin, supra note 296, at 1227.
303. Kaplow, supra note 143, at 561.
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A contestation rule, by contrast, has the beneﬁt of clarity. With clarity
often comes lower costs. If the law is clear about what it requires, an entity
attempting to comply with a contestation rule can spend less money on
lawyers and risks fewer penalties for erroneous noncompliance. This has
implications for competition: For smaller and less resourced companies,
lower-cost rules could establish a more level playing ﬁeld—although some
rules may be costly in their execution and so disadvantage less resourced
companies regardless. A contestation rule, too, has the potential beneﬁt
of affording less wiggle room. By establishing clear and inﬂexible processes, a contestation rule can better guarantee that the same process will
be afforded equally across all actors.
The second axis along which contestation varies is how much substantive law it incorporates or relies on. A right to contest can be more purely
procedural, focused on the mechanics of contestation—on affording a
right to contest, but not the underlying substantive rights. Or contestation
can be substantive, establishing not just how contestation should occur, but
on what basis a decision may be contested. Simply put, a right to contest
that has a substantive focus incorporates not just the procedural rules of a
challenge, but the substantive basis of that challenge. For example, a law
could state: “Individuals have a right to contest decisions, which cannot be
made on the basis of an erroneous piece of data.” An individual invoking
this right to contest could then challenge a decision for being based on an
erroneous piece of data.304
The other pole of this axis—contestation based on procedure—might
seem strange. How can one have a right to contest a decision that lacks
grounding in a substantive right? But when we look to existing models of
contestation rights, it becomes apparent that sometimes process is divorced from the substance of the challenge. This can occur in two ways.
First, some versions of contestation establish how, procedurally, one might
contest a decision, without establishing a substantive basis for the challenge. This is the case for some early implementations of the GDPR’s right
to contestation. Second, even where there is an underlying substantive basis, other features of a contestation scheme—including strict procedural
rules and decision-making at speed and scale—can render the scheme procedural in practice. As described below, this is the case for the notice-andtakedown process of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In
fact, some schemes allow challenges to be made and completed without
really getting to any substantive basis for them at all.
For example, a law might state: “Individuals have a right to challenge
an AI’s decision to assign them a particular grade.” This statement establishes only that there is a right to challenge the AI’s decision. It does not
304. This is not to say that establishing a substantive basis for contestation makes things
simple. The problems with disparate impact cases show that this is no easy task. See, e.g.,
Ajunwa, Auditing Imperative, supra note 4, at 652–58 (discussing empirical studies of court
cases that demonstrate the difficulty of proving disparate impact cases).
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establish, normatively or practically, what reasons or reasoning might give
rise to successful challenges.
A law that fails to identify the substantive basis for a right to contest
leaves substantive decisions in the hands of nonlegislative actors. The substance of a challenge might then be decided not by legislators but by regulators, judges, the contesting parties themselves, or the nonjudicial
entities mediating or adjudicating contestation. Or it may afford a right to
contest that is all procedure, with no clear substance at all.
Once again, this design choice—whether to make the right to contest
more substantive or more procedural—has consequences, both good and
bad. The benefit of a right to contest that is more focused on procedure is
that substantive law can be subtle, heavily fact dependent, and complicated.
Expertise in substantive law can thus be very expensive, which can impede
individual access to justice. Additionally, as the due process theory discussed
above argues, process can matter for its own sake. Process by itself can afford
transparency, reveal problems in decision-making, give individuals agency
in a decision, and make decision-making accountable, even if underlying
substantive norms go unstated.
There are downsides, though, to a heavily procedural and minimally
substantive right to contest. The first is arbitrariness. Affording the ability to
contest a decision without substantive grounding gives no notice to the entity whose decisions are subject to contestation, except that it may be subject
to challenges against any and all decisions. Unconstrained challenges bring
with them costs, including the cost of a large volume of challenges.305 Arbitrariness can be bad for challengers, too; creating no substantive backstop
to a contestation right means that an adjudicator (who is sometimes the same
as the entity whose decision is being contested) has untethered discretion.
The following tables illustrate the archetypes. Table I describes the
archetypes. Table II offers hypothetical statutory language illustrating
them.
TABLE I: THE CONTESTATION ARCHETYPES
Contestation Standard

Contestation Rule

Procedural
Focus

1) Contestation Standard
with a Procedural Focus

2) Contestation Rule with
a Procedural Focus

Substantive
Focus

3) Contestation Standard
with a Substantive Focus

4) Contestation Rule with
a Substantive Focus

305. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[N]oticebased liability for interactive computer service providers would provide third parties with a nocost means to create the basis for future lawsuits . . . . In light of the vast amount of speech
communicated through interactive computer services, these notices could produce an
impossible burden for service providers.”).
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TABLE II: HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES OF THE CONTESTATION ARCHETYPES
Contestation Standard

Contestation Rule

Procedural
Focus

1) “An individual shall
have a right to contest
decisions, and shall be
afforded adequate
process.”

2) “An individual shall have
a right to contest decisions.
She shall be provided notice
of an adverse decision
within 5 business days . . . “

Substantive
Focus

3) “An individual shall
have a right to contest
decisions, which shall not
be biased.”

4) “An individual shall have
a right to contest decisions,
which cannot be made on
the basis of erroneous data
points.”

As with all archetypes and models, in reality, most laws map onto a
continuum, rather than reside at the poles.306 For example, the GDPR’s
right to contestation is on its face purely procedural, but read in context,
arguably has substantive components.307 On the spectrum between substantive and procedural, the GDPR’s right to contest, at least on its face,
sits closer to the procedural pole:
GDPR Right to Contest

Procedural

Substantive

Laws, too, will often contain more than one archetype at a time. For
example, the chargeback process of the Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA)
contains both precise language on substance (making it a contestation
rule with a substantive focus), and precise rules on the elements of required notice and contestation timelines (making it also a contestation
rule with a procedural focus).
Further, laws may operate very differently in practice from how they
appear on paper. This can be deliberate—when, for example, a law delegates interpretive power to a regulator that adds in details that make a standard more rule-like in practice. For example, the EU’s Right to Be Forgotten
has arguably become more rule-like over time, as regulators have issued

306. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy,
89 Wash. U. L. Rev. 103, 107 (2011) (“Given the linearity of substance and procedure, one
could imagine the distinction either as a dichotomy of black and white . . . or as a spectrum
of gray, with many or even most legal rules falling in the mushy middle. Descriptively, of
course, the latter view is more accurate.”).
307. See GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(3). For example, the right applies to a decision
that “signiﬁcantly affects” the subject of the decision, id. art. 22(1), and the regulators responsible for explaining the articles have clariﬁed that the apparently procedural requirement of a “solely” automated decision in fact involves a determination of whether there was
meaningful human involvement, see Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making,
supra note 115, at 20–21 (discussing meaningful human involvement).
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more detailed guidelines.308 Similarly, the GDPR’s right to contestation has
been altered by Member States whose implementations of the right have
moved it from one quadrant to another.309
Or, the law’s implementation might change over time to depart from
its original design. For example, some online platforms have developed
approaches to online copyright infringement that one of us has termed
“DMCA Auto” and “DMCA Plus.”310 In these approaches, online service
providers (OSPs) employ automated systems to remove content—or prevent it from ever making it onto the provider’s platform. Some versions of
these approaches forgo substantive review in favor of rapid removal at
scale; others go beyond what is required by the DMCA in the ﬁrst place.311
In turn, these decisions are sometimes subject to a privatized version of
contestation that also departs from the law.312 On paper, then, the DMCA
establishes a contestation rule with a procedural focus, grounded in substantive copyright law. But what happens in practice may depart from the
substantive law; in the case of “DMCA Plus,” practice may depart from the
DMCA’s procedural requirements, too.
This brings us to an important aspect of our chosen archetypes: Each
is an example of privatized contestation—contestation effected by private
parties. In each chosen archetype, the private parties that actually apply a
contestation scheme develop that scheme and operate under some type of
308. See Eur. Data Prot. Bd., Guidelines 5/2019 on the Criteria of the Right to Be
Forgotten in the Search Engine Cases Under the GDPR (Part 1), paras. 13–83 (July 7, 2020),
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁles/ﬁle1/edpb_guidelines_201905_rtbfsearc
hengines_afterpublicconsultation_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6SVM-V474]
(detailing
grounds for a data subject’s personal data to be delisted from search engine results and
grounds for a search engine’s proper refusal to delist such data); see also Article 29 Data
Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice of the
European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección
de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja Gonzáles” C-131/12, at 2–3 (2014), http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/
wp225_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/98GH-6SPR] [hereinafter Article 29 Working Party,
Guidelines on Google Spain] (listing circumstances under which data subjects can demand
that “search engines . . . de-list certain links to information affecting their privacy from the
results for searches made against their name”).
309. See Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note
115, at 18–23 (comparing member state implementations).
310. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 29;
see also Maria Strong, U.S. Copyright Off., Section 512 of Title 17: A Report of the
Register of Copyrights 67 (2020), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section512-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C68-HWFA] (noting the existence of “DMCA+
systems”); Annemarie Bridy, Copyright’s Digital Deputies: DMCA-Plus Enforcement by
Internet Intermediaries, in Research Handbook on Electronic Commerce Law 185, 187
( John A. Rothchild ed., 2016) (surveying “the current landscape of DMCA-plus
enforcement”).
311. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 29.
312. See Bridy, supra note 310, at 197 (explaining how YouTube’s Content ID program
and Vimeo’s Copyright Match program “allow users to dispute a copyright owner’s claim on
content”).
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statutory or regulatory framework. Some readers might characterize these
choices as leaving a missing box: privatized contestation unconstrained by
law or regulation. For example, much ink has been spilled on the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) Section 230 and the broad immunity it affords to platforms from liability for online content moderation.313
In the absence of a statutory contestation mechanism for most online content, many platforms have developed contestation schemes that are constrained only by the platforms’ preferences and interests.314 Those purely
privatized mechanisms can certainly inform the conversation about how
to design contestation rights—especially whether or not companies can be
trusted to come up with adequate process and substance. However, this
Article aims to structure a conversation about statutory and regulatory design rather than entirely privatized approaches.315
The rest of this Part turns to examples that illustrate these archetypes
of contestation in action. Table III identiﬁes how our examples map onto
our contestation archetypes.
TABLE III: THE CONTESTATION ARCHETYPES IN ACTION
Contestation
Standard

Contestation
Rule

Procedural
Focus

1) The GDPR’s “Right
to Contestation”

2) The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act’s (DMCA’s)
“Notice-and-takedown” regime;
The UK Right to Contestation

Substantive
Focus

3) The EU’s “Right to
Be Forgotten” (RTBF);
The Slovenian Right to
Contestation

4) The Fair Credit Billing Act
(FCBA); The French &
Hungarian Rights to
Contestation

313. E.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace 170–81 (2016); Eric
Goldman, An Overview of the United States’ Section 230 Internet Immunity, in The Oxford
Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability 155, 155 (Giancarlo Frosio ed., 2020); Jeff
Kosseff, The Twenty-Six Words That Created the Internet (2019); David S. Ardia, Free
Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 373 (2010);
Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 401 (2017); Eric Goldman, The Ten Most
Important Section 230 Rulings, 20 Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 1 (2017); Felix T. Wu,
Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 293
(2011).
314. See Kate Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent
Institution to Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129 Yale L.J. 2418, 2427–48 (2020) (discussing Facebook’s content moderation process prior to the establishment of the ﬁrm’s
Independent Governance and Oversight Board); Van Loo, supra note 5, at 832 (providing
“case studies of the dispute processes designed by Airbnb, Amazon, Facebook, and
Google”).
315. Inasmuch as reforms to CDA 230 suggest implementing statutory changes, these
archetypes may prove useful.
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In the wild, none of these examples is perfect. Here, each is simpliﬁed
for purposes of illustration. At their core, however, these examples effectively illustrate the variations in how a right to contest might be
designed.316
B.

Archetype 1 Illustrated: The GDPR’s Right to Contestation

The first quadrant of the contestation archetypes is a contestation standard with a procedural focus.317 The GDPR’s right to contestation embodies this
archetype.
As discussed above, the GDPR’s right to contestation is a set of standards rather than speciﬁc rules. It does not, on its face, provide substantive
grounds for challenging algorithmic decisions—those grounds, some suggest, will be found in other areas of substantive law.318 The Guidelines issued by the EU’s data regulator, the European Data Protection Board,
highlight the centrality of the right to contest without giving it much further substance.319
While the right to contestation itself is as of yet a cipher, other GDPR
rights can be understood to give it substance. For example, a number of the
GDPR transparency rights are meant to enable contestation.320 The GDPR
requires notice to individuals who have been subjected to an automated decision; disclosure of “meaningful information about the logic involved” in
an automated decision-making system; and explanation of individual decisions.321 These various forms of transparency are intended to enable individuals to meaningfully contest algorithmic decision-making.322

316. The newly enacted Virginia Consumer Data Privacy Act, Va. Code § 59.1-577(C)
(2021), and Colorado Privacy Act, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 3445, 3459 (to be codiﬁed at Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 6-1-1306(3) (2021)), each contain privatized contestation models for “personal
data rights” that could be slotted into the archetypes.
317. To be clear, this is what the GDPR right to contest looks like on the face of the law.
Certain EU Member States have further detailed this right, sometimes in ways that move it
from this ﬁrst archetype to one of the other quadrants. For further discussion of this hybridization, see infra section III.F.
318. Bayamlıoğlu, Transparency of Automated Decisions, supra note 9, at 41–49 (observing that “[n]either Article 22 nor the GDPR in general[] contains any guidance as to
the substance of the right to contest automated decisions” and arguing that the contents of
the right of contestation can be “a legal procedure or an adjudicatory system”).
319. Id. at 41.
320. The right to explanation and the right to know “meaningful information about the
logic involved,” GDPR, supra note 13, art. 15(1)(h), in automated decision-making are, according to the Guidelines, meant to empower individuals to contest such decisions,
Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 27; see also Mendoza
& Bygrave, supra note 10, at 91; Selbst & Powles, supra note 127, at 236 (“[T]he test for
whether information is meaningful should be functional, pegged to some action the explanation enables in the data subject, such as the right to contest a decision as provided by
Article 22(3).”).
321. Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 196–200.
322. Id. at 211.
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Generally applicable GDPR rights also give meaning to, or complement, the right to contestation.323 For example, the right to access, which
includes a right to see both the data a company holds about an individual
and inferences a company has made, enables individuals to challenge a
decision as being based on incorrect data or incorrect inferences.324 The
GDPR contains a correction right (the “right to rectiﬁcation”) as well,
which enables individuals to require companies to correct inaccurate personal data.325 Several other generally applicable GDPR rights, such as the
right to erasure, right to object, and right to restrict processing,326 can each
be understood as alternatively (1) complements to the right to contestation, (2) minimum requirements regardless of the strength of the contestation right, or perhaps (3) as models for the contestation right.
The right to contestation is intertwined, too, with the GDPR’s treatment of the “human in the loop” of automated decision-making.327 For
reasons ranging from a concern about respecting human dignity328 to a
concern about excessive deference to automated decisions,329 the GDPR
pushes both private and public entities toward involving humans in
signiﬁcant decisions, rather than allowing such decisions to be made by
machines alone. If companies wish to escape Article 22’s safeguard
requirements, they have to meaningfully involve a human in the loop.330
Where Article 22 applies, companies must adopt a means for “human
intervention.”331 The Guidelines suggest this might mean “for example
providing a link to an appeals process at the point the automated decision
is delivered to the data subject, with agreed timescales for the review and a
named contact point for any queries.”332 This suggestion in some ways resem-

323. See Edwards & Veale, supra note 175, at 49.
324. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 15(1); see also Guidelines on Automated Individual
Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 17.
325. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 16; see also Edwards & Veale, supra note 175, at 38.
326. GDPR, supra note 13, arts. 17, 18, 21.
327. Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop, supra note 72, at 231.
328. Id.; see also Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 10, at 84 (noting “a concern to uphold
human dignity by ensuring that humans (and not their ‘data shadows’) maintain the primary role in ‘constituting’ themselves”); Zarsky, Incompatible, supra note 182, at 1016–17
(“[W]hen faced with crucial decisions, a human should be treated with the dignity of having
a human decision-maker address his or her personal matter.”).
329. Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 10, at 84; Bygrave, Minding the Machine, supra
note 10, at 18; Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1271–72.
330. First, Article 22’s scope and stringency incentivize companies to meaningfully involve humans in algorithmic decision-making. Recall that Article 22 applies only when decisions are “based solely on automated processing”; this has been interpreted in the
Guidelines to mean decisions that do not involve meaningful human involvement and oversight. Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 20–21 (discussing what constitutes “meaningful human involvement”).
331. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(3).
332. Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 32.
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bles the DMCA notice-and-takedown process, in that it establishes a company contact point and suggests that there be timescales for procedures,
although it does not establish speciﬁc timelines.
Also notable is that the Guidelines’ example does not involve an external neutral decision-maker but houses the appeals process within the
same company that implements automated decision-making.333 While this
guidance arguably moves the right to contest from a pure contestation
standard to something more rule like, it still leaves most details up to the
entity processing the AI decision. Moreover, it is an example, not a
requirement.
The central concern about the right to contestation is that, like its
predecessor, it may become dead-letter law.334 The Guidelines, however,
show335 that the regulators that enforce the GDPR believe contestation is
a core component of the GDPR’s basket of rights.
A second concern about the right to contestation as a contestation
standard is that it leaves substantial wiggle room for companies and governments to render the right ineffective in practice. Furthermore, the
GDPR allows Member States to implement their own versions of the
right.336 As a standard, Article 22 leaves ample room for Member States to
craft their own versions of the contestation right, potentially resulting in
both higher compliance costs for companies operating across the EU and
in varying degrees of efficacy that depend on where a person lives.
Finally, the GDPR right at ﬁrst appears to be largely procedural rather
than substantive. It is not clear from the text on what basis someone may
contest an AI decision. This leaves open the possibility that implementing
entities or Member States can construct a right that is almost entirely procedural. And in fact, both the Guideline example discussed above and the
implementation by some Member States discussed below have construed
the right to contestation as being largely procedural in nature. This risks
defanging the right and allowing companies to comply through rubberstamped processes rather than requiring effective mechanisms with meaningful effects.337
But there are strong arguments that when it is read in context, there
is a substantive backstop to the GDPR’s contestation right—illustrating
333. Cf. Citron & Pasquale, Scored Society, supra note 8, at 20 (proposing that the FTC
plays an analogous supervisory role in the context of credit-scoring algorithms); Crawford
& Schultz, supra note 8, at 126–27 (proposing that a regulatory entity like the FTC play this
role).
334. Edwards & Veale, supra note 175, at 65–67; Wachter et al., Why a Right to
Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist, supra note 115, at 96–97.
335. Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 115,
at 4.
336. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(2)(b).
337. Wachter & Mittelstadt, Right to Reasonable Inferences, supra note 120, at 569 (calling “into question that the right to contest can be meaningfully implemented without underlying decision-making standards”).
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that laws often fall on a spectrum between the poles rather than existing
as pure versions of the archetypes. At least, individuals can contest the inaccuracy of the personal data on which decisions are based, using the general GDPR right to rectiﬁcation.338 It is clear, too, that the right to contest
is intended to go beyond mere rectiﬁcation. Like other restrictions on AI
decision-making, the right is intended to protect “the data subject’s rights
and freedoms and legitimate interests.”339 One can thus argue that the
GDPR affords a right to contest not just erroneous decisions, but biased
and discriminatory decisions, and most decisions based on highly sensitive
personal data.340 There is the worrisome prospect that both complying entities and Member States will eschew this substantive grounding and take
the GDPR’s right to contest in the more proceduralized direction offered
in the Guidelines.
C.

Archetype 2 Illustrated: The DMCA’s “Notice-and-Takedown” Process and
the UK Right to Contestation

We now move to the second archetype: a contestation rule with a procedural focus. This is illustrated by some implementations of the inﬂuential
“notice-and-takedown” process created by section 512 of the U.S.
DMCA.341 We also offer the UK implementation of the GDPR’s right to
contestation as an example.
1. DMCA Section 512. — The DMCA’s section 512 contains one of the
most widely adopted versions of a contestation right in the digital age. The
DMCA’s approach has been exported in various forms throughout the
world,342 including in the implementation of the EU’s E-Commerce

338. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 16 (“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from
the controller without undue delay the rectiﬁcation of inaccurate personal data concerning
him or her.”).
339. Id. art. 22(3).
340. GDPR, supra note 13, Recital 71. Recital 71 explains that entities should aim to
minimize errors and to “prevent . . . discriminatory effects on natural persons on the basis
of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs, trade union membership,
genetic or health status or sexual orientation,” and to not utilize processing “that results in
measures having such an effect.” While not speciﬁcally directed at the contestation right,
these substantive goals can be understood as the goals of contestation as well. Additionally,
Recital 71 states that AI decisions based on particularly sensitive personal information (“special categor[y]” data, such as biometric data, racial data, and sexual orientation data)
“should be allowed only under speciﬁc conditions.”
341. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2018).
342. For a detailed account of the DMCA’s inﬂuence on other implementations, see
Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 21–23 (“The ECommerce Directive was largely inspired by the DMCA safe harbors, though it differs from
the DMCA in several notable ways.”). For comprehensive discussions of the background and
relationship between the U.S. and European approaches, see generally Aleksandra
Kuczerawy, Intermediary Liability and Freedom of Expression in the EU: From Concepts to
Safeguards (2018); Miquel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbors and Their European
Counterparts: A Comparative Analysis of Some Common Problems, 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts
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Directive.343 For better or worse, section 512 has become a worldwide model
for a privatized version of individual due process as applied to online
expression.344
Section 512 structures online copyright disputes. Its drafters sought
to reduce legal uncertainty for OSPs and to reduce costs for copyright
holders facing online copyright infringement.345 Under section 512, copyright holders can address online copyright infringement by sending relatively inexpensive “takedown” notices directly to OSPs.346 If OSPs respond
to the takedown notices by removing the allegedly infringing material,
they receive “safe harbor” from certain types of secondary liability for their
users’ copyright infringements.347 In turn, targets of takedown notices can
contest removal by sending a “counter notiﬁcation” asking that material
be reinstated.348
Section 512’s notice-and-takedown scheme, taken as a whole, exempliﬁes a contestation rule. If material infringes copyright, then it comes
down. Moreover, the statute dictates many (though notoriously not all)
precise elements of a tightly orchestrated process.349 Copyright holders
481, 511 (2009) (arguing that, while the EU and U.S. statutes include problematic ambiguities and other similarities, their differences render them functionally distinct).
343. Council Directive 2000/31, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 13 (EC) [hereinafter ECommerce Directive]. Note that, in the majority of implementations, “takedown” is reserved for copyright complaints, though it is sometimes applied to other serious complaints
(such as complaints of so-called “manifestly unlawful” speech), and rarely, to any unlawful
content. See Aleksandra Kuczerawy, From ‘Notice and Take Down’ to ‘Notice and Stay
Down’: Risks and Safeguards for Freedom of Expression, in The Oxford Handbook of
Intermediary Liability Online 525, 526 (Giancarlo Frosio ed., 2020) (comparing and contrasting some speciﬁc national implementation strategies and how they “can impact the
right to freedom of expression”).
344. Beyond the E-Commerce Directive, the DMCA has inﬂuenced approaches in
online service providers’ mechanisms for removing content that implicates issues other than
copyright. See, e.g., Report a Trademark Issue, Twitter, https://support.twitter.com/forms/
trademark [https://perma.cc/A8HF-W8BF] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021); Trademark Report
Form, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/help/contact/284186058405647 [https://
perma.cc/42ES-JWFA] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021).
345. H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49–50 (1998); S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 20 (1998).
For a comprehensive account of the reasoning behind, and debates surrounding, the passage of the DMCA, see generally Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright: Protecting Intellectual
Property on the Internet (2001).
346. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3); S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 45 (explaining how the “notice and
takedown” procedure of subsection (c)(3) is a “formalization and reﬁnement” of the cooperative process meant to efficiently handle network-based copyright infringement).
347. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C); S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 19 (explaining that under section
512, there are a series of “safe harbors” for certain common activities of OSPs, in which the
OSP receives the beneﬁt of limited liability).
348. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(B).
349. A number of aspects of section 512 have been the subject of expensive and timeconsuming litigation, once again illustrating that most real-life examples sit on a spectrum
rather than being a pole of the archetypes. Even the timeline for takedown itself contains,
in addition to precise rules, standards such as “act[] expeditiously to remove” material. Id.
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
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must send a takedown request that contains speciﬁc information.350 If a
copyright holder properly requests a takedown, OSPs must “respond[] expeditiously to remove” material.351 Those whose material is targeted by a
takedown notice can contest removal by sending a “counter notiﬁcation”—that, again, contains speciﬁed information352—back to the OSP.353
If a counternotice arrives, the OSP must forward it on to the notice sender,
who can choose to ﬁle a copyright lawsuit against the target or let the dispute go.354 If, after a statutorily prescribed time period (ten to fourteen
days), no lawsuit is ﬁled, the OSP must replace the targeted material.355
Viewed as it is applied in practice, section 512 also exempliﬁes a procedural focus. Section 512’s contestation mechanism, in theory, is
grounded in substantive copyright law. Takedown and “putback” should
turn on copyright infringement or noninfringement, respectively. And in
some circumstances, this is how it operates: OSPs review takedown requests and consider whether there is infringement, then decide whether
to remove the complained-of material.356
In other cases, however, the notice-and-takedown project is, in practice, almost entirely procedural. In these circumstances, notices arrive and
material is removed with little or no substantive review by OSPs.357 This
occurs for a number of reasons. First, some OSPs must manage notices at
scale—millions, or at the limit, even a billion or more notices in a year. For
these OSPs, automated review and takedown is the only practicable
option.358
Second, the notice-and-takedown system creates an interlocking set of
requirements, incentives, and risks that push OSPs away from substantive
review and toward takedown. To begin, a copyright holder sending a
takedown notice does not have to prove a copyright violation. They just
have to identify allegedly infringing materials and state that they believe
in good faith that the targeted use is not authorized.359 OSPs reviewing the
notice then have strong incentives to err on the side of removal, because
strong remedies—injunctions, stiff statutory damages, and attorneys’
350. Id. § 512(c)(3) (specifying the required “[e]lements of notiﬁcation”).
351. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C). This, of course, is a standard embedded within a largely rulebound process. As noted, none of the archetypes is a perfect example.
352. Id. § 512(g)(3) (specifying the “[c]ontents of counter notiﬁcation”).
353. Id. § 512(g)(2)(B).
354. Id. § 512(g)(2)(B)–(C).
355. Id.
356. See Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 40–
41 (noting that these relatively substantively-based processes are still designed and followed
by the OSPs, which are not neutral arbiters).
357. Id. at 54 –55.
358. See id. at 52–54 (explaining that “notice-and-takedown” policies range from using
human review to evaluate manageable numbers of requests to processing mass amounts of
notices using automated systems).
359. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A).
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fees—are available for copyright infringement.360 Some OSPs thus simply
comply with all notices that appear to conform with section 512’s procedural requirements.361 As an OSP representative put it in empirical work
by one of us, “[T]he process forces you to try to stay out of making judgment calls [and] to take [takedown requests] at face value.”362
In these situations, the online platform either engages in a substantive
analysis biased by the incentives in the system or does not engage in substantive copyright analysis at all. Instead, the law establishes a statutorily
dictated process that is implemented by nonneutral parties, acting against
a legal and practical backdrop that militates toward takedown.
Section 512(f), which provides a judicial backstop to the process, allows participants to sue one another for knowing material misrepresentations that result in content being improperly removed or restored.363 That
is, section 512(f) does tether the notice-and-takedown process to the substance of copyright law—and provides recourse to a neutral arbiter—but
only inasmuch as it prevents users of the process from knowingly misrepresenting the law, and only inasmuch as it is actually invoked in practice
(which isn’t much). In the end, the ability to recover damages under section 512(f) pales in comparison to the downside risk OSPs incur by refusing removal or replacing contested material.364
On its face, the section 512 process is carefully structured to balance
responsibilities and protect the rights of both copyright holders and notice
targets. By some measures, section 512 has been extraordinarily successful.
Its takedown process has been followed an estimated billions of times over
the last twenty years,365 relatively inexpensively resolving disputes and
clearing infringing material from the internet. Measured by the myriad of
online dispute resolution processes that mimic its structure,366 it is also
wildly successful as a model.

360. Statutory damages range from $200 to $150,000, per work infringed. Id. § 504(c)(2).
Because statutory damages are calculated per work infringed, OSPs, which may host or link
to very large numbers of user-posted works, can face extremely high potential awards. For a
detailed discussion of the effect of statutory damages in the U.S. copyright system, see
Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in
Need of Reform, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 439, 452 (2009) (observing that the “new higher
range for statutory damages that could be awarded against willful infringers . . . unfortunately opened up opportunities for excessive awards far beyond congressional intent”).
361. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 41.
362. Id.
363. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f).
364. Statutory damage awards are potentially so high that some OSP decisions not to
remove disputed material may fairly be characterized as “betting the company.” Urban et
al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 43. OSPs also consider the
slowness and expense of court cases, and the high burden of proof required by section
512(f), to be stymieing. Id.
365. Id. at 8.
366. See supra notes 342–344 and accompanying text.
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Yet section 512 attracted due process concerns from its inception.367
Copyright holders have complained that the takedown process is insufficiently effective, too costly, and burdensome.368 OSPs have argued that section 512’s process risks capturing legal uses along with infringing
materials.369 The “counternotice” mechanism was added late in the legislative process in response to process concerns.370 Some have pointed out
that the required ten-to-fourteen-day takedown period could quell timesensitive speech; others have observed that it gave the notice sender little
time to ﬁle a lawsuit if a counternotice arrived.371 Civil society groups have
worried that section 512’s contestation mechanisms and other design features are insufficient to deter abusive or mistaken removals.372
The DMCA’s due process protections thus appear to be shaky. Although the lack of public visibility into the system makes it impossible to
fully observe, there is now a small body of empirical research into the notice-and-takedown process373 and stakeholder experiences.374 The U.S.
Copyright Office, too, recently completed a multiyear study of the section
512 system.375 Investigators consistently have found mistaken or improper
uses of the takedown system. In 2006, one of us found that 29% of a sample
of notices to Google Search were ﬂawed.376 In 2017, one of us found that
31% of a large sample of notices sent to Google Search were questionable.
In that same sample, 70% of the notices sent to Google Image Search were
fundamentally ﬂawed, largely because of one proliﬁc sender.377 Without

367. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”?
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 Santa
Clara Comput. & High Tech. L.J. 621, 633–36 (2006).
368. Strong, supra note 310, at 77–82.
369. Id. at 139–41; Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note
287, at 39–43.
370. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 367, at 633–36.
371. Id. at 636–37.
372. Id.; Strong, supra note 310, at 11.
373. E.g., Sharon Bar-Ziv & Niva Elkin-Koren, Behind the Scenes of Online Copyright
Enforcement: Empirical Evidence on Notice & Takedown, 50 Conn. L. Rev. 339 (2018);
Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 159, at 473; Daniel Seng, The State of the Discordant
Union: An Empirical Analysis of DMCA Takedown Notices, 18 Va. J.L. & Tech. 369 (2014);
Urban & Quilter, supra note 367; Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice,
supra note 287; Jennifer M. Urban, Brianna L. Schoﬁeld & Joe Karaganis, Takedown in Two
Worlds: An Empirical Analysis, 64 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 483 (2017) [hereinafter Urban
et al., Takedown in Two Worlds]; Rishabh Dara, Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling
Effects on Free Expression on the Internet, Ctr. For Internet & Soc’y (2011), http://cis-india.
org/internet-governance/intermediary-liability-in-india.pdf [https://perma.cc/TL9G-LWDC].
374. E.g., Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis & Brianna L. Schoﬁeld, Notice and
Takedown: Online Service Provider and Rightsholder Accounts of Everyday Practice, 64 J.
Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 371 (2017) [hereinafter Urban et al., Accounts of Everyday Practice];
Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287.
375. Strong, supra note 310.
376. Urban & Quilter, supra note 367, at 667.
377. Urban et al., Takedown in Two Worlds, supra note 373, at 499, 510.
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her notices, 36% were questionable. Also in 2017, Sharon Bar-Ziv and Niva
Elkin-Koren investigated the Israeli (.il) notices from the same sample, discovering that only 34% contained allegations of copyright infringement;
the other 66% were improper subject matter.378
The DMCA’s contestation mechanisms thus apparently have failed to
fulﬁll their purpose. Despite evidence that improper or questionable removals are not uncommon, counternotices appear to be rare; section
512(f) suits for any party’s knowing material misrepresentation of a copyright violation are even rarer.379 The counternotice mechanism is used extremely infrequently;380 OSPs largely consider it a dead letter.381 The
Copyright Office’s study, too, uncovered problems with the counternotice
process.382 The DMCA thus has lessons to teach about what to avoid, or to
include, when designing contestation.
2. The UK Implementation of the Right to Contestation. — The UK implementation of the GDPR’s right to contestation offers a second example of
a contestation rule with a procedural focus. In implementing the GDPR
before Brexit, the UK adopted a highly proceduralized approach to challenging algorithmic decision-making. This approach builds on domestic
law in place before the GDPR.383
Prior to the GDPR, section 12 of the UK Data Protection Act of 1998
required a company to notify individuals of an automated decision “as
soon as reasonably practicable” and provided individuals twenty-one days
to request reconsideration or request a new decision with human involvement.384 A company then had to respond within twenty-one days with “a
378. Bar-Ziv & Elkin-Koren, supra note 373, at 359–60.
379. Because no public record of counternotices exists, it is impossible to know exactly
how often they are sent; however, all available evidence indicates they are rare. Most quantitative work focuses on notices to search engines, which are less likely to receive counternotices because they are not required to forward notices to the targets. See, e.g., Seng, supra
note 373; Urban & Quilter, supra note 367, at 626; Urban et al., Takedown in Two Worlds,
supra note 373, at 393. Relying on studies of search alone would likely result in an underestimate of counternotices. However, a qualitative study of OSPs and large notice senders,
covering a wide range of OSP types, also found counternotices to be rare. Urban et al.,
Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 44 – 46.
380. Urban et al., Accounts of Everyday Practice, supra note 374, at 394.
381. Id.
382. Strong, supra note 310, at 162 (“Another aspect of section 512 that received significant attention . . . was the ten–fourteen day period between when the OSP receives a
counter-notice and when the copyright holder must ﬁle a federal lawsuit or see the material
get replaced set forth in section 512(g)(2)(C).”).
383. See Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note
115, at 9–10 (noting that the UK’s 2018 Data Protection Act’s proceduralized process for
contesting algorithmic decision-making is probably due to previous provisions of the UK
Data Protection Act of 1998).
384. UK Data Protection Act 1998, c. 29, § 12(2)(b) (UK) (“[T]he individual is entitled,
within twenty-one days of receiving that notiﬁcation from the data controller, by notice in
writing to require the data controller to reconsider the decision or to take a new decision
otherwise than on that basis.”).
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written notice specifying the steps that [it] intends to take to comply with
the [individual’s] notice.”385 Nothing in the law speciﬁed what measures a
company needed to take to adequately reconsider a decision. Thus, the
UK approach to algorithmic decision-making, prior to the GDPR, was to
focus on procedural timelines and not on substantive prohibitions or on
standards for reversing decisions.
New UK law implementing the GDPR extended the twenty-one days
to one month. As before, a company must notify an individual of an automated decision in writing “as soon as reasonably practicable”; the individual has one month (instead of twenty-one days) to request that a company
“(i) reconsider the decision, or (ii) take a new decision that is not based
solely on automated processing.”386 The company then ordinarily has a
month to “consider the request, including any information provided by
the data subject . . . comply with the request, and . . . by notice in writing
inform the data subject of: (i) the steps taken to comply with the request,
and (ii) the outcome of complying with the request.”387 This process may
be amended through regulation.388 This establishes what Gianclaudio
Malgieri has referred to as a “proceduralized explanation”—individuals
are given insight into the process of contestation, which may itself check
company behavior, or even incentivize pro-consumer outcomes through
transparency.
Other implementing EU Member States also specify some procedural
requirements for contestation, though not to the same level of detail as
the UK. Ireland and France invoke appellate procedure.389 Ireland requires companies to enable an individual to “(I) make representations to
the controller in relation to the decision, (II) request human intervention
in the decision-making process, [and] (III) request to appeal the decision.”390 As in the UK, companies must “notify the [individual] in writing

385. Id. § 12(3).
386. UK Data Protection Act 2018, c. 12, § 14(4)(a)–(b) (UK).
387. Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 115,
at 9 n.80 (quoting UK Data Protection Act 2018, § 14(5)) (“Section 14(5) states that the
data controller must react within the period described in Article 12(3), GDPR[,] . . . which
commences] within one month of receipt of the request . . . [and] may be extended by two
further months where necessary.”).
388. According to Malgieri, these safeguards in the UK law “basically absorb[]” the
GDPR safeguards of contestation, expressing their point of view, and getting human intervention. Id. at 10. Under this interpretation, the UK has implemented the right to contestation as a right to “reconsider the decision”; the right to obtain human intervention as the
right to “[t]ake a new decision that is not based solely on automated processing”; and the
right to express one’s voice as the right to have a company consider “any information provided by the [individual].” Id. at 10.
389. See id. at 10–11, 13, 15.
390. Data Protection Act 2018, § 57(1)(b)(ii) (SI 7/2018) (Ir.).
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of (i) the steps taken to comply with the request, and (ii) in the case of an
appeal . . . the outcome of the appeal.”391
It is too early to know how these proceduralized implementations of
Article 22 will fare, but the DMCA suggests some lessons. Section 512’s
detailed timelines and requirements for notices and counternotices have
not, for the most part, created a usable contestation process. Instead, both
the process as actually practiced and substantive decisions turn on OSPs,
which are inﬂuenced by their analysis of liability risk. Without substantive
standards for reconsideration or guidance on how to treat additional information provided by the data subject, it is unclear whether procedures
alone will enhance accuracy and prevent discrimination or respect dignity.
Similarly, the UK law’s transparency requirements require a description of
the procedural steps themselves, not the underlying reasons for a decision.392 This is process giving, not reason giving. By itself, the UK rubric is
unlikely to foster the consistency and reliability, or serve the decisiondisciplining functions, that we expect from adequate process.
D. Archetype 3 Illustrated: The “Right to Be Forgotten” and the Hungarian
and Slovenian Rights to Contestation
To illustrate our third archetype, a contestation standard with a substantive focus, we turn to the EU’s so-called “Right to Be Forgotten.” We additionally point to the Hungarian and Slovenian implementations of the
GDPR’s right to contestation.
1. The Right to Be Forgotten. — The “Right to Be Forgotten” (RTBF),
more accurately characterized as a right to erasure of certain personal
data, grew from European data protection law in existence before the
GDPR.393 In the 2014 Google Spain case, the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) interpreted data protection law to hold that a
search engine must, as a “data controller,” respond to certain requests
from individuals to erase personal data—that is, to challenges by individuals to the inclusion of their personal data in search engine results.394

391. Id. § 57(2)(b). France bans automated decision-making, including semi-automated
decision-making, in the judicial context. Fully automated administrative decisions are also
prohibited. However, semi-automated decisions are permissible in particular contexts, under conditions that include implementing administrative procedures for appeals. Malgieri,
Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 115, at 13.
392. See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
393. The right emerged in current form from the Court of Justice of the EU’s (CJEU’s)
2014 case, Google Spain, and exists in current form in Article 17 of the GDPR. For a compelling history of its origins and characterization of its nature, see Meg Leta Ambrose & Jef
Ausloos, The Right to Be Forgotten Across the Pond, 3 J. Info. Pol’y. 1, 6–11 (2013).
394. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 100(3) (May 13, 2014).
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The RTBF thus functions, in effect, as a right to contest inclusion in
search engine results.395 The RTBF is not an absolute right to erasure but
rather a right to request erasure, with the search engine, as with the DMCA,
acting both as an interested party and as arbiter. Unlike the DMCA, however, the RTBF contains no putback mechanism—and in fact, establishes
virtually no procedural rules at all.396
The Google Spain decision was quickly characterized as a blow to free
speech, with European authors noting that the CJEU failed to explicitly
consider the fundamental right to freedom of expression.397 Others identiﬁed the decision as a prime example of core differences between the U.S.
and EU approaches to managing the tension between privacy and
speech.398 This focus on free speech, however, risks obfuscating the utility
of the RTBF as a contestation model.
Among our contestation archetypes, the RTBF is most accurately characterized as a contestation standard with a substantive focus. The CJEU in
Google Spain established substantive requirements for search engines to use
in determining whether to delist search results. The court found that “as
a rule” individual rights to data protection and privacy “override . . . not
only the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also
the interest of the general public in having access to that information upon
a search relating to the data subject’s name.”399 But the court also established a substantive balancing test for search engines to use in establishing
exceptions. Companies may balance between individual interests in privacy and data protection and a public interest in access to information.400

395. See Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU
Right to Be Forgotten, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1017, 1037 (2016) (describing the process as
an “administrative procedure for ﬁling and deciding RTBF claims”).
396. See id. at 1023 (noting that the CJEU left erasure requests to the discretion of the
search engine or other entity receiving the request).
397. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 293, at 52–56 (noting how “Google Spain and the
Article 29 Working Party guidelines . . . chafe[] against free expression norms and values
recognized in Europe and beyond”); Daphne Keller, The Right Tools: Europe’s
Intermediary Liability Laws and the EU 2016 General Data Protection Regulation, 33
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 287, 354 (2018) (discussing how the RTBF is both similar to and different
from intermediary liability); Stefan Kulk & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Google Spain v.
González: Did the Court Forget about Freedom of Expression?, 5 Eur. J. Risk Regul. 389, 397
(2014) (discussing the court’s reliance on private ordering and observing that “search engine operator[s] may not be the most appropriate party” to balance the fundamental rights
involved).
398. See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US
Perspectives, 30 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 161, 167–68 (2012); Orla Lynskey, Control Over Personal
Data in a Digital Age: Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzalez, 78 Mod. L. Rev. 522,
531 (2015); Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the Right to be
Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 Duke L.J. 981, 1061–62 (2018).
399. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 99 (May 13, 2014).
400. Id. ¶ 81.
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Under certain circumstances, companies may maintain information in
search results, for example when the individual is a public ﬁgure and the
interest of the general public in such information outweighs privacy
concerns.401
The CJEU’s opinion in Google Spain establishes a contestation standard rather than a rule. It requires companies to respond to individual
takedown requests, but leaves a great deal of leeway for determining what
constitutes an individual interest in privacy and what constitutes a public
interest in access to information.402 What the CJEU did not do is give any
indication of the procedure a search engine must follow: The CJEU decision emphasized substance, without establishing a contestation process.
Over time, both companies and regulators have ﬁlled in some of the
gaps left by the CJEU. First, Google established an Advisory Council that
issued a report indicating the substantive criteria the search engine would
use in evaluating takedown requests.403 Regulators then established their
own list of criteria.404 This dialogue has largely clariﬁed the substantive
standard set by the CJEU into something more rule-like in nature.
Whilst it is true that the data subject’s rights protected by those articles
also override, as a general rule, that interest of internet users, that balance
may however depend, in speciﬁc cases, on the nature of the information
in question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on the
interest of the public in having that information, an interest which may
vary, in particular, according to the role played by the data subject in public life.
Kulk & Borgesius, supra note 397, at 398.
401. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 97 (May 13, 2014) (“[T]he interference with his fundamental rights
is justiﬁed by the preponderant interest of the general public in having . . . access to the
information in question.”).
402. See id. ¶ 81.
403. In the immediate aftermath of the court’s decision, Google established an Advisory
Council and went on tour, holding public meetings in seven European cities to discuss the
substance of the right. Lee, supra note 395, at 1044. Google’s Advisory Council issued a
forty-one-page report in 2015, pointing to four substantive criteria: an individual’s role in
public life, the nature of the information, the source of the information, and the passage of
time. The Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten (Feb. 6, 2015), https:/
/static.googleusercontent.com/media/archive.google.com/en//advisorycouncil/advisem
ent/advisory-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5DJ-G7TG]; see also Paulan Korenhof, Jef
Ausloos, Ivan Szekely, Meg Ambrose, Giovanni Sartor & Ronald Leenes, Timing the Right
to be Forgotten: A Study Into “Time” as a Factor in Deciding About Retention or Erasure
of Data, in Reforming European Data Protection Law 171, 172–73, 180–84 (Serge Gutwirth,
Ronald Leenes & Paul de Hert eds., 2015) (exploring the role of time in the RTBF and
identifying “speciﬁc points in data processing, which also denote speciﬁc points or periods
in time, where enforcing of RTBF is reasonable or even necessary”).
404. The Article 29 Working Party, the leading data protection regulator, issued guidelines in November 2014, with thirteen substantive criteria for balancing when to delist content. Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Google Spain, supra note 308. Once the GDPR
went into effect, with a new provision speciﬁcally describing a right to erasure as a “right to
be forgotten,” the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) set about creating a new set of
guidelines, adopted in July 2020. These Guidelines largely reference the previous
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Regulators have not, however, set out a speciﬁc process that search
engines must follow. In the absence of such rules, Google created its own
process.405 The RTBF has prodded companies into creating a privatized
system of contestation similar to, but in some ways crucially different from,
the DMCA. That system was likely inﬂuenced by implementations of the
E-Commerce Directive, an EU-wide instrument established in 2000.406
Google set up what Edward Lee has described as an “administrative
procedure for ﬁling and deciding RTBF claims.”407 Google put a webform
up on its website for individuals to request delisting.408 The requester also
had to provide a document verifying their identity and (as with the DMCA)
attest to the accuracy of the representations made.409 The current version
of the webform is similar to what Lee describes but appears to contain
some changes.410
At least initially, Google hired fewer than a hundred employees to process claims “on a case-by-case basis.”411 Sometimes the staff would reach

Guidelines under the Directive, delineating the substantive criteria that support a data subject’s right to delisting, and exceptions to the right, following Article 17 of the GDPR. See
GDPR, supra note 13, art. 17; European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 5/2019 on the
Criteria of the Right to be Forgotten in the Search Engines Cases Under the GDPR (July 7,
2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_201905_rtbf
searchengines_afterpublicconsultation_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AH7-MKWQ] (“[T]he
criteria of delisting developed by the Article 29 Working Party in guidelines on the implementation of the Court of Justice . . . C-131/12 can still be used by search engine providers
and Supervisory Authorities to assess a delisting request based on the Right to object (Article
17.1.c GDPR).”).
405. Lee, supra note 395, at 1037.
406. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 343.
407. Lee, supra note 395, at 1037.
408. Id. at 1038. Lee describes the webform at the time as containing the following
ﬁelds: (1) which country’s law applies; (2) personal information, including the name used
to search; (3) the speciﬁc URLs desired removed, and an explanation as to (a) how the web
page is related to the requester and (b) “how the inclusion of this URL as a search result is
irrelevant, outdated, or otherwise objectionable.” Id.
409. Id. at 1038–39.
410. It now requires: (1) the country of origin (similar to which country’s law applies);
(2) the full legal name and contact email address of the requester, and a statement of
whether the requester is acting on their own behalf or someone else’s; (3) speciﬁc URLs
requested delisted (same as Lee describes). EU Privacy Removal: Personal Information
Removal Request Form, Google, https://www.google.com/webmasters/tools/legal-removal
-request?complaint_type=rtbf&visit_id=637202230061146146-20083139&rd=1 [https://per
ma.cc/2CLS-5YGJ] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021). However, the reason requested is changed to
the arguably vaguer request for “(1) how the personal information identiﬁed . . . relates to
the person on whose behalf th[e] request is made; and (2) why . . . the . . . information
should be removed. For example: ‘(1) This page is about me because a, b, and c. (2) [It]
should be removed because x, y, and z.’ ” Id. Under the current form, Google no longer
indicates its criteria for delisting in its request for information from the individual. Id. The
attestation requirement is still there, with an individual having to make a sworn statement
as to accuracy. Id.
411. Lee, supra note 395, at 1039–40.
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out to the requester for more information.412 For harder cases, Google
would rely on a self-created “senior . . . panel consisting of ‘senior lawyers,
engineers, and product managers,’ ” which would occasionally call in an
outside expert.413 If a claim was rejected, Google sent a rejection indicating
reasons and pointing to the complainant’s right to ﬁle a complaint with a
national data protection authority.414 If Google found the claim valid, it
notiﬁed the requester of removal of the URL.415
As mentioned, the primary criticism of the RTBF is that it skews toward delisting.416 Webmasters have limited options to ask for relisting;417
members of the general public have no way to state an interest in keeping
information searchable.418 Commentators have criticized the reliance on
private companies to balance what in the EU are fundamental rights.419
Unless companies voluntarily disclose information, there is no window
into the decision-making process.420
Perhaps surprisingly, however, the RTBF did not, as some naysayers
predicted, break the internet in Europe.421 Google established a process
for handling complaints that appears to be manageable, at least for that
company.422 Google’s transparency reports indicate that roughly ﬁfty-eight

412. Id. at 1040.
413. Id. (quoting Lisa Fleisher & Sam Schechner, How Google’s Top Minds Decide
What to Forget, Wall St. J. (May 12, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-googles-topminds-decide-what-to-forget-1431462018 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)).
414. Id. at 1040–41.
415. Id. at 1041 (“If the claim for removal is accepted, Google sends the requester a
notice indicating the removal of the URL.”).
416. See Kulk & Borgesius, supra note 397, at 394 –95 (noting that the Google Spain judgment resembles intermediary liability under the E-Commerce Directive, which “creates an
incentive for intermediaries to systematically take down content after complaints, which may
interfere with the freedom of expression of those communicating on the internet”).
417. Id. at 396–97 (“If Google delists a search result, it informs the relevant website
publisher. Google tells the website publisher which URL it delisted, but does not disclose
who submitted the request or other details about the request . . . . [T]he publisher can ask
Google to re-evaluate the delisting.”).
418. Id. at 397 (explaining that Google’s practice leaves the public with no way to oversee how their right to access information is limited).
419. Id. at 394 (discussing the court’s reliance on private ordering and observing that
“search engine operators may not be the most appropriate party to balance the fundamental
rights involved”).
420. See id. at 395 (“A general problem of private ordering by online service providers
through notice and takedown mechanisms is the lack of transparency of their decisions.”).
421. See Robert Krulwich, Opinion, Is the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ the ‘Biggest Threat
to Free Speech on the Internet’?, NPR (Feb. 24, 2012), https://www.npr.org/sections/
krulwich/2012/02/23/147289169/is-the-right-to-be-forgotten-the-biggest-threat-to-freespeech-on-the-internet?t=1627911057362/ [https://perma.cc/M9V9-7NZD] (suggesting that
internet companies may delist content quickly to avoid ﬁnes or criminal prosecution, inhibiting the public’s right to know and freedom of the press).
422. See Lee, supra note 395, at 1038–41.
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percent of targeted content stays up.423 Still, there are costs to leaving substantive discretion to private companies and costs to failing to articulate
processes in detail.424 Certain interests, such as the public’s, are left out of
the process.425 The process and substance of decisions can appear less legitimate.426 And while Google has established procedures that seem to
largely, though not entirely, map onto other familiar contestation mechanisms, other, smaller companies might not have the desire or capacity to
adopt the same.
2. The Hungarian and Slovenian Implementations of the GDPR’s Right to
Contestation. — Several EU Member States have established substantive
backstops to the GDPR’s right to contestation.427 For example, Hungary
requires that automated decision-making “not infringe the requirement
of equal treatment.”428 Slovenia states that decisions “based on the processing of particular categories of personal data . . . are . . . prohibited if
they could lead to discrimination against the data subject or persons close
to her/him.”429 Slovenia identiﬁes the right to contest as a measure “for
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and the legitimate
interests of the individual.”430
Slovenia and Hungary thus each anchor their contestation schemes
to a substantive standard rather than a rule. Creating a backstop based on
fundamental rights of nondiscrimination and equal treatment arguably
preserves dignitary interests. It also reduces the risk that the Slovenian and
Hungarian schemes decay into empty processes untethered from substance, as has happened with, for example, some implementations of the
DMCA.431
At the same time, this approach creates interpretative space, which has
both costs and benefits. What constitutes “discrimination” or “equal treatment” is hotly contested.432 On the one hand, this creates flexibility for applying the right in new contexts. On the other, it potentially leaves leeway
for less stringent implementations by self-interested actors. We advocate in

423. Id. at 1043.
424. See, e.g., Kulk & Borgesius, supra note 397, at 393 (explaining that delisting information conﬂicts with freedom of expression).
425. Id.
426. See id. at 395 (“A general problem of companies [delisting] . . . through notice
and takedown mechanisms is the lack of transparency of their decisions. Without clarity on
which results have been delisted, members of the public have limited ability to know the
extent to which their freedom to receive information has been interfered with.”).
427. Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 115,
at 2.
428. Id. at 16.
429. Id. at 18.
430. Id.
431. See supra section III.C.1.
432. See Barocas & Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, supra note 70, at 715.
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Part IV below for ways to constrain self-interested interpretations of substantive backstops, to preserve the utility of a substantive standard without sacrificing some of the benefits that come with the constraints that typify rules.
E.

Archetype 4 Illustrated: The FCBA’s Chargeback Process and the Hungarian
and French Rights to Contestation

Our fourth and ﬁnal contestation archetype is a contestation rule with
a substantive focus. This example, the 1974 FCBA, is not intrinsically digital,
but it still holds lessons for the right to contest AI.433 Components of the
French and Hungarian implementations of the GDPR’s right to contestation also illustrate this archetype.
1. The Fair Credit Billing Act. — The FCBA affords consumers a right
to contest erroneous credit card charges.434 In many ways, the FCBA is
structurally similar to section 512 of the DMCA. First, it provides the substantive basis of contestation. The law deﬁnes a contestable “billing error”
to include: a charge that wasn’t made by the credit card holder; a charge
that is in the wrong amount; a charge for which the credit card holder
requests additional clariﬁcation; a charge for goods or services that
weren’t accepted or delivered; accounting errors; and more, including errors deﬁned by regulation.435 Second, in addition to the substantive deﬁnition of “billing error,” the law contains various detailed procedural
requirements.436 And, as with each of the archetype examples, there is no
neutral arbiter in the FCBA process. Credit card companies themselves decide whether or not to reverse charges.437
Yet the FCBA does not founder in empty proceduralism as some implementations of the DMCA do. Rather, it retains its substantive focus
while providing detailed process requirements.438 This is likely for a few
reasons. First, the substantive clarity of the statute constrains credit card
companies’ discretion to reject reversal requests. The extensive, speciﬁc
substantive deﬁnition of a “billing error” tethers credit card companies’
discretion in the contestation process.439 By contrast, the DMCA ties
takedown to copyright infringement440—still substantive, still rule-based,
but much more complicated to determine (and contestable) than whether
an FCBA “billing error” has occurred. Second, while both models rely
heavily on precisely deﬁned processes, differences in the design of those
433. See Van Loo, supra note 5, at 851–52 (identifying the relevance of credit card dispute adjudications to the conversation over platform process).
434. 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (2018).
435. Id.
436. Id. § 1666(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(d) (2020).
437. See Van Loo, supra note 5, at 852.
438. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666(a)–(b).
439. However, federal courts have refused to second-guess companies. Section III.F below discusses this wrinkle further. See Burnstein v. Saks Fifth Ave. & Co., 208 F. Supp. 2d
765, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
440. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2018).
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processes create different incentives, risk structures, and, ultimately, outcomes.441 These differences, and their effects, are discussed further in Part
IV.
In practice, the FCBA appears to be quite successful in resolving billing disputes and enjoys a more positive reputation than the DMCA.442 As
Rory Van Loo notes, the FCBA establishes a working contestation process
that is “free, accessible, and fast” and has not “necessarily come at the expense of merchants.”443 Credit card companies have beneﬁted, too, from
increased consumer trust fostered by the FCBA contestation process.444
Scholars of alternative dispute resolution have criticized the FCBA process
on a number of grounds, including the lack of damages, limited consumer
awareness of the process, and the arms-length rather than relationshipbased method of adjudication.445 Consumer protection advocates, however, largely see the FCBA chargeback process as a success.446 Credit card
companies rule in favor of consumers some eighty to ninety percent of the
time.447 Perhaps because of this rate of success, consumers appear to view
the process with satisfaction, and rarely bring suits to challenge it.448
This is not to say that the FCBA is a perfect model or that it can necessarily be replicated for every kind of dispute. For example, the FCBA
may be successful in part because its substantive scope can be clearly deﬁned. It is far easier to deﬁne an erroneous credit card charge than to
deﬁne copyright infringement or discrimination.449 And there can be costs
to a constrained, ex ante deﬁnition of the substance of challenges, including limiting the scope of contestation and missing newly developed problems as technology evolves. But as recent conversations about the use of
personal data have turned to the centrality of consumer trust, policymakers might do well to look to the FCBA as a contestation model.450
441. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1666; 17 U.S.C. § 512 (presenting the procedural and
substantive requirements under the DMCA and FCBA and the overall framework of the
acts).
442. See Van Loo, supra note 5, at 854, 859.
443. Id. at 854.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 853 (citing Amy J. Schmitz, There’s an “App” for That: Developing Online
Dispute Resolution to Empower Economic Development, 32 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub.
Pol’y 1, 16–19 (2018)).
446. See Van Loo, supra note 5, at 853 (citing Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution
in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of ADR, 15 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 675, 691
(2000)).
447. See Van Loo, supra note 5, at 854.
448. See id. at 853.
449. Section IV.A below discusses this further.
450. Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Information Privacy for an Information Age 61
(2018) (discussing what trust means for privacy); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking
Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 431, 451 (2016) (“Because disclosure
of personal data leaves people vulnerable, trust is the glue that holds together virtually every
information relationship.”).
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2. The Hungarian and French Implementations of the GDPR’s Right to Contestation. — Both the Hungarian and French implementations of the
GDPR’s right to contestation contain contestation rules with a substantive
focus. Hungary requires that automated decision-making not be “made
using sensitive data, unless otherwise provided for in the law.”451 France
similarly prohibits automated decision-making based on sensitive data.452
An individual contesting a particular decision could refer to these prohibitions. If a company’s decision-making violates them, presumably the
company would be required to reverse its decision.
Again, however, these are not perfect instantiations of the archetype.
The substance of France’s law is embedded within a deeply procedural administrative law framework, as section III.D discusses above. Hungary also
includes, in addition to its substantive rule, the broad substantive standard
(“the requirement of equal treatment”) discussed above in section III.D.
F.

The Design of Privatized Process: Other Considerations

In addition to the two key axes illustrated by the four archetypes, contestation schemes may vary in other important characteristics. These also
can affect the schemes’ ability to provide meaningful process and should
be taken into account when designing and operationalizing a contestation
right. First, there is the question of who decides. A contestation scheme
may house contestation with a neutral arbiter, have a mediating platform
adjudicate, or have one of the parties themselves adjudicate. Second, how
contestation schemes structure parties’ incentives matters. Third,
transparency matters. Subjecting decisions to public transparency over
time—a core element of judicial process—can illustrate whether a contestation scheme is systemically fair. Finally, contestation schemes are heavily
affected by the details of the regulatory context in which they reside. For
example, contestation can be a stand-alone right, or it can be housed
within a broader regulatory system that also provides systemic governance
tools.453 For example, the GDPR’s right to contestation is just one element
of the GDPR’s approach to algorithmic accountability. The GDPR also deploys a number of systemic regulatory tools, for example impact assessments,454 which act as risk mitigation processes. Companies also have
reporting and recording obligations455 and obligations to design technology to protect individual rights.456 Each of these governance tools aims to

451. Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 115,
at 16.
452. Id. at 13.
453. See Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1578 (“Individual rights can
produce instrumental contributions, be an important component of systemic accountability,
[and] give substance to the rules in a collaborative governance regime . . . .”).
454. See Kaminski & Malgieri, Impact Assessments, supra note 287.
455. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 30.
456. Id. art. 25.

2021]

THE RIGHT TO CONTEST AI

2031

correct errors and protect from bias and discrimination on a systemic
scale, complementing individual rights.
Context also includes other elements of regulatory setting and regulatory design. Even where a contestation scheme is largely privatized, it
often interacts with a background regulatory environment that can be calibrated to check privatized contestation. A contestation scheme may, like
the DMCA, have a judicial backstop that enables sanctions of parties who
misrepresent the substantive law.457 It may be set within a complex regulatory scheme with signiﬁcant penalties, such as the GDPR, in which regulators are armed with large ﬁnes and a human rights court may be willing to
intervene.458 Or, as with the FCBA, federal courts may refuse to intervene
in second-guessing parties’ decisions.459 Background rights may favor one
party or the other, depending on the rights implicated (for example, copyright, free speech, or privacy) and on the legal system of the country in
which the contestation scheme has been structured. Background rights,
too, can be legislative in nature or constitutional/fundamental, varying
the kinds of interventions courts or regulators might make.
IV. CRAFTING A MEANINGFUL RIGHT TO CONTEST AI
No matter how strong the case for a right to contest AI, it will fail if
not carefully designed and implemented. Contestation schemes can fail to
fulﬁll due process values or actually undermine them, losing legitimacy.
Or they can fail because they simply don’t work: They are too costly to
invoke, they are too difficult to use, or they don’t resolve the dispute. This
ﬁnal Part considers how to design an effective right to contest AI—one
that resolves disputes, meets due process goals, and is seen as legitimate.
There is no one right way to design a right to contest AI. Legislators
could take any one of the archetypes as a starting point and adjust it to
avoid foreseeable pitfalls. Moreover, contestation is contextual and entangled with other aspects of process such as notice and reason giving, the
speciﬁcs of underlying substantive law, and incentive structures. Designing
a successful contestation mechanism requires attention not just to contestation itself, and not just to the algorithm, but to the entire decision-making
system—human, machine, and organizational—together with the underlying
legal framework.
The complexities of contestation thus do not neatly lend themselves
to a one-size-ﬁts-all prescription. However, there are better and worse ways
to design contestation, with signiﬁcant lessons to be learned from both the
theory and case studies explored above. This Part analyzes the observations, archetypes, and case studies from Part III, placing them against the
457. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2018).
458. GDPR, supra note 13, ch. 8.
459. See, e.g., Burnstein v. Saks Fifth Ave. & Co., 208 F. Supp. 2d 765, 775 (E.D. Mich.
2002).
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due process values set forth in Part II to draw practicable lessons about the
design and implementation of this right.
We begin with the archetypes from Part III. While a right to contest
AI could track any of the archetypes, the case studies illustrate how best to
avoid design pitfalls. This Part then turns to privatized process design, including how to craft participation, the role of the decision-maker, risks and
incentive structures, and the importance of regulatory context and of systemic governance and transparency. It then explains that the right to contest AI should constitute a ﬂoor, not a ceiling, which might be augmented
in certain policy settings. This Part concludes by discussing coverage
thresholds and possible exceptions and challenges.
A.

Applying the Archetypes

Part II details the theoretical goals of an individual right to contest:
improving accuracy and reducing bias, supporting rule of law values such
as consistency and rationality, and affording respect and agency to individuals. Each contestation archetype Part III describes has strengths and
weaknesses with respect to these due process goals and values.
A right to contest AI that, like the GDPR’s Article 22, tracks the archetype of a contestation standard with a procedural focus raises several problems.460 Failing to clarify a substantive basis for contestation potentially
allows self-interested decision-makers to defang the right, making it useless
in practice. If there is no clear and consistent substantive basis for challenges, individual challenges are unlikely to serve the instrumental function of improving accuracy or preventing bias. Nor are individual
challenges likely to serve rule of law values if there is no common substantive standard under which decisions could be evaluated for consistency.
With respect to dignity, affording individual challenges with no clear
substantive basis or set of procedures could make it harder for individuals
to exercise agency or feel respected by the system. The lack of procedural
clarity in a contestation standard (versus a rule) risks disempowering individuals, rather than affording them a clear avenue for process. At best, a
contestation standard with a procedural focus imposes on decision-makers
the signiﬁcant costs of determining when decisions should be overturned
and of establishing sufficiently clear and meaningful process for affected
individuals to feel respected by the system.
A right to contest that, like the UK’s implementation, illustrates a contestation rule with a procedural focus faces similar problems. It too risks overproceduralizing at the expense of substance, undermining due process
values such as accuracy and rule of law. By providing clear procedural rules
and timelines, however, it potentially puts contestation within the reach of
more individuals, giving more people a sense of agency by lowering the
information costs of contesting decisions. The efficacy or legitimacy of
460. See supra Part III.
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such a system depends on how well-meaning decision-makers are, what
sorts of substantive challenges are considered, how consistent substance is
across challengers, and more broadly, what incentives decision-makers
have to decide for or against challengers.
Affording a right to contest with a clear substantive focus, whether
rule-based or standard-based, can address a number of these concerns.
However, the right to challenge a decision on substantive grounds can still
be meaningless if the afforded process is shallow or perfunctory. For example, if a contestation process has no clear timelines, decision-makers
can delay challenges, stymieing multiple due process goals: corrections of
inaccuracies, revelations of unfair or inconsistent treatment, empowerment of individuals. Other missing particulars of process can similarly shift
a right to contest from substantive to illusory. Without clear notice, a person won’t know to challenge an unfair decision. Similarly, if there is no
reason giving, individuals will ﬁnd it difficult or impossible to challenge an
AI decision on the basis of a substantive problem, as section IV.B discusses
further below.
As discussed above, contestation rights with a substantive focus can
present additional issues depending on how legislators have deﬁned the
substantive bases of challenges. A right to contest that, like the Hungarian
implementation, illustrates a contestation rule with a substantive focus risks
on the one hand being overbroad, banning all automated decisions based
on particularly sensitive data, whether or not such decisions are inaccurate
or unbiased or unfair. On the other hand, a rule with a substantive focus
risks being too narrow, missing challenges individuals should be able to
bring. However, a right to contest that, like the Slovenian implementation,
embodies a contestation standard with a substantive focus risks instead creating too much leeway for substantive interpretation, imposing costs on both
challengers and decision-makers. There is no one deﬁnition of discrimination, and delegating the interpretation of discrimination to private companies risks both confusion and self-serving interpretations.
However, understanding the archetypes and the pitfalls they present
can help legislators and regulators avoid many of these pitfalls, not just in
enacting new laws but in applying those that now exist. For example, where
the GDPR largely articulates a standard with a procedural focus, regulators
and Member States should now focus on (1) creating more detailed timelines and processes to standardize the required procedure, and (2) articulating more clearly the substantive harms on which such challenges might
be based, even if this involves pointing to other substantive areas of EU or
Member State law.461 Member States that have implemented the right
through a different archetype could focus their efforts differently. Regula-

461. See supra note 129 (explaining that while Article 22 is procedural in nature, other
substantive areas of EU law can be understood to give it substance).
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tors in Slovenia, for example, might establish a workable contestation process and timeline, while regulators in Ireland might establish or point to
substantive bases for contestation.
For countries that have not yet enacted a right to contest AI, a hybrid
approach is advisable—that is, a law that contains elements of multiple archetypes and uses multiple regulatory tools. A right to contest that combines clear procedural rules with both substantive rules and substantive
standards is the better path forward as a starting point than reﬂexively
mimicking either the GDPR or the DMCA/UK approach.
The FCBA model—a contestation rule with a substantive focus, where the
substantive underpinnings are clear and relatively straightforward to apply—potentially has signiﬁcant beneﬁts, as section III.E discusses above.
However, determining what constitutes AI bias is far harder to determine
than what constitutes an erroneous credit card charge. The right to contest AI could then be partially modeled after the FCBA archetype, with
some clear substantive rules: that an AI decision cannot be made on the
basis of racial data, or gender, or sexual orientation, for example, because
such decisions are de facto biased.
Coupling a set of speciﬁc substantive rules with a contestation standard has the beneﬁt of being simultaneously clear and ﬂexible. With the
archetypes in mind, regulators could adopt a standard—for example, that
establishes a right to contest AI decisions that evidence “bias” or “discrimination”—while also avoiding the foreseeable pitfalls of standards. A variety of common drafting or regulatory tools can help. For example,
legislators or regulators can clarify standards without forgoing malleability
by providing an open list of examples. Regulators can issue soft law guidance. Legislators or regulators could bring in external participation and
accountability, requiring companies to consult affected stakeholders and
legal experts when deﬁning what “bias” and “discrimination” mean in a
particular context.462 Legislators might establish certiﬁcation processes or
codes of conduct backed by regulatory oversight, as the GDPR does, to give
substance to standards in sectoral context. Ex post, courts could articulate
substantive backstops, for example by affording an avenue for legal challenges to AI decision-making after an individual exhausts a privatized contestation right.463
In sum, while a contestation right is unlikely to succeed or fail solely
because it is based on a particular archetype, due process goals are better
served with certain common features. Clear process can make it easier for
462. This once again points to the importance of embedding an individual right to contest in a broader regulatory scheme, as the GDPR does, and as Slovenia does in particular.
463. Some have suggested not only allowing court challenges to discriminatory AI
decision-making but also placing a burden on a company to prove the system is not discriminatory. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Paradox of Automation, supra note 4, at 1726 (proposing a doctrine
of “discrimination per se” if employers fail to audit or otherwise quality check algorithms);
James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 Calif. L. Rev.
Online 164, 170 (2017).
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individuals to contest AI decisions, giving them a sense of agency and bolstering the perceived legitimacy of a system. Clear substance can direct
challenges appropriately, lower costs of participation, and better serve speciﬁc instrumental goals, such as accuracy or antidiscrimination. Both clear
process and clear substance can serve rule of law values by uncovering arbitrariness, unfairness, or irrational decision-making. However, there is
also value in ﬂexibility, particularly with regard to substance, as it can accommodate previously unanticipated goals or values and support stakeholder and expert participation.
B.

The Right to Contest as Privatized Process: Notice and a Hearing

However well-crafted a right to contest AI, individual participation
can be illusory if it is not supported by certain features. Participation rights
should feature familiar elements of due process: notice, reason giving, and
an opportunity to be heard before a legitimate, if not neutral, decisionmaker.464 They should also include design elements beyond due process,
such as incentive structures that support legitimate decision-making and
recognition of the broader regulatory context, including backing individual challenges with robust systemic governance.
1. Meaningful Notice and an Opportunity to Be Heard. — The paradigmatic elements of due process as articulated by Judge Henry Friendly include: notice of a decision and the grounds of that decision, a right to
know the evidence on which a decision is based, a hearing before an unbiased decision-maker or tribunal, a right to present arguments against a
decision; and a statement of reasons.465 Friendly’s elements are more of a
menu than a checklist; what constitutes a fair hearing may vary with circumstances such as the level of harm and administrative costs.466
It would be challenging to administer a number of Friendly’s elements in the context of a right to contest AI.467 However, a right to contest
AI that does not include at least elements of notice, evidentiary disclosure,
and reason giving will not provide a meaningful hearing. Individuals cannot correct inaccurate decisions if they cannot see the incorrect data, reasoning, or inferences underlying decisions. Individuals cannot be assured
that decision-making is being applied nonarbitrarily if they cannot understand a decision-making system’s logic. And individuals are unlikely to feel
respected by a contestation right that does not provide a sufficient window
464. See Friendly, supra note 2, at 1279–95 (advocating for notice of the proposed action and grounds asserted, right to know the evidence, and statement of reasons).
465. Id. at 1279, 1280–81, 1283–87, 1291–92; see also Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8,
at 116 (summarizing Friendly’s eleven elements of a fair hearing).
466. Friendly, supra note 2, at 1278.
467. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 116, noting that administering a right to call
witnesses in the context of “data due process” would be “difficult and potentially cumbersome.” Of Friendly’s elements, they point to “an unbiased tribunal,” “the right to know the
evidence against one,” “the making of a record,” and “a statement of reasons” in the data
analytics context. Id. at 117.
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into decision-making—through notice, evidence, and reason giving—to
make meaningful challenges possible.
The GDPR’s transparency requirements reﬂect longstanding due process traditions and are intended to enable the contestation right.468 The
GDPR requires that individuals be notiﬁed when a decision involves automated decision-making.469 The GDPR’s general rights to review and correct data can provide data subjects with information on which to base a
challenge.470
In the context of AI decision-making, however, notice and access
rights are not enough. Due process theory explains that reason giving plays
a central role.471 Friendly describes reason giving as necessary for a number of purposes: to prevent wrong decisions, to achieve more uniformity
across decisions, and to make negative decisions more acceptable.472
Frederick Schauer similarly describes reason giving as displaying commitment to an outcome, allowing decision disciplining, and showing respect
for the subjects of decisions.473 For a right to contest AI decisions to be
effective, individuals must be afforded access to both the AI’s “record” and
its reasoning.
The GDPR consequently requires both that individuals affected by AI
decision-making be provided “meaningful information about the logic involved” in such decision-making,474 “the significance and envisaged consequences” of the decision-making process,475 and a “right to explanation.”476
The GDPR’s much-debated “right to explanation” requires that individuals
be provided an explanation of automated decisions with significant effects.477 What this constitutes has been hotly debated.478 EU Member States

468. See supra section III.A.
469. GDPR, supra note 13, arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g).
470. All of this information must be given in “a concise, transparent, intelligible and
easily accessible form, using clear and plain language” in the form requested by the data
subject. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 12(1).
471. Margot E. Kaminski, Understanding Transparency in Algorithmic Accountability,
in The Cambridge Handbook of the Law of Algorithms 121, 128–29 (Woodrow Barﬁeld ed.,
2020) (“Transparency takes many different shapes and sizes . . . . [A] person impacted by a
lending decision might be provided an explanation of that decision, at an abstract enough
and simple enough level so as to be understandable, but also complex enough to be actionable, to allow her to contest the decision.”).
472. Friendly, supra note 2, at 1292.
473. Schauer, Giving Reasons, supra note 207, at 657–58.
474. GDPR, supra note 13, arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g). There is some debate over whether
“meaningful information about the logic involved” refers to a particular decision or to an
overview of how the AI works as a whole. Wachter et al., Counterfactual Explanations
Without Opening the Black Box, supra note 27, at 860 n.69; Selbst & Powles, supra note
127, at 241 n.41.
475. GDPR, supra note 13, arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g).
476. Id. art. 13(2).
477. Kaminski, Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 25, at 197.
478. Id. at 200.
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have implemented the right to explanation in a variety of ways, ranging from
France’s requirement that decisions be “legible,” to the UK’s more minimalist interpretation.479
The GDPR is not alone in requiring reason giving and records. The
FCBA similarly requires that a credit card company explain why it has
failed to refund a charge and provide documentary evidence to support
this reasoning on request.480 By contrast, the RTBF does not mandate explanation of search engine decisions, although Google has voluntarily
taken it upon itself to provide an explanation when it rejects a claim.481 For
a right to contest to be meaningful, there must be some individually comprehensible explanation of the reasoning behind a decision.
Other elements of a fair hearing include participation, such as an opportunity to explain why a decision is wrong or a right to call witnesses.482
The GDPR’s Article 22 includes at least two participation rights: a right to
human intervention, and a right to “express his or her point of view.”483
These rights are interdependent with the GDPR’s transparency rights and
the particulars of how a contestation process is implemented. Whether a
right to express one’s point of view is meaningful will depend on whether
the right to explanation provides a sufficient measure of reason giving to
support meaningful participation. It will depend on whether the contestation process and timeline are clear and low cost. And it will depend on
whether the substantive aspects of the decision, such as underlying law, are
easily understandable. Proprietary algorithms and datasets only add impenetrability.484
It is unclear how robustly the GDPR’s participation requirements will
be incorporated into actual contestation procedures. This, again, suggests
an advantage to contestation rules rather than standards. The highly proceduralized UK rubric allows the data subject to provide “additional information.” It is unclear, however, what “additional information” can be
provided, or how it will be treated. Depending on how it is operationalized,
this could create robust participation, or instead result in very limited
“conversations” that are unlikely to serve as a true “sign of respect” for the
data subject.485

479. Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 115,
at 14.
480. 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2018) (“[S]end a written explanation or clariﬁcation to the obligor, after . . . an investigation, setting forth . . . the reasons why the creditor
believes the account of the obligor was correctly shown in the statement and, upon request
of the obligor, provide copies of documentary evidence of the obligor’s indebtedness.”).
481. Lee, supra note 395, at 1040–41.
482. Friendly, supra note 2, at 1281–82.
483. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(3).
484. See, e.g., Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8; Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 159,
at 49.
485. Schauer, Giving Reasons, supra note 206, at 658, and accompanying text.
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The French approach to the use of AI in the public sector demonstrates another way to structure a combination of reason giving and participation rights. French law requires not just reason giving but
comprehensibility. In France, the law, at least as it applies to the public
sector, requires the users of algorithms (that is, public officials) to be able
to exercise control over them and to explain how they work to an affected
person.486 This is connected to robust participation rights: For public sector decisions, the “structured mechanism” for a right to contest AI is dictated by French administrative law, including robust administrative
procedures.487
The French approach thus combines reason giving with human oversight, so as to create the possibility of meaningful intervention by the contesting parties and by the human using the algorithm.488 Whether
contestation should require such a level of human intervention and oversight capacity remains an open question. Such comprehensibility requirements could protect data subjects but will likely preclude the use of certain
kinds of complex algorithms.
2. A Legitimate Decision-Maker. — A neutral arbiter is considered core
to due process.489 A neutral arbiter affords dignity to participants, tethers
parties’ discretion, and helps identify and eschew bias and error, ultimately
providing conﬁdence that decisions are accurate and fair. Schemes that
lack a neutral arbiter may gain efficiency at the cost of legitimacy.
For example, one of the criticisms of the DMCA’s notice-andtakedown process is that online platforms—chosen for their handy intermediary location between copyright holders and alleged infringers—are
not neutral arbiters. Platforms’ interests—in avoiding liability, attracting
and keeping a user base, and limiting administrative costs—may be at odds
with the disputants’ interests. Neutrality concerns also pervade recent discussions of content moderation, with Facebook establishing the purportedly neutral Facebook Oversight Board to decide appeals.490 There may be
merit in a hybrid system in which initial arbiters are not necessarily neutral
486. French law requires that public authorities be able to exercise a mastery, or ensure
control, over algorithmic decision-making to the extent of being able to explain, intelligibly
and in detail, how the processing works to the impacted person (a loose translation of
French law). Pour ces décisions, le responsable de traitement s’assure de la maîtrise du traitement
algorithmique et de ses évolutions aﬁn de pouvoir expliquer, en détail et sous une forme intelligible, à
la personne concernée la manière dont le traitement a été mis en oeuvre à son égard. Malgieri translates this as “the data controller ensures the control of the algorithmic processing and its
evolutions in order to be able to explain, in detail and in an intelligible form, to the person
concerned how the processing has been implemented in his or her individual case.”
Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 115, at 13 (emphasis omitted).
487. Id.
488. Malgieri refers to this and other French law regarding private processing as “one
of the few cases in which a law guarantees a right to explanation.” Id. at 15.
489. Borraccetti, supra note 91, at 105.
490. Klonick, supra note 314.
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but those who review their decisions are. Van Loo has suggested one such
scheme by which privatized contestation overseen by companies can later
be appealed to federal courts.491
In an ideal world, an uninvolved party would adjudicate contestation
of AI decisions. In some settings, this may be possible, particularly where
the potential harms to an affected person are high enough to justify the
attendant administrative costs. For example, when AI is used in the criminal justice system, affected defendants should be afforded the ability to
meaningfully contest AI decisions before a judge.492 When AI decisionmaking is used in a regulatory setting, constitutional due process may require adjudication by a neutral party.493
A right to contest private sector AI decisions, however, is unlikely to
include a neutral arbiter, at least at ﬁrst bite. The privatized contestation
schemes discussed in Part III illustrate this as a practical matter. Where
speed and scale are concerns and the impact of decisions arguably less
signiﬁcant, the cost of a neutral arbiter can be prohibitive. Neither our
archetype contestation schemes nor Article 22 feature a neutral arbiter. To
the contrary, interested actors make the decisions.
Under Article 22, a company that uses AI to make decisions about a
person will likely also be the arbiter of challenges to those decisions. At
ﬁrst glance, this might appear to delegitimize the entire process. However,
as the next section discusses, setting up the right incentives for a nonneutral decision-maker can improve both outcomes and legitimacy. Jurisdictions that have not yet formulated a right to contest AI might consider
balancing neutrality with efficiency, for example, by requiring the arbiter
to hold an independent position within a company or by contemplating
hybrid private–public systems for “appeals.”
In some cases, the question isn’t only whether there should be a neutral human decision-maker but whether there should be a human decision-maker at all. A contestation scheme can be entirely automated.494
Some parties may be tempted to address the decision-maker cost and efficiency problem by replacing, or augmenting, human decision-makers with
491. Van Loo, supra note 5, at 871–72.
492. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 79, at 2039–51 (discussing the right to confront and
impeach machine “witnesses”); Wexler, supra note 6, at 1395–413 (arguing against using a
criminal trade secret privilege to prevent criminal defendants from examining and challenging software programs).
493. See, e.g., Huq, Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State, supra note 8,
at 1905–06. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss what meaningful contestation
might entail in these contexts. It would certainly entail more than attaching a warning to AI
tools as, for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has done. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d
749 (Wis. 2016).
494. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 29.
Confronted with internet-scale infringement, some rights holders deploy algorithms to
identify potentially infringing materials and generate notices. For the subset of OSPs that
receive these notices—which can exceed a billion a year—the response is to automate the
takedown process. One of us has called this system “DMCA Auto” and “DMCA Plus.” Id.
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AI.495 Having an AI “judge” contestation “cases” would certainly make the
system faster and less expensive.
However, having an AI arbiter would compound the difficulty of uncovering AI bias. Arbitrating AIs will have biases of their own—biases that
may be difficult for humans to observe or understand. The GDPR places
importance on recourse to a human, rather than AI, intervention in an AI
decision. There is an active scholarly debate over the importance and effect more generally of having a “human in the loop.”496
Where decision-makers aren’t neutral arbiters, a privatized contestation system must tether decision-maker self-interest. One way to do so is to
establish a judicial or regulatory backstop. Contestation could be appealable to a judge or neutral external board;497 one could establish regulatory
oversight over contestation systems;498 or one could make abuse or misrepresentations legally actionable.499 As the DMCA shows, however, none of
these approaches is perfect; a legitimate contestation system might require
multiple checks. Regulators might additionally require decisions to be
made or overseen by an independent officer within a company, require
reporting by a company to a regulator, or provide whistleblower protections for employees who wish to report on a contestation system. Section
IV.B.4 further discusses such systemic regulations.
3. Risk and Incentive Structures. — The effects of a contestation scheme
are deeply inﬂuenced by the incentive structures created by law and reﬂected in practice. Another way to tether decision-maker discretion is to
structure decision-maker incentives such that even nonneutral decisionmakers ﬁnd it attractive to pursue accuracy and legitimacy, and to rule in
favor of contesting individuals when appropriate. For example, the FCBA
chargeback process encourages credit card companies to rule for challengers and refund charges, because the alternative—conducting an investigation—is expensive.500 The UK’s proceduralized implementation of the
right to contest might similarly encourage companies to decide for individuals. By contrast, both the RTBF and section 512 processes operate in
the shadow of liability risk for the online intermediaries making removal

495. See generally Huq, Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State, supra
note 8; Van Loo, supra note 5.
496. See, e.g., Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, supra note 8, at 681; Meg Leta Jones,
The Ironies of Automation Law: Tying Policy Knots with Fair Automation Practices
Principles, 18 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 77, 134 (2015); Rebecca Crootof, Margot Kaminski &
Nicholson Price, Humans in the Loop 4 (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
497. See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 314, at 2425; Lee, supra note 395, at 1036; Van Loo,
supra note 5, at 870.
498. See, e.g., Crawford & Schultz, supra note 8, at 109.
499. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2018).
500. Van Loo, supra note 5, at 854.
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decisions. Consequently, both the DMCA and RTBF are criticized for skewing platforms’ incentives toward removal.501
Incentives for contesting individuals also merit attention. For example, uneven legal requirements, resulting in uneven risk allocation, afflict
the DMCA’s complaint and contestation processes. Senders of takedown
notices have to declare under penalty of perjury that they are authorized
to act. However, none of senders’ other statements, including their substantive assertions of infringement, is subject to this stricture.502 But counternotice senders must accept perjury exposure for their statements that
disputed material is not infringing,503 along with U.S. federal court jurisdiction and process.504 According to OSPs interviewed by one of us as part
of a qualitative study, the perceived risk to targets of misstating their rights
to post contested material chills counternotices.505 Indeed, it can chill
OSPs from encouraging users to submit counternotices, even when they
think counternotices are warranted.506 This is neither a practically usable
contestation process, nor one that garners legitimacy.

501. Because remedies for copyright liability can be punishing, the DMCA incentivizes
online service providers to reduce risk by erring on the side of removing material. Statutory
damages range from $200 to $150,000, per work infringed. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Because statutory damages are calculated per work infringed, OSPs—which may host or link to very
large numbers of user posted works—can face extremely high potential awards. For a detailed discussion of the effect of statutory damages in the U.S. copyright system, see
Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 360. Some have argued that the RTBF also skews too
heavily toward takedowns because companies have an incentive to avoid liability for posting
personal information in violation of data protection law. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 397, at
320–22. At the same time, companies also appear to have other incentives, both principled
and economic, to push back against delisting. For example, Google has developed the practice of placing notices in search results from which links have been delisted and notifying
webmasters of removal, despite criticism from regulators. Article 29 Working Party,
Guidelines on Google Spain, supra note 308, at 9 subsec. 22, 10 subsec. 23. Indeed, in 2016,
the Spanish Data Protection Authority ﬁned Google €150,000 for communicating allegedly
identiﬁable information about three data subjects to webmasters. See David Erdos,
Communicating Responsibilities: The Spanish DPA Targets Google’s Notiﬁcation Practices
When Delisting Personal Information, Inforrm’s Blog (Mar. 21, 2017), https://inforrm.
wordpress.com/2017/03/21/communicating-responsibilities-the-spanish-dpa-targets-googles
-notiﬁcation-practices-when-delisting-personal-information-david-erdos/ [https://perma.cc
/G5Q3-3XX4].
502. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i-v), with id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi).
503. Id. § 512(g)(3)(C).
504. Id. § 512(g)(3)(D).
505. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 287, at 44 – 45.
506. Id. at 45. At the same time, these requirements fail to deter bogus counternotices
from some bad actors, determined pirates operating from the safety of jurisdictions outside
the United States, who are undeterred by perjury penalties or section 512(f) damages. Id.
at 46. For example, one rights holder interviewed as part of the Notice and Takedown in
Everyday Practice research described
receiv[ing] only seven [counter] notices in the last two years (we have sent
nearly 9,000 notices to Google). Two were a result of administrative errors
on our end. Five were [bogus counternotices] from Russian or Ukrainian
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4. Regulatory Context and Systemic Regulation. — Both the substantive
rights underlying a contestation scheme and the regulatory design around
it can inﬂuence how the scheme operates in practice and whether it is perceived as legitimate. For example, the DMCA’s section 512 exists against
the backdrop of substantive copyright law, including cases on intermediary
liability. The RTBF is backstopped both substantively and institutionally by
judges (the CJEU) and regulators (data protection authorities enforcing
the GDPR). Determining how the regulatory setting affects a right to contest may be particularly challenging for general-purpose algorithmic contestation schemes like Article 22, which are intended to work across legal
and market sectors.
Again, an individual right to contest AI is both necessary and by itself
insufficient. As noted in section II.B.I, there have been extensive and valid
critiques of a regulatory model that relies primarily on individual rights,
given the United States’ history of emphasizing individual notice and
choice.507 Relying only on individual contestation could in the best case
still forgo the beneﬁts of effective systemic regulation of AI, and in the
worst case, afford a stamp of legitimacy to an illegitimate system.508
Effective governance of AI requires expertise in both substantive law
and in technology—expertise that is expensive to acquire, and that most
individuals will not have, but that regulators may be more effective at obtaining and applying. Many of the problems with AI, too, are best addressed ex ante—by, for example, inspecting parameters and training sets
or involving affected stakeholders—before a system is deployed. And many
of the problems with AI will be best assessed systemically, rather than on a
case-by-case basis—for example, an AI’s impact on particular marginalized
groups or physical settings.509
Thus it is crucial to situate contestation rights within regulatory oversight and other systemic risk mitigation measures.510 For example,
Slovenia’s implementation of the right to contest contains a proactive procedural requirement that a “specially focused impact assessment” be
carried out “[p]rior to the introduction of a system of automated decision-

torrent sites that knew that there was no chance that we would sue them
in their jurisdiction.
Id.
507. See supra notes 242–245 and accompanying text.
508. Edwards & Veale, supra note 175, at 67 (similarly discussing the individual Article
22 “right to explanation” as potentially being a “transparency fallacy”).
509. See, e.g., Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1579 (“An accountable
collaborative governance regime can also complement individual procedural rights. Establishing systemic accountability in a collaborative governance regime can bolster individual
rights by providing oversight in the name of affected individuals.”).
510. See id. at 1549; Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating AI Risk Through the GDPR 13
(unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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making procedures.”511 This must “include an impact assessment on related human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular with regard
to nondiscrimination.”512 Other measures, such as requiring that technology be designed ex ante to protect human rights, requiring companies to
involve an independent corporate officer in internal decisions and oversight, or requiring external audits of the system, all can make contestation
rights more fair and effective. Legislators can backstop these systems with
substantive regulations and signiﬁcant penalties for failure. Individual
rights and systemic governance are not in opposition; they can complement and augment each other.513
Further, a privatized right to contest cannot be legitimate without some
form of systemic transparency. Transparency into how a contestation system
is operating and whether it meets due process goals is crucial for accountability and oversight. Subjecting decisions to public transparency over time—
a core element of judicial process—can illustrate whether a contestation
scheme is systemically accurate or fair. Strikingly, the Council of Europe’s
Recommendations recommend systemic transparency for contestation.514
Yet transparency is often lacking in privatized contestation schemes. For
example, the DMCA operates with a considerable lack of transparency and
ensuing uncertainty about its reliability.515 Leaving aside the small number
of section 512(f) lawsuits, the DMCA has no transparency requirements. Rather, its contestation scheme operates as a “black box” in which private complainants, websites, and targets make decisions without insight into others’
actions.516 There is no requirement for websites or other parties to disclose
their policies, provide their frameworks for decision-making, or explain
their decisions.517 As a result, the U.S. Copyright Office has lamented that
511. Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States, supra note 115,
at 18.
512. Id. With this provision, Slovenia appears to be requiring a specialized version of
the “Data Protection Impact Assessments” (DPIAs) required by Article 35 for all processing
“likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.” GDPR, supra
note 13, art. 35(1). Malgieri argues that DPIAs are generally required for algorithmic
decision-making but sees the “human rights” aspect of Slovenia’s specialized impact assessment as different from the general requirement. Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in
the EU Member States, supra note 115, at 18.
513. Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1577–80; see also Kaminski &
Malgieri, Impact Assessments, supra note 287, at 126–27.
514. Council of Eur., Recommendation on the Human Rights Impacts of Algorithmic
Systems, supra note 20, at 13 (“[Companies] should make public information about the
number and type of complaints made by affected individuals or groups . . . .”).
515. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, supra note 282, at 113,
119–20.
516. See, e.g., Bar-Ziv & Elkin-Koren, supra note 373, at 343–44; Urban et al., Accounts
of Everyday Practice, supra note 374, at 374.
517. Although some companies voluntarily provide statistical “transparency reports”
and/or contribute notices they receive to the research repository Lumen, this is a minority,
and there is no standard for what information is required. This lack of a standard has led to
calls for greater voluntary transparency with standardized reporting. See, e.g., Manila
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“the privatized, extra-judicial nature of takedown notices and counter-notices under section 512 . . . result[s] in much of the information about how
the system is being utilized in practice being inaccessible.”518 The Copyright
Office named this as “a key obstacle” for “policy makers looking to create
evidence-based policy with respect to the notice-and-takedown regime.”519
Similarly, RTBF transparency, while encouraged in regulators’
Guidelines,520 is neither mandatory nor consistent. This, too, creates questions about the legitimacy of the system. Google, for example, has set up
some transparency processes and described at least some of the substantive
criteria it currently uses to render decisions, but the full criteria are
unclear.521
Systemic transparency could take a number of forms. Record-keeping
about decisions and challenges could be made available to the public or
to regulators.522 If this is too onerous, other options could partially ﬁll the
gap. For example, the European Commission Guidelines’ “good practice
suggestions” for algorithmic decisions—auditing, certiﬁcation, and ethical
review boards—could also be applied to contestation mechanisms.523
Principles on Intermediary Liability, ManilaPrinciples.Org, https://www.manilaprinciples.org
[https://perma.cc/E4DV-N9H8] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021); The Santa Clara Principles on
Transparency and Accountability in Content Moderation, SantaClaraPrinciples.Org, https:/
/santaclaraprinciples.org/ [https://perma.cc/T4YD-AHLV] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021).
For examples of “transparency reports,” see, e.g., Transparency Report, Google, https:/
/transparencyreport.google.com [https://perma.cc/5HEX-QTVY] (last visited Aug. 2,
2021); Content Removal Requests Report, Microsoft, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/
corporate-responsibility/content-removal-requests-report [https://perma.cc/FU3E-UVVG]
(last visited Aug. 2, 2021). Contributors to the Lumen database can be found at Lumen,
https://lumendatabase.org [https://perma.cc/2KEN-9TR2] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021).
518. Strong, supra note 310, at 70.
519. Id.
520. Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Google Spain, supra note 308, at 3
(“[T]he . . . Working Party . . . strongly encourages the search engines to . . . make more
detailed statistics available.”).
521. Google voluntarily set up several different sources of transparency regarding the
EU’s Right to Be Forgotten. For example, it has provided webmasters with notice of removals, Lee, supra note 395, at 1041, and issued a summary report. Theo Bertram, Elie
Bursztein, Stephanie Caro, Hubert Chao, Rutledge Chin Feman, Peter Fleischer, Albin
Gustafsson, Jess Hemerly, Chris Hibbert, Luca Invernizzi, Lanah Kammourieh Donnelly,
Jason Ketover, Jay Laefer, Paul Nicholas, Yuan Niu, Harjinder Obhi, David Price, Andrew
Strait, Kurt Thomas & Al Verney, Google, Three Years of the Right to Be Forgotten 2 (2018),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1H4MKNwf5MgeztG7OnJRnl3ym3gIT3HUK [https://per
ma.cc/3LEC-QDDW]. Google also responded to regulators’ encouragement by running an
actively updated transparency report that covers the RTBF. See Requests to Delist Content
Under European Privacy Law, Google, https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/
overview?hl=en [https://perma.cc/N94J-ZPD5] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021). Google reports
numbers of URLs delisted, categories of requesters, categories of material targeted by removal requests, and statistics including the percentage delisted or retained. Id.
522. See, e.g., the recently proposed Washington Privacy Act, S.B. 5062, 67th Leg., 2021 Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 2021) (requiring data protection impact assessments to be made available to the
state Attorney General); see also Algorithmic Accountability Act, S. 1108, 116th Cong (2019).
523. Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 32.
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A Floor, Not a Ceiling

AI creates problems wherever it goes. Thus, a right to contest AI
decisions with significant effects should attach to the technology and apply
across sectors, not just to specific applications. This recommendation runs
counter, however, to the current U.S. sectoral approach to regulating information privacy.
Therefore, a right to contest in the United States should operate as a
floor, not a ceiling. This approach would allow decisions in particular subject
matter areas to receive added protections. This Article has already mentioned
criminal law. Perhaps housing, employment, and credit decisions should also
receive augmented protections, grounded in existing regulatory regimes.524 A
right to contest could be designed so that in addition to subject-matterspeciﬁc laws, regulatory guidance could help ﬁll in sector-speciﬁc
applications, as could co-regulatory tools such as codes of conduct.525
D. Thresholds for Coverage
It is beyond the scope of this Article to delineate which kinds of decisions should be subject to a contestation right. However, a right to contest
AI should apply at least to decisions with signiﬁcant effects, even in the
private sector. And a right to contest AI should apply not just to decisions
made solely by AI, but to human decisions that signiﬁcantly rely on AI
tools.
Due process rights, in general, wax and wane with the importance of
the underlying interest. The GDPR’s contestation right applies to
decisions with “legal” or “similarly signiﬁcant[]” effects.526 We leave to
policymakers and other research what kinds of decisions have sufficiently
“signiﬁcant effects” to necessitate contestation rights. The Council of

524. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018); Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. (2018).
525. Dennis D. Hirsch, Going Dutch? Collaborative Dutch Privacy Regulation and the
Lessons It Holds for U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 Mich. St. L. Rev. 83, 122–35; Dennis D. Hirsch,
The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34
Seattle U. L. Rev. 439, 465–66 (2011); Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 12, at 1574;
William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 959, 983–85 (2016).
526. GDPR, supra note 13, Recital 71; see also Guidelines on Automated Individual
Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 21–22, which describes “legal effects” as applying to
fundamental rights (such as freedom of association and voting), legal status (such as denial of
citizenship), recourse to entitlements or benefits, and rights under a contract. “Similarly significant” effects are effects that have an impact on a data subject similar to a change in legal
rights in terms of its effects on the data subject’s “circumstances, behaviour or choices.” The
Working Party notes that it “is difficult to be precise about what could be considered sufficiently signiﬁcant,” but suggests that access to credit, health services, employment or education might qualify, and that vulnerable individuals might be signiﬁcantly affected even when
others are not. Id.
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Europe’s Recommendation, for example, contemplates impacts on
human rights and democratic systems.527
As noted, there is an active policy debate over whether only “solely”
algorithmic decisions should be regulated or whether regulations should
apply more broadly to cover human decisions facilitated by machines.528
While the GDPR covers only “solely” automated decisions (although guidance has interpreted this to include at least rubber-stamping humans), the
proposal of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada suggests
dropping the qualiﬁer to cover the use of AI more broadly.529 Proposed
legislation in the United States similarly would have applied to AI that
helps make impactful decisions.530 Because regulation could be easily
evaded by using a human to rubber-stamp what is essentially an AI process,
and because of concerns about human competence to question AI tools,
this broader deﬁnition is preferable.
E.

Exceptions and Challenges

While a right to contest AI should in general function as a crosssectoral ﬂoor, it may make sense to carve out exceptions for some applications or to tailor the threshold for coverage so that some applications
aren’t included. In some cases, it may be that some other oversight mechanism—for example, expert oversight by a doctor with a ﬁduciary duty to
a patient531—adequately substitutes for an individual right to contest. In
others, it may be that the right’s threshold coverage could be tailored to
leave out some kinds of arguably signiﬁcant effects, such as telecommunications network outages.532 Future research may address this question.
527. See Council of Eur., Recommendation on the Human Rights Impacts of
Algorithmic Systems, supra note 20, at 6, 9, 11, 13.
528. See supra notes 115, 150, 307 and accompanying text.
529. See GDPR, supra note 13, art. 22(1); Guidelines on Automated Individual
Decision-Making, supra note 115, at 7 (explaining that an activity may still be “solely” automated processing even if there is human involvement). The Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada states:
PIPEDA will need to deﬁne automated decision-making to create speciﬁc
protections to apply to it. Unlike the GDPR or Quebec’s Bill 64, the term
should drop any qualiﬁer such as “solely” or “exclusively”, which scopes
the applicability of speciﬁc protections very narrowly. These also make the
term susceptible to subversion where a human role is added in the process
to merely evade additional obligations.
Off. of the Priv. Comm’r of Can., supra note 23.
530. Algorithmic Accountability Act, S. 1108, 116th Cong. § 2(1) (2019) (deﬁning an
automated decision system as “a computational process, including one derived from machine learning, statistics, or other data processing or artiﬁcial intelligence techniques[] that
makes a decision or facilitates human decision making[] that impacts consumers”).
531. Kluttz et al., supra note 27, at 22–23.
532. See USM Sys., How Artificial Intelligence Is Used in the Telecom Industry?, Medium
(Aug. 17, 2020), https://usmsystems.medium.com/how-artificial-intelligence-is-used-in-the-te
lecom-industry-dd65459a220a (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining that AI can
support monitoring equipment to prevent outages and network disruptions).
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Signiﬁcant open questions and challenges remain. For example, under what circumstances, if any, should policymakers allow for unexplainable AI? Relatedly, what level of explainability is necessary for effective
contestation? The EU suggests that a right to explanation and right to contestation are intertwined, but that might not always be the case. Centralizing the right to contest—versus the right to meaningful explanation—
might address some of the purportedly irreconcilable challenges of blackbox AI, if an effective contestation scheme could be designed without necessarily opening the black box. One way to do so might be to give individuals performance metrics and allow contestation on the basis of disparate
impact on a particular group.533
Other questions, however, remain. What happens if there is a clear
tradeoff between affording a right to contest and accuracy? Or between
affording a right to contest and bias across a system? Again, these are problems for future researchers, but a look to the due process literature might
be informative.
CONCLUSION
Returning now to the International Baccalaureate students whose
story begins this Article, the importance of the right of contestation becomes clear. Writing in the Harvard Business Review, a parent of an IB student and two colleagues argue that the IBO should have designed a more
contestable process.534 “[Better design] is about making sure that people
understand what information is used in assessing grades and what the steps
are in the appeals process itself.”535 This argument invokes both dignity
(participation) and rule of law (transparency) values. In other words, people confronted with AI decision-making look for more transparency, more
explanation, and more participation: a right to contest.
There is a growing momentum around the world for establishing a
right to contest AI decisions. This right has an important role to play in
the United States, where it is not yet a meaningful part of policy conversations. A right to contest AI is both normatively desirable and practically
feasible. A right to contest could ameliorate the foreseeable harms of AI.

533. See Edwards & Veale, supra note 175, at 55–56 (explaining that performance metrics give information on a model’s unseen data, including breakdowns like success in certain
subcategories of data).
534. Evgeniou et al., supra note 45 (arguing that IBO should have created an easier
appeals process that offered human-led re-evaluation of grades).
535. Id.
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